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This thesis uses administrative data from the National Pupil Database (NPD) to examine
the phenomenon of ethnic sorting into English secondary schools. The thesis investigates
the contribution of parental decision-making to observed patterns of school segregation,
and also argues that sorting influences the efficacy of competition-based policies for ed-
ucational improvement.
Focusing upon three towns with ethnically-mixed populations in the North West of Eng-
land – Blackburn, Oldham and Preston – the thesis investigates the hypothesis that
segregation can be explained by the aggregate effect of individual choices. It is proposed
that parents’ preferences for the ethnic characteristics of school peer groups, and socio-
economic differences in parental regard for school test score performance, are important
factors in contributing to uneven sorting in schools. The impact of sorting on market
structure is also examined, both in relation to the amount of choice that parents en-
joy in segregated school markets, and the amount of competition that schools face from
neighbouring schools.
In order to study school choice in the three markets, the thesis develops a random utility
model for parental preferences, incorporating proximity, test scores, and preferences for
ethnic peer groups. However, data on individuals’ choice of school are lacking in England,
and data on pupil allocations from the NPD do not relate straightforwardly to preferences,
since popular schools have limited capacity. To deal with this limitation of the data, the
thesis adopts a structural game-theoretic model of two-sided matchings, and develops an
innovative method to estimate the parameters of the random utility model. In developing
the method the thesis considers the inferential properties – notably identification and
large-sample bias – of two-sided empirical models, and provides simulation evidence to
support the use of such models for estimation of preferences in large many-to-one markets.
The thesis contributes to the, hitherto primarily US-based, evidence on ethnic self-
segregation in schools. It concludes that there is robust evidence that preferences for
ethnic peer groups contribute to sorting in the markets studied. The thesis also presents
evidence that different socio-economic groups place different weight upon academic per-
formance when choosing a school. In relation to the effects of sorting on competition,
the thesis shows that peer preferences and sorting reduce the potential for schools to
compete on quality. Finally, the thesis concludes that preference-induced sorting not
only hinders the establishment of self-improving school markets, but also inhibits the
inter-group contact necessary for socially-cohesive, diverse communities to flourish.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A central concern of research in education has been the separation of children from differ-
ent ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds into different schools. The unbalanced sorting
or segregation of children into different schools is an important regularity in education
systems internationally. Sorting in schools is important for several reasons. First, and
perhaps most importantly, schools are intended to be places where children are socialised,
first mix with children of other families in a safe context, and learn about the diversity
of society and their place in it (Green et al., 2006). In this respect, segregated schools
have been blamed for perpetuating deep-rooted ethnic divisions in some communities in
the North of England, for example (cf. Cantle, 2001). It is argued that, if schools do
not allow the different socio-economic, ethnic and religious groups to come into contact
with each other, social cohesion is weakened, and inequalities and divisions of the current
generation are reproduced in a new generation.
This thesis is also concerned with another reason for studying sorting which has been
overlooked – the effect of segregated school demographics on the structure and function-
ing of school markets, both as sites for constructive competition, innovation, and the
raising of standards, and as facilitators of parental choice. Much theoretical and empir-
ical economic literature has drawn causal links between choice-based education policies
and sorting. However, usually the focus is upon policies as causes, and sorting as a conse-
quence. For example, economic models of voucher-based market reforms in the US have
shown that free markets in education can lead to cream-skimming and socio-economic
stratification (Epple and Romano, 2012a). It is also possible – as we intend in this thesis
11
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– to consider the ways in which pre-existing sorting affects the economic behaviour of
parents, and the consequent conduct of schools.
1.1 School choice and quasi-markets
Quite apart from their relevance for explaining sorting, school choice policies have, them-
selves, formed a central topic of education research. In the nearly thirty years since a
system of school choice was introduced in England in 1988, successive waves of reform
under different governments have continued to reconfigure the structure of the English ed-
ucation system around a quasi-market model. This process has paralleled diverse choice-
based reforms in other countries. Sweden and Chile have, since the 1980’s, implemented
systems incorporating substantial school autonomy, private providers and pupil-based
funding of schools. The US has experienced a variety of small and medium scale school
choice programmes. In England, reforms to the financial structure of the sector have not
gone as far as in some other countries, but successive waves of grant-maintained schools,
city technology colleges, foundation schools, academies and free schools have ensured
that in 2016 only 35% of secondary schools are under local authority control (Gee et al.,
2016).
This is not to say, however, that the dominance of school choice is uncontroversial.
Researchers and policy-makers have continued to debate the consequences of choice-
based reforms for welfare, standards, and social justice. Proponents of school choice tend
to rely on three rationales (Gibbons et al., 2006). The first is that parents know their
circumstances and their children’s needs better than the state, so allowing parents to
decide where their children are educated leads to improvements in allocative efficiency
and family welfare. The second argument supporting school choice is that choice will
impose market-like discipline, by inducing schools to compete for pupils, raising standards
and therefore improving outcomes at little cost. The third rationale for school choice is
that it will improve social mobility and reduce inequality by providing families an exit
from failing schools, and disrupting selection by mortgage whereby less aﬄuent families
tend to be priced out of neighbourhoods containing popular schools. These arguments
directly counter arguments that school choice creates sorting, by pointing out that sorting
is already present in the absence of choice.
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However, the actual causal mechanisms leading to sorting are not well understood. It
is clear that much of the imbalance of different groups in schools is due to imbalances
in the local demographics schools draw from. However, researchers disagree on whether
schools are more, or less segregated than their surrounding communities. Proponents of
school choice have argued that, where parents have choice, schools can be less segregated
than their communities. However, this does not appear to be borne out by research (eg.
Johnston et al., 2004, 2006; Burgess et al., 2005; Harris, 2010), which tends to show a
small but robust element of post-residential sorting.
Researchers also disagree on the relative contribution of choices and constraints in ex-
plaining observed patterns of post-residential sorting. Some argue that sorting is ex-
plained by the ways that different social and ethnic groups engage differently with the
choice process, whereas others argue that the different constraints different groups face, in
terms of admissions policies, travel and the location of good schools, are more important
for understanding patterns of sorting. The relative importance of these factors clearly
matters if we wish to study the effects of sorting on school choice and quasi-markets.
1.2 Preferences and sorting
One way to approach sorting, that avoids the dichotomy between choices and constraints
is to recognise that, in a quasi-market school system, all constraints facing a family can
be understood as the consequences of choices made elsewhere, and that these knock-on
effects can ultimately be traced back to the choices of other families. Even the strategic
actions of schools with regards to admissions policies, capacity and cream-skimming must
ultimately be explained as a response to the actual or expected behaviour of parents.
The various models linking parental preferences to sorting emphasise different decision
processes. Whilst much of the English sociological literature focuses on asymmetries of
information and social capital that disadvantage working class groups in the admissions
process (eg. Ball, 1993), economic models (and the rational choice strand in sociology)
tend to focus upon the influence of economic factors on the importance accorded to
school performance relative to proximity and convenience (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1996).
However, a largely overlooked dimension of parental choice, at least in the English quan-
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titative vein, is the possibility that parents actually have preferences for sorting per se;
that is, that the criteria parents use to select a school include, amongst others, the com-
position of each school and the likely socio-economic and ethnic characteristics of their
child’s future peer group.
In the US, on the other hand, there are several studies that have economically mod-
elled the consequences of peer preferences for sorting (eg. Clotfelter, 1976; Caetano and
Maheshri, 2013). In the study of ethnic segregation, for example, it is widely recog-
nised that a significant factor in the severe ethnic segregation of some communities and
schools is the reluctance of white families to remain in schools and neighbourhoods when
the proportion of minority ethnic groups becomes subjectively large. The phenomenon of
white families deserting schools and neighbourhoods, known as “white flight” (Clotfelter,
1976) came to prominence as a result of the de-segregation policies of the 1970’s, and
has been incorporated into economic models of tipping dynamics to explain long-term
sorting processes. This thesis posits that parental decision-making is the basic unit of
analysis for understanding the existence of segregation and the effects of segregation on
quasi-markets.
1.3 Substantive research questions
In relation to the English secondary school sector, the thesis is concerned with two
very well-studied phenomena: school segregation and the structure of educational quasi-
markets. However, despite the abundance of studies approaching either or both of these
topics, there is a scarcity of studies, especially in the UK, that make explicit the role of
parental preferences in both explaining and linking these phenomena. One of the reasons
for this scarcity is the lack of good data on preferences, as discussed below.
We are interested in the ways that realistic models of school decision-making set up in-
tractable, self-reinforcing dynamics of segregation that problematise the posited compet-
itive mechanisms underlying secondary school markets. Our main focus is the hypothesis
that parents take into account the prospective ethnic peer groups of their children, and
the role of these peer preferences in contributing to ethnic (self-)segregation. We also
investigate preferences for “quality” which are vital to quasi-market arguments and, fol-
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lowing the lead of other studies (eg. Hastings et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2014), we ask
whether these preferences are moderated by socio-economic status.
With regards to these hypothesised choice phenomena, the thesis asks three questions:
1. What is the relative importance of heterogeneous preferences for academic perfor-
mance and peer groups, in the choice of school, relative to school proximity and
other school characteristics?
2. How do these heterogeneous preferences affect the short- and long-run dynamics of
sorting in English secondary schools?
3. What is the long-run effect of these preferences on both the amount of school choice
parents enjoy, and the competitive pressures schools face?
The ordering of these questions is important: understanding preferences sheds light on
the dynamics of sorting; understanding the dynamics of sorting sheds light on the struc-
ture and efficacy of secondary school markets. To answer the first question requires
a quantitative assessment of the weightings of decision-criteria in school choice. This
in turn allows us to populate the parameters of economic models for the prediction of
aggregate effects of individual choice.
Although socio-economic differences in school choice are considered, the focus of the thesis
is on ethnic sorting and the preferences that lead to this. Whilst the literature on sorting
in the US tends to focus on ethnic segregation, the focus in England is usually much
more upon socio-economic or class stratification. This difference of emphasis reflects the
fact that ethnic segregation in the UK is not nearly as pronounced or as deeply rooted
as in the US. In England, the minority ethnic population is a much smaller proportion of
the population, and it is only in some urban areas that the minority ethnic population
reaches large enough numbers for sorting to even be a meaningful concept.
However, the geographical clustering of minority ethnic communities means that there
are places in England where ethnic segregation in schools is a significant phenomenon.
Where present, the separation of pupils into different schools along ethnic lines, and the
interaction of this with socio-economic sorting, sets up patterns of mutual self-segregation
that may arguably be more intractable than the more widespread sorting along class lines.
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These research questions are motivated partly by a concern that under different be-
havioural assumptions, quasi-market mechanisms may not work as advertised, and may
even be damaging to standards and social mobility. There is necessarily an element of
harshness to quasi-market reforms; in order for them to work, schools (and therefore
school staff, leaders, and pupils) must be put under pressure to perform, or face the
threat of closure. If this is the best way to improve standards and align educational
offerings to parents’ wishes then this pressure is justified; however, if school systems are
such that some schools are unfairly doomed to failure, then much disruption and suffering
may be caused for no good purpose. If “failing” schools are predominantly those that
serve less aﬄuent communities, the disruption may serve to worsen, rather than improve,
social mobility and equity.
1.4 Methodology
In order to obtain estimates of both socio-economically and ethnically heterogeneous
preferences, a repeated cross-section of three separate urban school markets is used from
the NPD. The three markets are Oldham, Preston, and Blackburn – all in the North West
of England. These markets are selected for socio-economically and ethnically diverse
patterns of mixing and sorting and a recent history of market-based structural changes.
The primary empirical task in this thesis is the estimation of the relative weightings of
different criteria in the decision-making of parents about secondary schools. Econometric
models of behaviour within the structural tradition are ideal for this task. The basic
idea behind structural models is that empirically-estimable parameters in the statistical
model correspond to theoretical parameters in a counterpart economic model of decision-
making. These parameter values, once estimated, can be used to mechanistically predict
the consequences of counterfactual scenarios.
The most commonly-used structural econometric models are discrete-choice Random Util-
ity Models (RUMs), for the estimation of criteria weightings using data relating observed
choices to observable characteristics of the chooser and the options to be chosen from.
The name random utility model stems from the parametrisation of choice functions in
terms of latent decision-utilities. Choosers are assumed to select the option from which
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they receive the greatest utility. This is the strategy adopted in the thesis, gathering rich
data on school and pupil characteristics from the National Pupil Database (NPD).
However, one of the reasons for the scarcity of studies explicitly modelling preferences
is that data on pupil preferences or choices is rarely available. With school allocations
data the unconstrained choice of each family is not observed, which hinders the clean
identification of utility weightings. To this end we develop a new structural model equat-
ing observed school allocations to the stable equilibria of two-sided matching games.
This structural methodology draws on the theory of stable matchings (Gale and Shapley,
1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990), and derives an incomplete structural model for the
identification of choice parameters. The incompleteness of the model is considered and
conditions for the consistency of estimates obtained from it are conjectured. Through
this model, using some justifiable assumptions about the allocation process and the lim-
iting behaviour of stable matchings, we can estimate the parameters of random utility
models for parental preferences that are economically equivalent to parameters estimated
from straightforward revealed choice data.
To answer the second and third research questions requires prediction of aggregate pat-
terns of demand for schools based on underlying demographics and counterfactual school
characteristics. The main feature of the structural modelling approach is that the eco-
nomic interpretation of estimated choice models is used to validate out-of-sample pre-
dictions made using them. Thus an estimated RUM can be used to predict aggregate
demand in counterfactual scenarios in which exogenous features of the data have been
manipulated. This feature is useful for both the prediction of long-run sorting dynamics,
and the analysis of market structure based on cross-derivatives of aggregate demand.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
The thesis deals with both substantive and methodological subject matter in fairly equal
measure, the methodological content forming a parallel and not subsidiary part of the
thesis’s original contribution. A slightly unusual feature of the structure of the thesis is
that, in order to maintain the flow of the development of the substantive investigation,
discussion of and motivation of the methodological approach is dealt with lightly during
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the first few chapters. After the substantive investigation is complete, we then return to
more fully motivate and describe the methods that have been developed as part of the
thesis.
Chapter 2 surveys the current state of the fields of school segregation and school choice
policy, both in England and internationally. The literature on socio-economic and ethnic
sorting is reviewed. It is argued that, rather than treating each possible dimension of
sorting independently, it is useful to consider generalised causal models of sorting. A
framework is posited for the analysis of the causes of sorting. The chapter also discusses
the theoretical, empirical, and structural literature on the effectiveness of educational
quasi-markets, arguing that structural approaches, based on models of parental choice,
bridge the gap between “black-box” empirical analyses and uncalibrated theoretical mod-
els. After this, Chapters 3 and 4 describe, motivate and explore the sample of pupils
from three towns in the North West of England. Chapter 4 investigates the question of
whether sorting in the sample is post-residential and uses Herfindahl and Dissimilarity
indices to provide an initial analysis of market structure. It is argued that methods that
do not explicitly model underlying decision-making are limited in their ability to explain
observed regularities.
Chapter 5 describes the structural model to be used, motivating and comparing this with
reference to standard discrete choice models, and lists several specifications of school
and pupil covariates to be estimated. Chapter 6 presents the estimated models. After
estimating models of parental decision-making, in Chapter 7 these are put to use to study
sorting dynamics and the influence of preferences on market structure. It is argued that
models of individual decision-making uniquely offer insights into the operation and likely
long-run effectiveness of education markets. This completes the substantive investigation.
Chapters 8 and 9 return to methodological considerations: Chapter 8 introduces the
theory of stable matchings, and reviews the usefulness of this theory for developing
structural econometric models of two-sided markets. The theory also has considerable
substantive interest in relation to school choice policy and the design of markets, and
these are discussed. Chapter 9 builds upon the theory of stable matchings to investigate
the inferential properties of empirical models of two-sided matchings. Issues relating to
bias and identification are thoroughly investigated using simulations, and it is argued
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that despite these issues it is still possible to obtain practically useful inferences using
incomplete structural models based upon stable matching theory. We return to the
stability likelihood method developed for the substantive investigation, comparing it to
similar methods and explaining how it is used in computation. Finally, Chapter 10 draws
conclusions from both the substantive and methodological strands of the thesis.
Chapter 2
School choice, quasi-markets and
segregation
Within the field of school choice research, two overarching themes stand out. The first
is concerned with the distribution of social groups within schools, and asks whether
unevenness exists, making the distribution of school demographics unbalanced on socio-
economic, ethnic, religious or other measures. This unevenness is usually called segre-
gation, stratification or sorting. One strand of this research programme examines the
causes of segregation, whilst a second strand examines the effects of segregation on out-
comes such as test scores, attitudes and employment to determine whether sorting leads
to disadvantage for certain groups of children, or all children.
The second theme is concerned with the evaluation of policies that seek to liberalise
the administration of school allocations, usually accompanied by the decentralisation of
school administration and funding. Work within this theme includes economic models
and empirical studies that seek to link liberalisation to desirable outcomes by invoking
arguments that link competition and market-like forces to performance and efficiency, and
studies that criticise these arguments. The implications of liberalisation for segregation
and equity are also central to arguments on both sides of this debate.
The first part of this chapter reviews the literature on sorting between schools. After
enumerating the various dimensions along which segregation has been studied, a frame-
work is developed for navigation and analysis of the literature relating to the causes of
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school segregation. The second part surveys the theory and practice of school choice
policies in the UK and internationally. The concept of a school choice policy is dissected,
before reviewing the literature assessing the effectiveness of school choice reforms, both
from a theoretical and empirical approach.
2.1 School choice and segregation
A major theme within the school choice literature is the existence of uneven school popu-
lations, or segregation. Segregation in school populations may refer to ethnic segregation,
such has been the focus of many studies in the US since the 1960s (see, for example Cole-
man, 1966), or socio-economic, or “class”, segregation, as has been emphasised in the UK
context since the mid-1990s (see Gorard (1999) for a review of the early work). Within
the latter category, the UK sociological literature has tended to focus on explanations in-
volving theories of class and various kinds of social capital, building upon the theoretical
framework of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Ball, 1993, 2003), whilst
within the economics literature segregation on income, wealth or occupational status has
been emphasised. Gibbons and Telhaj (2007) study a different dimension of sorting,
sorting by ability, arguing that the “real consideration that seems to be at the back of
most parents’ and pupils’ minds is ability stratification”(Gibbons and Telhaj, 2007, Exec.
Summary). They argue that the important aspect of segregation is the extent to which
it creates hierarchical relations between schools on measurable aspects of performance,
and that the most important cause of this is disparities in intake ability.
Another overlooked dimension of sorting, particularly in UK studies of ethnic segregation,
is religion. While there appears to be a dearth of literature explicitly focussing on
religious stratification, ethnographic studies such as Byrne and de Tona (2014) report
that in parental discourse, ethnic differences are often a shorthand for, or conflated with,
religious differences. Whilst this dimension of difference was absent from the original
twentieth century debates on racial segregation in the US, this distinction may have
increased in importance on both sides of the Atlantic as a consequence of the increasing
role of religion in debates around immigration and multiculturalism.
However, a closer reading of the literature reveals that none of these dimensions of segre-
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gation can be comfortably treated in isolation. In most contexts, the particular histories
of colonial and post-colonial migration dictate the form of relations between ethnicity
and economic prosperity. Likewise, socio-economic status is strongly correlated with in-
take ability, whilst ethnic groups appear to differ in their attitudes towards academic
success and consequent attainment. For example, Burgess (2014) provide evidence that
minority ethnic children make greater progress at school than other groups. Part of the
difficulty in separating these dimensions of segregation lies in the analytical inadequacy
of the concepts of ethnicity, class and socio-economic status themselves as simplifications
of a more complex set of individual affiliations.
For this reason, before focusing on ethnic segregation and socio-economic segregation
in turn, we will develop a framework for the analysis of segregation in schools that
is agnostic with regards to the typology used. This approach highlights the common
elements running across the analysis of different kinds of segregation, whilst avoiding the
reification of one way of categorising children.
In elucidating this causal framework, we will give examples of how different sub-disciplines
have emphasised different parts of the causal model, and also how studies focusing upon
different sorting typologies tend to focus on different causes. The framework is causal in
that it attempts to comprehensively enumerate all of the most important variables that
lead to segregation in school populations, and should be applicable in most contexts,
although not all variables will be relevant in all contexts.
Figure 2.1 represents the framework diagrammatically. The model is constructed around
two dichotomies that arise frequently, either implicitly or explicitly, in the school choice
literature. The first is the dichotomy between choices and constraints, as described by
Dorsett (1998) in relation to residential sorting; that is, those causes of segregation that
relate to parental choices, and those causes that relate to the nature of the school system
and the scarcity of supply. This is almost, but not quite, equivalent to the economic
distinction of demand-side and supply-side factors. The difference is that factors, such
as informational asymmetries, which act on the demand side but cannot be thought of
as choices, here are categorised as constraints.
The second dichotomy is the distinction between residential causes of segregation and
post-residential causes. Post-residential sorting is sorting that cannot be explained by
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where families live; it includes the influence of choices parents make, and constraints
upon those choices, once residential abode is fixed. The residential and post-residential
stage can be thought of as sequential points in time at which decisions are made. The
residential decision is made first, and home location may be thought of as, in most cases,
exogenous at the point the formal school choice process begins. There is considerable vari-
ation in the relative timing of these housing and schooling decisions (Allen et al., 2010).
Clearly this decision has an important bearing on subsequent school choice decisions.
However, the availability of good schools and school catchments also has an important
bearing on residential decisions for many home-buyers. Gibbons et al. (2013) and Machin
and Salvanes (2016) have shown that the quality of nearby schools is taken account of
in the price of some types of family house. In the US, where neighbourhood schooling
is the norm, studies have tended to focus on residential choice within so-called Tiebout
models (Tiebout, 1956), as a proxy for direct school choice. This evidence suggests that
residential decisions already incorporate school decision-making, and therefore consider-
ing only post-residential sorting as being related to “school choice” risks underestimating
the important contribution of schooling to patterns of sorting.
In fact, a feature of the framework is that very few of its elements can be causally isolated
from each other, and any of its elements can be modelled as endogenous with respect
to other elements. Most importantly, whilst it is possible to model the factors we have
labelled constraints as exogenous features of the context, more accurately they are usually
created as a result of the choices of others. At the simplest level, with fixed school supply,
each person’s choice to express a preference for a given school will make another student
less likely to obtain a place at that school. At the next level of sophistication capacities
and even the entry and exit of schools from the market may be modelled as endogenous
outcomes of the operation of market-like mechanisms, with schools treated as strategic
agents with their own incentives. At the highest level, in so-called political economy
models, the legal, fiscal and administrative structure of the market may be considered as
the equilibrium outcome of the competing incentives of parents-as-voters.
An aspect of the relationship between choices and constraints that has perhaps been
overlooked, is the extent to which parents may approve of and even prefer schools that
manifest certain barriers to entry. Usually in economic models of school choice, parents
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are assumed to be indifferent with regards to school admissions policies (and other school-
level constraints such as capacity control); they obviously prefer that their child be able
to access as many schools as possible, but they do not have preferences with regards
to the admissions constraints per se. However, what little evidence there is suggests
that parents do positively value certain kinds of admissions constraints, and will vote to
maintain selection policies that are threatened such as, for example, selection by ability
in grammar schools (Smithers and Wainwright, 2000). Sociologist Richard Ball makes
this point forcibly:
“For some consumers the point about choice is that they ‘require’ exclusivity
and/or performance advantage. . . The sort of schooling they value is that
sort which is difficult to get into and which produces superior performance
outcomes.”(Ball, 1993, p12)
Falabella et al. (2014) provide international evidence from Finland and Chile, countries
with liberalised school markets, that suggests that parents in those countries explicitly
value schools that set up barriers to entry. This kind of behaviour is difficult to explain
using current economic models.
With regards to parental choices, the most direct way in which the aggregate decisions of
parents may cause sorting is if parents have preferences for sorting per se. For example,
parents may prefer schools where a greater proportion of the students belong to their
child’s in-group. More controversially, parents may have negative preferences for certain
other groups, or parents may even prefer schools with a smaller proportion of their own
group.
Within parental choices, it is not only preferences for peer groups that can lead to
segregation. If different social groups have different preferences for some school charac-
teristic this may also lead to sorting. Therefore, any systematic between-group variation
in preferences may lead to segregation of groups between schools. The main examples
of preference differentials that have been studied in the literature are group-moderated
preferences for quality and distance to school. Within the sociological literature, there
has been an emphasis, as far as heterogeneous preferences are concerned, on the way
that social class moderates the overall importance given to school choice, so that lower-
SES families will be more likely to choose the neighbourhood school as a default option
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(Taylor, 2002). Evidence from qualitative interviews (Taylor, 2002) also suggests that
lower-SES groups are more likely to take the preferences of their children into account.
A final hypothesis within the remit of parental choice is that some parents “internalise”
externally-imposed limitations on their choice set, and post-rationalise decisions that
have been made with these limitations in mind. In this way, even choices can be seen
to be causally dependent upon constraints. To the extent that there is a group differen-
tial in constraints, there may also be differentials in constraint internalisation leading to
sorting.
Under the heading of constraints, arguably the most important constraint in the UK
is house prices. Parents cannot exercise choice of school if they do not live within the
catchment areas of their preferred schools. As mentioned previously, Machin and Salvanes
(2016) and other authors have robustly estimated a quite large capitalisation of school
quality in the market prices of houses within the relevant (de facto) catchment areas.
As for post-residential constraints, most of these relate to supply-side factors that may
be, to a greater or lesser extent, within the control of individual schools. Some types
of school, including Academies, Free Schools and Voluntary Aided schools, act as their
own admissions authorities and can set admissions policies for over-subscription within
the Admissions Code. Other schools may not set their own admissions policies, but their
Local Authority-mandated admissions policies still constitute constraints on parental
choice if the school is over-subscribed.
Apart from admissions policies, other factors within a school’s control include the school’s
overall intake capacity and the school’s marketing strategy. It has also been argued
(Office of the Children’s Commissioner, 2014) that some schools have subtle means of
exclusion by, for example, maintaining expensive school uniform policies, or minimising
their provision for Special Educational Needs and Disabilities (SEND). Capacity control
is an important factor in school choice constraint, as even community-controlled schools
have some discretion over the size of their intake. If a school is oversubscribed, the
decision to grow involves commitments to invest in capital (extra buildings) and labour
(extra teachers) that are inherently risky in the face of uncertain future demand. Allen
and Burgess (2010) look at data on high-performing, low-performing and middling schools
over a ten-year period, and find that high-performing schools grew by on average 10.3
Chapter 2. School choice, quasi-markets and segregation 26
per cent, whereas middling schools grew only slightly less rapidly at 7.0 per cent. This
suggests that school incentives to grow are not strongly linked to performance.
What is more, it is often the case that popular schools enjoy some sort of comparative
advantage in terms of intake, where – either as a result of geographical, faith, or academic
selection – these schools’ intakes consist to a greater degree of pupils who have better
prior attainment, more supportive family envionments and/or better behaviour than
surrounding schools. For such schools, any increase in capacity would risk diluting this
comparative advantage.
Given the riskiness of increasing supply to match demand, it would be unsurprising if
some popular schools chose not to grow, but instead to use their popularity to “cream-
skim” their applicants to obtain an intake that is both easy to teach and likely to cast the
school in a good light. Although cream-skimming is widely discussed in the literature
on school choice, there is very little quantitative evidence that schools systematically
strategically select students (Office of the Children’s Commissioner, 2014; Coldron et al.,
2008). On the other hand, there is also little evidence that popular schools make an
effort to match supply to demand. Finally, the limited amount and quality of information
parents receive to inform school choice constitutes a constraint that affects all parents to
a greater or lesser degree.
2.1.1 Horizontal vs. vertical sorting
The preceding section articulated an analytical framework for school sorting anchored
by two dichotomies: choice vs constraints; and residential vs. post-residential. A final
dichotomy, which will be very useful in analysing sorting and segregation is one which
bases its typology on the desires and intentions of members of two groups who are sorted.
Assuming, for the moment, that agents have conscious preferences and intentions with
regards to sorting (i.e. peer preferences), we can ask whether sorting is driven primarily
by one group’s preferences for sorting, or both groups’ preferences. If it is the former,
we can ask whether the “passive” group is ambivalent, or actually has preferences for
integration.
Clearly these two scenarios have very different implications for those concerned and for
policy-makers. In a scenario where one group prefers separation, but the second group
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Figure 2.1: Diagram of the causal factors associated with sorting in schools. Choices are those
factors where sorting arises as a consequence of the aggregate decisions of parents, whereas con-
straints describe barriers to choice that unequally affect different groups, leading to sorting. The
further distinction between residential and post-residential causes acknowledges that much sort-
ing in schools is caused by underlying sorting in communities, but that schools are themselves a
contributory factor in residential sorting.
wants to integrate, sorting will only arise if the first group has some means to exclude
the second group from its favoured schools. Such means may include house prices or
admissions policies. In contrast, if both groups prefer sorting, then sorting may arise
without constraints, and may be difficult to remedy without somehow changing people’s
preferences. To distinguish between these two situations we will call sorting arising
from mutual peer-preferences “horizontal” sorting, and sorting arising from one-sided
preferences “vertical” sorting. Rather than being a dichotomy, it is more accurate to
describe this dimension as a continuum, since the extent to which each group prefers
separation or integration is continuous.
The next two sections apply the framework to the literature on socio-economic sorting,
and then ethnic sorting, highlighting the way that focusing on different dimensions of
segregation invokes different emphasis on causes, particularly the relative importance
accorded to horizontal and vertical sorting.
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2.1.2 Socio-economic or class segregation
There is a large literature on class segregation in England’s schools. A central concern of
this literature has been the evaluation of the effect of school choice on class segregation,
since the introduction of school choice in the late 1980’s (e.g. Ball, 1993; Gorard, 1999).
A feature of the sociological tradition at least since Ball (1993) has been the de-emphasis
of explicit preferences, in favour of a focus on class differentials in capability to make
effective choices. Although preferences are implicit in much of the literature (especially
the preference of higher-SES groups not to mix with lower-SES groups), the central
argument in the sociological tradition seems to have been of school choice as a “game” at
which more privileged groups have an unfair advantage. Whilst higher-SES groups are
sophisticated choosers, lower-SES groups are forced to settle, and post-rationalise their
constrained choices, leading to unreliable reports of satisfaction.
This research inherently imposes a vertical model of peer preferences, where higher-SES
groups seek to exclude lower-SES groups, but lower-SES groups are implicitly assumed to
be either ambivalent or have an underlying wish to assimilate. In contrast, the rational
choice strand championed by Breen and Goldthorpe (1996) suggested that parents have
similar underlying preferences, but face very different risks and uncertainty and, begin-
ning from different reference levels, frame the same outcomes in very different ways.
2.1.3 Ethnicity and segregation
The body of literature examining ethnically segregated schools in England is smaller
than that for class segregation. Within the qualitative sociological tradition there is a
considerable overlap with the work on class segregation in school. During the last ten
years Diane Reay, especially, has focused on the intersection of class and ethnicity in
school choice (Reay et al., 2007; Reay, 2008) (cf. Weekes-Bernard, 2007). Bridget Byrne
and Carla de Tona, on the other hand, specifically investigate the role of ethnicity, and
explicit preferences for ethnic mix, in school choice (Byrne and de Tona, 2014).
More demographically-oriented literature such as Johnston et al. (2004), Burgess et al.
(2005), Johnston et al. (2006) and Harris (2010) has attempted to quantify the extent of
ethnic segregation in England, and answer the question: how much of ethnic segregation
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in schools is additional to that which can be explained by residential segregation?
Johnston et al. (2004) plot “concentration profiles” that show different levels of segre-
gation for different ethnic groups, and substantial regional variation. In general, Asian
students (predominantly south Asian – Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi) are more con-
centrated into segregated schools than black students. Nationally, about 35% of Asian
students are enrolled in schools where at least 50% of the students are Asian, whilst only
about 10% of black students are in schools where black students are a majority (Johnston
et al., 2004, Figure 5). Whilst the novel use of concentration profiles displays a lot of
information, Johnston et al. have not compared each ethnicity’s concentration profile to
a reference concentration profile that it might have if students were allocated randomly.
These reference profiles would depend upon each ethnicity’s proportion of the total popu-
lation, and their absence means that it is not easy to compare the levels of segregation of
different ethnicities. Nor have they attempted to separate the segregation resulting from
uneven residential distribution from post-residential segregation. The latter is arguably
of more importance in studying school segregation.
Burgess et al. (2005) calculate Indices of Dissimilarity (ID) and Isolation (II) for both
secondary schools and census wards (a geographical unit of analysis), and compare these
nationally and by LEA. They find marginally higher levels of segregation, as measured
by these indices, in schools than wards. In common with Johnston et al., they find that
post-residential segregation is more associated with communities where south Asians are
numerous, than communities where blacks are numerous. The study highlights the diffi-
culty of comparing residential segregation to school segregation, since the two are based
upon very different areal units. School segregation is implicitly based upon catchment
areas as areal units, but these are not directly measurable, usually overlap each other,
and are endogeneous with respect to preferences. In addition, they point out that there
are on average twice as many wards per LEA as schools, and cite Massey and Denton
(1988, p299), advising that “smaller areal units generally produce higher indices of segre-
gation because they are more homogeneous.” This fact is used to argue that, if anything,
their method underestimates additional post-residential segregation.
Acknowledging this difficulty, Johnston et al. (2006) compare two levels of schooling
(Primary and Secondary) to several layers of geographical aggregation (output areas,
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and lower- and middle-layer super output areas). Rather than using indices to measure
segregation, they classify both schools and areas into types depending upon the propor-
tions of whites and ethnic minorities. Types I and II correspond to units where whites
form a majority of more than 80% and 50-80% respectively. In type III and IV units,
whites form a minority of 30-50% and less than 30% of the population, but no other
ethnic group dominates. In type V units, whites form less than 30% of the population
and some other single ethnic group forms a majority. In the tables they produce by each
unit, it is clear that ethnic minorities are much more likely to be enrolled in a type IV or
V school than they are to be living in a type IV or V neighbourhood. However, although
Johnston et al. provide more options than Burgess et al., they do not get around the
problem of incommensurate units of analysis. This pitfall will affect any measure of seg-
regation that is used to compare schools to residential areas on different units, whether it
be an index, a graph or a set of categories. In order to overcome this problem, it is neces-
sary to either compare school to residential segregation on the same units (which would
have to be school catchment areas) or to model the process of education decision-making
itself.
Allen (2007) overcomes the incomparability of units by comparing observed Indices of
Dissimilarity at schools, to those computed under a counterfactual where all pupils are
allocated using a proximity rule. Allen finds evidence of post-residential segregation,
especially in those schools designated own-admissions authorities.
A common feature of these studies is the finding that ethnic segregation is not a nationally
homogeneous phenomenon, but depends strongly on local contexts, and manifests itself
differently in different areas. A primary observation is that, in most rural and suburban
areas – in fact the majority of areas – ethnic minorities do not reach large enough
concentrations for ethnic segregation to be apparent in schools. This is because on
a larger geographical scale the UK’s population is highly segregated, and most of the
ethnic minority population is concentrated into a few towns and cities. In localities with
smaller concentrations of ethnic minorities, it is not possible for ethnic minorities to reach
a critical mass to form a majority in any school. It is not clear whether ethnic segregation
still tends to occur in the sense that ethnic minorities form a larger minority in some
schools than others, but given that in the country as a whole ethnic minorities form about
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20% of the population (Office for National Statistics, 2016) this micro-clustering would be
difficult to measure using indices and would have negligible impact on school populations.
In spite of this, there appears to be a generalised perception that ethnic segregation
is ubiquitous, even (or especially) in areas with very low ethnic minority populations.
Johnston et al. (2008, p.88) observe that “the perception of increased segregation appears
to be based on more extreme (or localised) cases than on typical experience.”
In areas with substantial minority populations Burgess et al. (2005) find that the specifics
of segregation, and post-residential school segregation in particular, depend not only on
the ethnic mix of the locality but also on the details of each specific situation. For
example, they found that towns in the North of England – Oldham, Blackburn and
Bradford – tended to have higher levels of segregation (both residential and school)
than other areas with comparable ethnic minority populations such as Birmingham and
Slough. They also found that London Boroughs tended to have higher levels of post-
residential segregation. This perhaps reflects the combination of greater density of schools
in the capital, and the greater residential costs, lowering the cost of travelling to school
relative to moving house, so that ethnic peer preferences for schools are less likely to
be already incorporated into residential choice. Johnston et al. (2007) study ethnic
segregation in two towns with substantial minority populations, Bradford and Leicester,
with very different outcomes in terms of attitudes and performance.
The effects of ethnically segregated schools are also geographically differentiated. In 2001
Oldham, Burnley and Bradford suffered riots motivated by grievances related to ethnic
divisions. In the wake of the Bradford riots, both the Ouseley Report (Ouseley, 2001)
and the Cantle Report (Cantle, 2001) stressed the importance of schools in perpetuat-
ing cultural isolation. Ouseley (2001) strongly criticised schools for their role in this,
advocating “confronting all-white and/or all-Muslim schools about their contribution, or
rather lack of contribution, to social and racial integration” (Ouseley, 2001, p.1). How-
ever, they also acknowledged that parental choices had a role in school segregation and
that many schools were “racially self-segregated” (Ouseley, 2001, p.16). Cantle (2001)
emphasised the role of mono-cultural schools in failing to promote ethnic integration,
and focussed on faith-based admissions criteria as an example of policies that exacerbate
polarisation of intakes.
Chapter 2. School choice, quasi-markets and segregation 32
The case of ethnic tension leading to civil unrest in northern towns, notably Bradford,
Burnley, and Oldham begs an explanation that goes beyond ethnicity, since towns in
other areas with similar ethnic demographics do not face all of the same problems. An
explanation must take account of the economic history of the region during the twentieth
century. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
In other areas with large ethnic minority populations, the relationship between ethnicity
and school choices is more complex. Byrne and de Tona (2014) explore the complex-
ities of preferences for multi-culturalism and ethnic mix of parents of different ethnic
backgrounds three areas of Manchester. In face-to-face interviews, they obtain candid
reflections on parents’ incorporation of “the ethnic mix” into school decision-making.
They find that considering ethnicity alongside other demographics such as economic and
occupational background is ubiquitous, but that variations emerge depending on the
outlook of the parents. Some white parents express concerns about the dilution of what
they consider to be traditional British values such as teaching Christian festivals (al-
though Byrne and de Tona note that there is no evidence that this belief is justified). In
contrast, more liberal white parents actively seek out ethnically-mixed schools as they
perceive mixing with other cultures to be beneficial for their children. Byrne and de Tona
find that ethnic minority parents also tend to prefer ethnically-mixed schools where their
children are not in a very small minority. They similarly perceive that ethnic mixing
is good for their own children, but also express the opinion that it is good for other
ethnicities (especially white children, who are nationally the most isolated ethnic group)
to mix with their children. What is striking is that in general parents interviewed by
Byrne and de Tona do not profess to be “colour-blind” in choosing schools, but rather to
take race and ethnicity (and class) into account in finely differentiated ways.
Studies of the extent of, and the effects of ethnic segregation on school populations
have a much longer pedigree in the US than in the UK. Until the 1950’s several US
states operated de jure racially segregated school systems in which black children were
not allowed to attend schools reserved for white children. When this state of affairs
was successfully challenged in Brown vs. Board of Education in 1954 (Clotfelter, 2001),
many studies asked whether the end of official segregation would lead naturally to de-
segregation, and what the effects of (de-)segregation on outcomes for both black and
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white children might be (Coleman, 1966; Rivkin, 1994).
In the years following Brown, and in the light of evidence (Coleman, 1966) that segregated
schools would lead to inherently unequal outcomes, many states implemented mandatory
de-segregation policies, which usually included “busing” black students many miles to
attend schools in predominantly white areas. In addition to the econometric literature
on the effects of segregation, other studies (Clotfelter, 1976; Rivkin, 1994) examined
the long-term trends in segregation to determine if court-mandated de-segregation was
working. It was noticed that de-segregation policies appeared to be accompanied by an
increase in enrolments of white pupils into the private sector, and also patterns of net
migration of white families away from districts with integrated schools, a phenomenon
which became known popularly as “white flight” (Clotfelter, 1976).
2.2 Markets, quasi-markets and performance
The second major strand in school choice literature is the analysis and evaluation of school
choice from a policy perspective, with a particular focus on the potential for school choice
deregulation to create benefits similar to those attributed to the operation of markets:
greater choice for the consumer; more efficient allocation of resources; improved school
conduct and greater productivity.
Obtaining an overview of academic work in this field is challenging. Much of the difficulty
stems from the diversity of geographic and political contexts under which school choice
deregulation has been debated, and the many policy variables (not to mention cultural
and economic differences) that make comparison between any two contexts problematic.
For example, empirical estimates of the effect of greater choice on school performance
in England, which operates a constrained hybrid quasi-market, will not be comparable
to estimates obtained using similar methods in Chile, which operates a fully deregulated
voucher system.
In very broad terms, school choice systems can be split into three categories: fixed
allocations; quasi-markets (Le Grand et al., 2008); and full markets. In a fixed-allocation
system, which is usually, but not always, a neighbourhood-schooling system, parents
have no choice and children are allocated to schools by local authorities. An example
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of a fixed-allocations system which was not a neighbourhood-schooling system was the
bused desegregation system of the 1960’s and 1970’s in the US.
In a quasi-market, parents are allowed to express a preference for any school, and this
is usually coupled with supply-side reforms to allow schools to expand and diversify to
meet demand. School funding is dependent to some extent on enrolments, so that schools
have incentives to attract pupils. Quasi-markets are differentiated from markets by the
fact that school funding is set by the government rather than being determined by the
market. In full markets, in contrast, each school has some degree of freedom to set
its own prices. The prices schools charge will then, at least under ideal conditions, be
determined by a competitive equilibrium. This does not preclude public subsidy of the
cost of education, but usually in full markets parents may bear at least part of the cost
of their children’s education. Note that the term “voucher” system, which is often used
in discussion of school choice policy, may denote either a full or quasi-market system.
The important aspect is whether or not schools are allowed to charge top-up fees.
Although these categories are broad, many countries operate systems that combine ele-
ments from each of them. For example, the allocation system in the UK is a quasi-market,
since parents have a right to express preferences for any school, and schools have some
freedom to expand to meet demand. However, the quasi-market co-exists with a small
fee-paying private sector. In other ways, the UK system operates in practice more like
a fixed-allocation system, as supply-side constraints mean that pupils often end up in
a local school regardless of their preferences. Fixed-cost funding and smoothed income
streams also dilute the effect of per-pupil funding on schools’ incentives. Likewise, the
US system is differentiated at a state, and even at a county level, with several small-scale
voucher programmes (around 65 according to Epple and Romano (2012a)). However, the
predominant system throughout the US is a fixed-allocation system, with a large private
sector and some open-enrolment “magnet schools”.
The main research question in this strand of the literature is whether moving from
fixed-allocation to market-like systems (either quasi-markets or markets) improves school
conduct and performance. Debates around the level of state intervention in school choice
are as old as state-funded education itself. As early as 1859 John Stuart Mill advocated
that the government should “leave to parents to obtain the education where and how
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they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees.”(Mill, 1859; Scarre,
2007). In many countries the introduction of universal free education was accompanied
by centralisation of allocative decisions based on local districts. In common with other
aspects of the welfare state, such as healthcare, in Western countries the idea of choice
as a driver for improvement in standards appears to have gained prominence only after
the fixed-allocations system was well-established.
2.2.1 Theoretical economic arguments for choice
An early proponent of the marketisation of school allocations was Milton Friedman (Fried-
man, 1955, 1962), who argued for a voucher-based full market system. Economic argu-
ments in favour of choice, in the form of full or quasi-markets for education, gained
popularity in the US during the next thirty years (Jencks, 1966; Levin, 1968; Coons and
Sugarman, 1978). Since the early 1990’s the field of school choice has developed along-
side, and usually lagging slightly behind, developing political rhetoric. Perhaps the first
big development in the 1990’s was a cluster of quantitative theoretical studies, building
increasingly sophisticated economic models of school choice. Manski (1992) provided a
forceful argument for this academic effort, frustrated that, as he saw it “the policy debate
has been long on advocacy and short on analysis.” (Manski, 1992, p353). As an aside, it
is amusing to note that in the UK at about the same time sociologist Stephen Ball was
articulating a similar sentiment, characterising the political discourse on school choice
as “Adam Smith meets Walt Disney”(Ball, 1993, p5). Manski criticised the existing
literature for its one-sidedness and economic simplicity, stating:
“During the past 30 years, the basic intellectual argument for systemic choice
has not notably advanced beyond the classical economic ideas sketched by
Friedman (1955, 1962). If anything, recent writing advocating choice views
the matter more simplistically than did Friedman. It seems enough today to
declare that choice promotes consumer sovereignty and competition.” (Man-
ski, 1992, p355)
In response to this perceived hyperbole and lack of rigour, he constructed an economic
model of a mixed school system with a large public sector and a voucher-subsidised fee-
charging private sector. The parameters of his model were calibrated to plausible values
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with reference to aggregate empirical properties of the US market. Under Manski’s
model, voucher systems did not uniformly improve attainment for low-income children,
and he concluded by urging caution in the drive to implement market-like educational
systems.
The theoretical economic models developed since have built upon this framework, adding
various economic features and usually using parameters that have been “calibrated” but
not statistically estimated. Epple and Romano (1998, 2008) allow the private sector to
charge variable fees, “cream-skim” students with high prior attainment, and earn profits.
In the former paper, the quality of schooling depends only on peer effects, whilst the
latter paper allows schools to choose how much to spend on teaching, and allows quality
to vary with both peers and expenditure. Further developments incorporate residential
inequality (Nechyba, 1999, 2000, 2003), religious schools (Ferreyra, 2007), information
asymmetries (Macleod and Urquiola, 2009) and the political economy of vouchers1 (Epple
and Romano, 2012b). Epple and Romano (2012a) provide a comprehensive review of the
theoretical school choice literature. The conclusions from these studies are varied, but
have several elements in common: first, private schools in voucher systems are motivated
to “cream-skim” students if they are not prohibited from doing so; second, outcomes for
low-income groups depend on the extent of cream-skimming and selective admissions.
2.2.2 Empirical evidence for quasi-market effects
In the mid to late 1990’s the theoretical economic work on markets in education began to
be supplemented by a wave of empirical studies with the aim of quantifying the “effect”
of competition on school performance and efficiency. Influential, and later controversial,
contributions by Caroline Hoxby (Hoxby, 2000, 2003) set a template for studies which
operationalised competition in various ways, and used instrumental variables or other
quasi-experimental methods to estimate a causal effect on test scores or other measures
of success. As an example, Hoxby (2000) used geographical data on waterways as natural
boundaries between districts, as an instrument for the amount of Tiebout choice families
face, and regressed this on school aggregate test scores. She found large positive effects
1So-called “political economy” models go further than models where the researcher manipulates policy,
in that they incorporate the political process that determines levels of taxation and funding, and the
details of school choice policies.
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of choice on outcomes. Although influential, the validity of the results were called into
question by Rothstein (2005) after a failed replication revealed the sensitivity of the
instrumental variable to seemingly arbitrary coding decisions.
This early work has been followed by a huge international literature following the same
template, focussing especially on large-scale voucher programmes in the US, Chile and
Sweden, but also including studies of choice in the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, India
and the UK. Notable reviews of this literature have been provided by Belfield and Levin
(2002), Allen and Burgess (2010), Sahlgren (2013) and Epple et al. (2015). Belfield and
Levin summarised their findings by concluding that the majority of studies showed a
substantively modest positive effect of competition on a range of outcomes, but that
more than half of estimated effects were not statistically significant. Allen and Burgess
find positive effects of competition in Sweden, but ambivalent findings in the US and
Chile. Sahlgren provides a thorough review of the literature, concluding that there is
enough evidence to suggest that competition between schools can improve performance,
yet commenting that “it is evident that the design of choice programmes matters quite a
lot for outcomes,” (Sahlgren, 2013, p97). Finally, Epple and Romano conclude:
“To summarize, the evidence thus far, while uneven, is sufficiently encour-
aging to make a strong case for continued experimentation and evaluation.
the evidence also suggests that work originating in a single country or in a
single research approach is unlikely to completely answer questions regarding
vouchers . . . the ongoing tasks include continuing refinement of identifica-
tion strategies, investigating longer-term impacts, providing a better under-
standing of why effects emerge or fail to emerge, and marshalling theory and
evidence to improve voucher design.” (Epple et al., 2015, p56)
Reduced-form evidence from England is less numerous than some other countries, but
given that quasi-experimental studies make no claims of external validity (that is, validity
beyond their political and geographic context) it is worth paying special attention to the
English evidence. Taylor et al. (2000) test the effect of increased competitiveness in a
local area on four school-level variables: exam performance; new admissions; change in
school size and stratification. The local level of competition is represented by the mean
lagged exam performance of other local schools. Although plausible as a measure of
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competition, this suffers from endogeneity issues, since it is not clear whether mean local
exam performance “causes” variation in school performance, or whether both are affected
by unobserved local variables. Taylor et al. find modest and unstable effects of local
competition on exam performance, and this effect, where significant, is dwarfed by the
strong effect of family background on exam performance. Otherwise, they find that a
school’s own lagged exam performance is positively correlated with both new admissions
and overall size, whereas the performance of its competitors is negatively correlated with
admissions and size. They take this as evidence that, although within-school efficiency
gains may be weak, systemic efficiency gains (i.e. gains from the growth of successful
schools relative to unsuccessful schools) may be larger. Finally, Taylor et al. regress
the change in the % of pupils claiming Free School Meals (FSM) at each school against
the school’s own lagged exam performance, and find a significant negative correlation,
suggesting that high-performing schools become more selective.
In a follow-up study, Bradley et al. (2001) use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to
measure the efficiency of each school in converting multiple inputs (% FSM-eligible pupils
and % of qualified teachers) into multiple outputs (% GCSE grades A*-C and attendance
rates). DEA accounts for inputs in a way analogous to (although methodologically very
different from) multilevel value-added (VA) models. However, Bradley et al. choose
only to account for % FSM, which leaves out a lot of prior variation on gender and
test scores. Unlike VA models, DEA allows schools to have heterogeneous goals, as
each school maximises a unique weighted sum of outputs given inputs. DEA efficiency
estimates were then regressed on measures of competition, represented as counts of the
number of other schools within various radii. The results show that an additional school
within 1km increases efficiency by 0.51% (±0.12%) in 1998, and an additional school
within 1-2km increases efficiency by 0.26% (±0.06%).
Other authors assess the effect on school performance of obtaining greater independence
from local authority control (Clark, 2009; Allen, 2013). Both authors use data on vot-
ing outcomes from ballots to determine whether schools will become grant-maintained
schools, within a regression discontinuity design. The aim of a regression discontinuity
design is to eliminate the endogenous selection mechanism, by including in the sam-
ple only those schools close enough to the voting threshold to be considered as good as
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randomly selected. Any confounding variables correlated with the vote should have a neg-
ligible effect if schools with very similar vote outcomes (except that they fall either side
of the threshold) are compared. Clark (2009) evaluates the short-run effect of obtaining
grant-maintained status on school performance and finds positive effects, while Allen
(2013) assesses performance more than 10 years after the vote, and finds no significant
association between grant-maintained status and performance. Allen argues that in the
short-run, “euphoria” effects may dominate and boost staff morale, whereas in the longer
term these effects will no longer be important.
Given the sheer number, diversity and international scope of empirical studies of com-
petition, it is perhaps surprising that a consensus has not emerged. However, the em-
pirical “programme evaluation” approach to studying school choice is hampered by two
weaknesses. First, there is a lack of methodological consensus, hampering comparability
of findings, on such questions as a) how to operationalise choice and competition and
whether or not to differentiate choice from competition; b) how to measure school out-
comes; and c) how to achieve causal identification of effects. Second, as the diversity of
international results makes clear, it cannot be assumed that a study of competition in
one voucher programme is applicable to other voucher programmes, with different tech-
nical features, implemented in a different political, economic and cultural context. By
minimising structural assumptions, the reduced form approach aims to finesse the whole
question of causal mechanisms. However, as Manski (1992) and others have shown, the
design of voucher systems, and particularly the design of details that affect the decisions
of families and schools, cannot be glossed over.
2.2.3 Evidence of “quality-seeking” behaviour
The most important underlying processes that reduced form approaches leave unmodelled
involve the decisions of families when faced with school choice. A necessary condition for
competition between schools to improve academic outcomes is that families are conscious
of, and value academic outcomes, such that they are more likely to choose a school
where expected outcomes are better. A handful of studies have attempted to explicitly
model educational decision-making to assess the extent to which parents value academic
performance. This structural approach can be thought of as a bridge between reduced
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form empirical methods and theoretical economic models, in that they explicitly aim to
estimate structural parameters that appear in theoretical models of decision-making.
Many of these studies model the importance attached to different aspects of school choice
indirectly, via residential choice and house prices. These studies exploit spatial Tiebout
variation in public services (i.e. school quality) to extract families’ willingness-to-pay
for educational quality. Models that use regression and quasi-experimental methods
to disaggregate the components of house price are known as hedonic pricing models
(Rosen, 1974). Advantages of such models are that they are applicable in contexts
without school (quasi-)markets, and they allow researchers to attach a monetary value
to parents’ willingness-to-pay for improvements in quality. Gibbons and Machin (2008)
provide a review of recent international literature on the contribution of school quality
to house prices. They find that, despite diverse contexts, studies fairly consistently find
that parents are willing to pay an additional 4% of the value for a one-standard-deviation
improvement in test scores (with an inter-quartile range of 4%).
Other studies do not use the hedonic pricing approach. Rothstein (2006) analyses
the correlations between house prices, family characteristics and school effectiveness,
and finds no evidence that families value school effectiveness. Instead of attempting
to estimate parents’ weightings for quality, Buckley and Schneider (2003) investigate
the decision-making processes of highly-motivated parents, to examine the claim that a
“marginal” group of well-informed consumers drives competition. They apply an exper-
imental method, in which parents use a specially-designed website to search for school
information, and find evidence that a subgroup of parents does take into account perfor-
mance information. Allen et al. (2014) use information on school capacities to infer choice
sets available to families in England. They find that parents of children on Free School
Meals are less likely to choose the highest-quality school available to them, compared to
other families.
In contexts with school choice – whether quasi-markets or full markets – it is possible
to study decision-making directly, although access to sensitive data about preferences
is often difficult. An increasing number of studies use choice data to examine parental
weighting of school academic performance against other criteria. Hastings et al. (2009)
use data on preferences from a school choice programme in North Carolina. They find
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that higher-SES parents place greater weight on performance than lower-SES parents,
and also that parents of minority ethnic groups place some weight on ethnic peer groups.
Using a very large ranked preferences dataset from the New York City school market,
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2015) also find evidence of the moderation of preferences for test
scores by SES, and also find evidence of preferences for ethnic peer groups. In general the
studies that have used data on choices have found an interaction between socio-economic
status and preferences for academic performance measured by test scores.
Throughout the school choice literature the importance of context, and the details of
policy design, have been stressed. The next section reviews the policy background of
school choice in England, elaborating on aspects of the recent history of education policy
in England that shed light on the development of the current system.
2.3 School choice in England: policy background
As described above, the UK public school system can be characterised as a quasi-market
in which tuition is fully subsidised by the state, but parents have the right to express
a preference for any school, and schools are funded based on the number of pupils they
attract. The current system has a number of interacting elements which affect the struc-
ture of the market, the conduct of schools and parents and the efficiency of allocations.
The development of each of these elements will be described for England. They are:
1. The right to express preferences
2. The allocation mechanism
3. Availability of relevant information for parents
4. School governance and autonomy
The first criterion is self-explanatory. A prerequisite for any school choice policy is that
parents are enabled to express a preference. However, this alone is not sufficient for
the establishment of an institution of school choice. For example in England, this right
was first formalised in the 1980 Education Act: “Every local education authority shall
make arrangements for enabling the parent of a child in the area of the authority to
express a preference as to the school at which he wishes education to be provided for his
child . . . ” (Education Act 1980, 6.1 [orig.]). However, the Act did not contain details
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of how this should be implemented, and included a clause obviating Local Authorities
from their duty to respect such preferences if compliance “would prejudice the provision
of efficient education or the efficient use of resources” (Education Act 1980, 6.3 [orig.]).
Thus the Act seemingly had little impact on school choice until supplemented by the
Education Reform Act (1988). The latter piece of legislation, which also introduced the
National Curriculum and grant maintained schools, is commonly taken to be the one
that introduced school choice into England.
The second element, the allocation mechanism, is perhaps the most technically esoteric
topic in school choice research. The link between school choice and mechanism design
was first made in a seminal paper by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), who exposed
flaws in the algorithms used at the time in Boston and other US cities. They showed that
school allocation mechanisms are related to other matching mechanisms studied under
the economics sub-discipline of mechanism design. Work by Abdulkadiroğlu and others
showed that these algorithms could be designed in such a way as to guarantee axiomatic
properties such as pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness. The first property, pareto
efficiency, means that the allocation selected by the mechanism is optimal in the sense
that no family can be made better off (according to their preferences) without making
some other family worse off.
The second property ensures that parents have no incentives to misrepresent their true
preferences in order to improve their allocation. This point is important: if parents
have a right to express preferences, but they are penalised for expressing their true
preferences, the value of school choice is diminished. In England, local authorities manage
their own allocation clearinghouses. Until 2007 a variety of methods were in use, many
of which were variants on the Boston Mechanism that is known to be vulnerable to
manipulation(Pathak and Sönmez, 2011). The School Admissions Code published in that
year made first-preferences-first allocation methods illegal (Department for Education
and Skills, 2007) and since then most local authorities have switched to stable matching
mechanisms.
Parents may be able to express preferences between schools, but in order for parental
choice to be effective parents must have access to relevant information about aspects of
school performance. Relevant in this context means information that is likely to make
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a difference to parental choices, and also information that is likely to accurately predict
some aspect of parents’ and students’ future satisfaction with the school. Hence, the
third aspect of effective school choice – performance information – can be evaluated in
two ways: by its perceived usefulness to parents at the time of decision-making; and also
by the long-term effectiveness of the decisions it supports.
In the UK, measures of performance have been reinvented several times in the last two
decades as a result of continuing methodological advances as well as changing political
priorities. Beginning in 1992 the government began to publish league tables, which are
rankings of schools based on some measure or combination of measures. However, league
tables often rely on measures of “raw” performance that have been shown to largely reflect
the backgrounds and previous education of a school’s intake, rather than the quality of
the education offered by the school. An important concept in educational performance
measurement has been the evolution of what are called “value-added” measures, which are
measures designed to control for pupils’ different starting points when they enter a given
stage of education. In addition to quantitative measures, and perhaps more high-profile,
the independent schools inspectorate, the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted),
established by the Education (Schools) Act (1992), publishes regular detailed reports on
all state schools. These reports include an overall grade reflecting the inspectors’ opinion
of the school, and it is often these grades alone that are publicised and well-known by
parents.
The fourth element of school choice policies is the creation of diverse educational institu-
tions, and the provision of sufficient school places, to increase the likelihood that parents
will be able to select a school that suits the needs of their children. The issue of suffi-
cient capacity has been largely ignored in the school choice literature, but the amount
of capacity in a school market compared to the number of students can have a large
effect on the real amount of choice that parents have (Calsamiglia and Miralles, 2012).
Much recent political effort in the UK has focused on the proliferation of different types
of school. These new school types such as specialist schools, academies and free schools
are characterised by greater autonomy in respect of both pedagogy and governance, and
direct financing from central government. Whilst a rationale for these developments has
usually been the promotion of choice by improving diversity and providing incentives for
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schools to maximise enrolments, a side-effect has been a reduction in the role of the local
authority, and an increasingly individualistic role for schools as enterprises in competition
with each other for resources and pupils.
Chapter 3
The sample
Chapter 2 introduced two topics of concern in studying school choice: the existence and
effects of segregation within school populations; and the degree to which the system
provides real choice for parents, and promotes competition between schools to attract
students. This chapter introduces and briefly describes the sample of students entering
secondary school in the North West of England between 2009 and 2012, and describes and
justifies the selection of a sub-sample of urban school markets from the regional data for
more detailed analysis. The three towns that are the focus of the main substantive study
are introduced and their socio-economic and ethnic demographics and recent history are
briefly explained.
3.1 The regional sample
All analyses are based on school and pupil data from the National Pupil Database. The
central dataset consists of four cohorts of year 7 secondary school entrants, corresponding
to the 2009/10 to 2012/13 school years. This is supplemented by school-level census data
for the years 2007/08 to 2012/13. The first two cohorts of school-level data were used to
construct lagged measures. Although the main analysis is conducted on medium-sized
urban school markets, data was initially obtained for Local Authorities covering a large
area of the North West of England. This includes school and year 7 pupil data for
the following local authorities: Lancashire; Blackpool; Blackburn with Darwen; Wigan;
Bury; Bolton; Rochdale; and Oldham.
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The full sample contains 92,110 pupils entering into year 7, the first year of secondary
school1. Table 3.1 shows the number of pupils in each cohort, and the ethnic and socio-
economic characteristics of the cohort.
Table 3.1: Regional Sample Descriptive Statistics
Ethnicity % FSM %∗
Year N N schools White Asian Other No Yes
2009/10 23,385 176 82.5 13.1 4.4 84.7 15.3
2010/11 23,442 169 80.9 13.9 5.1 84.5 15.5
2011/12 22,474 168 79.7 14.8 5.5 85.0 15.0
2012/13 22,809 171 78.2 16.2 5.6 84.4 15.6
All 92,110 189 80.3 14.5 5.2 84.7 15.3
∗Eligible for Free School Meals (FSM)
With this larger dataset we were able to visually represent our urban school markets in
their wider context and assess whether schools at the boundaries of each market should
be included. In this way the selection of the urban samples was fine-tuned. The next
section describes the selection of three urban school markets for the main substantive
analysis.
3.2 The urban samples
From the regional sample, three smaller urban school markets were selected for more
detailed analysis and choice modelling. It was necessary to select medium-sized sub-
samples, rather than using the regional data, for computational feasibility. The innovative
and computationally intensive nature of the structural estimation method used, involving
numerical integration and loops over all possible choice possibilities, limited the size of
the samples that could be processed. In particular the computational complexity of the
method is sensitive to the number of schools in the sample, as it implies a separate latent
variable for each school.
The integrated nature of the estimation method means that each sample is necessarily
localised; that is, we must sample schools with sufficiently overlapping catchment areas
1In England there are a small number of local authorities that operate middle schools (schools serving
children from 9 to 13/14 years of age). In these systems year 7 pupils are not necessarily secondary school
entrants. However, there are only a small number of these schools remaining in England, and none of
the local authorities in the sample operates middle schools.
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Figure 3.1: Empirical quantile contours containing (90%, 95%, 99%) of the 2009–2012 intake for
each study area. Contours are calculated using convex hull peeling (Wolf and Bielefeld, 2014).
It is clear that the catchment areas of Preston schools and Blackburn schools are not entirely
isolated.
and probabilities of allocation. Failure to do this would lead to statistical separation and
loss of information. In this respect, the two-sided method is no different from normal
discrete choice methods. In addition, for our structural model we must sample all of
the entrants to a given school, as failure to sample a pupil who is on the borderline of
acceptance could materially bias results.
There are also substantive benefits to selecting medium-sized school markets. First,
as discussed in Chapter 2, there is no reason to expect parental preferences, and peer
preferences in particular, to be homogeneous throughout England. By comparing several
self-contained and integrated school markets this allows us to assess the between-market
heterogeneity of preference parameters. By not choosing communities that are too large
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we increase the probability that the parameters we estimate are reasonably internally
homogeneous. Second, by sacrificing scope we gain the advantage of methodological
intimacy in that it is possible to gain a more qualitative understanding of the sample.
Of course, we do not gain much detail at the level of individual pupils, since sample
sizes are still in the thousands, but at the level of the medium-sized town we can become
familiar with individual schools, neighbourhoods and the meso-level geography of a single
school market. As is shown in Chapter 4, school markets tend to have quite well-defined
boundaries.
Another reason for focusing on urban areas is that, at a regional level, the proportion
of minority ethnic groups in the pupil population is too low to discern sorting patterns.
The distribution of minority ethnic groups is strongly clustered in urban centres. Simi-
larly, patterns of socio-economic sorting are dominated by the urban-rural divide. As a
consequence, it is only in urban areas that ethnic and socio-economic groups are mixed
enough to discern post-residential sorting and schools with large proportions of minority
ethnic pupils.
It may be that preferences depend upon structure of the school market as well as aspects
of each school and family. To this end, three study areas have been chosen that are
similar, yet sufficiently different to reflect structural variation in the composition of school
markets. The three study areas are all in the North West of England, but despite this
they manifest considerable variation in such factors as the presence of private school
options, selective schools, faith schools, local demographics and school governance. The
three areas are located in different Local Education Authorities (LEAs); they are Preston
(part of Lancashire LEA), Blackburn with Darwen, and Oldham.
The study period spans four cohorts of secondary school entrants from 2009/10 to
2012/13. This period covers rapid structural reform, with the “Building Schools for
the Future” programme, and the second-wave academisation of many schools. In Old-
ham, in particular, these changes have been particularly drastic. The study period allows
us to analyse preferences before and after these changes, and may potentially provide a
natural experiment for the study of preferences under structural reform.
It is worth noting that Preston and Blackburn are not quite far apart enough for their
intakes to be entirely non-overlapping, as can be seen in Figure 3.1. There are a few
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families in Blackburn who send their children to a school in Preston, and very small
number who send their children from Preston to Blackburn. An aspect that all of the
study areas have in common is that none of them have any ability-selecting state schools
(Grammar schools).
3.2.1 Preston
Table 3.2: Preston Descriptive Statistics
Ethnicity % FSM %∗
Year N N schools White Asian Other No Yes
2009/10 1,701 15 79.3 15.6 5.1 88.5 11.5
2010/11 1,716 15 76.6 16.6 6.8 87.4 12.6
2011/12 1,659 16 75.2 13.9 10.9 87.9 12.1
2012/13 1,800 16 75.3 17.9 6.7 86.8 13.2
All 6,876 16 76.6 16.0 7.4 87.6 12.4
∗Eligible for Free School Meals (FSM)
A medium-sized city of around 240,000 inhabitants, Preston is the administrative capital
of Lancashire. The study area comprises two districts, separated by the River Ribble.
These are the non-metropolitan districts of City of Preston and South Ribble. City of
Preston has a more ethnically-diverse population than South Ribble. Major religions in
Preston (not including South Ribble) are Christianity 61% and Islam 11% (Office for
National Statistics, 2016). Preston’s main ethnic groups are: white British, 76%; Indian,
10%; and Pakistani, 3%. Preston’s ward with the highest proportion of Asian residents
is Deepdale, near the city centre.
Together, the districts encompassed 16 secondary schools in 2013. The city is perhaps
unusual for a city of its size in that it has no independent secondary schools within the
two districts studied. This means that it is possible to include the entire local secondary
education market within the sample. However, families in the area do send their children
to private schools further away. Eight of the 16 schools have a religious denomination,
including two Church of England schools, one Muslim school and five Roman Catholic
schools. The large number of RC schools reflects Preston’s historical association with
Catholicism and continuing large Catholic population (Hunt, 2009).
The secondary school offering in Preston has been relatively stable during the study
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period. One new school was created (Preston Muslim Girls’ School), and a couple of
schools gained academy status. However, a long-established school, Tulketh High School,
had closed and merged with Fulwood High School in 2007, two years before the first cohort
we study.
3.2.2 Blackburn with Darwen
Table 3.3: Blackburn Descriptive Statistics
Ethnicity % FSM %∗
Year N N schools White Asian Other No Yes
2009/10 1,290 10 57.8 38.7 3.5 80.1 19.9
2010/11 1,229 10 54.7 41.1 4.2 81.3 18.7
2011/12 1,239 9 52.8 44.1 3.1 84.3 15.7
2012/13 1,286 10 48.8 46.4 4.8 83.0 17.0
All 5,044 11 53.5 42.6 3.9 82.1 17.9
∗Eligible for Free School Meals (FSM)
Blackburn with Darwen is a unitary authority in East Lancashire, encompassing Black-
burn and the smaller town of Darwen to the south, with a combined population of around
140,000. The area has a large Muslim population; at 27% of the population it is the third
largest proportion of any local authority in the UK, and the largest outside London. 53%
of the population are Christian. The major ethnic groups in the area are: white British
67%; Indian 13%; and Pakistani 12%. Blackburn’s ward with the highest proportion of
Asian residents is Whalley Range, pictured in Figure 3.4
Blackburn had six independent schools2 (not included in the sample), and ten state
secondary schools in 2013. Of the state schools, five are faith schools, with two Roman
Catholic, two Muslim schools and one Church of England school. During the study
period two state schools merged, and a Muslim boys’ state school opened.
3.2.3 Oldham
The metropolitan borough of Oldham has a population of around 230,000, with the
town of Oldham at its centre. In the early 2000’s Oldham became infamous for ethnic
2Four of the six independent schools are Muslim faith schools.
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Table 3.4: Oldham Descriptive Statistics
Ethnicity % FSM %∗
Year N N schools White Asian Other No Yes
2009/10 2,359 15 67.2 27.0 5.8 80.6 19.4
2010/11 2,364 13 64.2 27.7 8.1 79.5 20.5
2011/12 2,308 12 66.5 27.9 5.6 78.7 21.3
2012/13 2,362 12 62.5 30.6 7.0 79.5 20.5
All 9,394 19 65.1 28.3 6.6 79.6 20.4
∗Eligible for Free School Meals (FSM)
tension and segregation as a result of the 2001 Oldham race riots (Amin, 2003). The
major ethnic groups in the area are: white British 76%; Pakistani 10% and Bangladeshi
7%. The district has the third largest proportion of Bangladeshi residents in the country,
and the largest Bangladeshi community outside London. Major religions are Christianity
(60%) and Islam (18%) (Office for National Statistics, 2016). In terms of the geographical
distribution of Oldham’s minority ethnic groups, many Asian families choose to live in
the Glodwick area to the east of Oldham town centre (see Figure 3.6). The ward of
Westwood has a concentration of Bangladeshi families.
At the end of the study period Oldham had 12 schools, of which two had Church of
England denominations and one Roman Catholic. In addition, one school was designated
as a Christian Academy, but without faith criteria for selection. This is the smallest
proportion of schools with faith admissions criteria of the three study areas. There were
four independent schools, not included in the sample.
Of the three study areas, Oldham has experienced the most drastic changes to its sec-
ondary school offering during the study period. Seven schools were closed, and merged
into four new “super-academies”. These changes were, at least in part, in response to
the extreme segregation in Oldham’s secondary schools. The most high-profile of these
mergers involved the closing of a school that was more than 90% white British – Counthill
School – and a school that was 90% of Pakistani origin – Breeze Hill School. The academy
that was opened to replace them – Waterhead Academy – was discussed in the national
news using such terminology as “forced integration” and “social experiment” (Nye, 2011).
The dataset encompasses these changes and this gives us a valuable opportunity to ob-
serve the evolution (or stability) of preferences during a time of structural reform.
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Figure 3.6 shows that in 2009 Oldham’s schools were not only segregated along white/Asian
lines, but also between Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils. The Grange school predom-
inantly served Bangladeshi pupils, whereas Counthill School served almost exclusively
Pakistani pupils. As Figure 3.7 shows, by 2012 Counthill School had been merged into
Waterhead Academy, and The Grange School had been converted into Oldham Academy
North at a new site.
3.3 A comparative recent history
Although they have developed differently, the economic and demographic history of the
three towns in the twentieth century shares common elements. During the nineteenth
and into the first decades of the twentieth century, the main industry in all three towns
was provided by the manufacture of cotton fabrics. Although this industry began to
decline after the First World War, favourable economic conditions in the aftermath of
the Second World War brought a temporary boost to the cotton industry (Singleton,
1991). Faced with labour shortages in this and other manufacturing sectors (for exam-
ple, the aerospace industry in Preston and Blackburn), industry leaders actively sought
immigration from Asian and Caribbean countries (Hunt, 2009). Immigrants from India,
Bangladesh and Pakistan settled in the three towns in the 1950’s and 1960’s, and other
textile-manufacturing towns in the North of England. As these workers usually arrived
with very little wealth, and were not in well-paid jobs, they tended to settle in inner-city
areas in each town, and create urban communities from a single country of origin.
The eventual terminal decline of the cotton industry brought unemployment and hardship
for those whose livelihoods depended on the industry, and this affected both white and
minority ethnic groups. First-generation immigrants, often having poorly-paid work and
less diverse support networks, arguably fared worse than white workers. In the latter part
of the twentieth, and the first decades of the twenty-first century the economic prosperity
of the three towns has diverged. Preston, having access to important aerospace, nuclear
and other industries, and being the administrative and commercial centre of Lancashire,
has been least vulnerable to the loss of cotton. Nearby Blackburn has arguably shared
the benefit of aerospace and other manufacturing industries.
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Oldham and similar towns such as Burnley, however, seem never to have fully recovered
from the economic effects of de-industrialisation (Singleton, 1991). At the turn of the new
century, unemployment among Asians in Oldham was around 50% according to Amin
(2003). The economic decline and lack of industry as a force for cohesion in Oldham
and other towns around the Pennines3 had negative effects upon inter-ethnic relations,
summarised by Arun Kundnani: “the textile industry was the common thread binding
the white and Asian working class into a single social fabric. But with its collapse, each
community was forced to turn inwards on to itself” (Kundnani, 2001, p106).
This short history is only a sketch, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that a basic
understanding of the economic and demographic history of Oldham, in particular, sheds
some light on the tensions that resulted in three days of race riots in Oldham in May
2001. The riots centred upon the predominantly-Asian neighbourhood of Glodwick, just
to the east of the town centre. The impact of the riots was summarised in The Ritchie
Report (2001), which called it “the worst racially motivated riots in the UK for fifteen
years” (Ritchie, 2001, p2). Describing the aftermath of the riots, Ritchie went on to
describe a string of worrying events:
“On the 1st June the house of the Asian Deputy Mayor of Oldham was fire-
bombed, he and his family only narrowly escaping. A week later the town
was again in the news as the British National Party scored its biggest success
ever in a UK General Election, taking over 6,500 votes in Oldham West
and Royton, 16% of the vote, and over 5,000 votes in Oldham East and
Saddleworth, or 11%. This confirmed the view of many that something was
seriously wrong in Oldham, that there was a community more polarised on
racial lines than anything seen before in the UK.” (Ritchie, 2001, p2)
The disturbances in Oldham were followed by riots in Burnley, Bradford and Leeds.
As the ramifications of demographic change and economic decline have been felt most
acutely in Oldham, it is plausible to expect the effect of these trends on schools and
preferences for schools to be felt most strongly in Oldham. In relation to the interaction
of ethnic and socio-economic factors at least, Oldham can be considered to be the pri-
mary “treatment” sample, with Preston and Blackburn acting in this sense as “controls”
3An upland region encompassing parts of Lancashire and Yorkshire in England
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Figure 3.4: Characteristics of schools in Blackburn in 2009
which bracket Oldham in terms of ethnic demographics; schools in Preston have a sim-
ilar proportion of minority ethnic pupils, but less apparent segregation, and schools in
Blackburn have a higher proportion of minority ethnic pupils than Oldham.













0 20 40 60 80 100
FSM %
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
% 5+ good GCSE















Figure 3.5: Characteristics of schools in Blackburn in 2012. As a new school, GCSE attainment
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Figure 3.7: Characteristics of schools in Oldham in 2012
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Table 3.5: Preston Schools
ID Full name Denom. Type Gender Active
1 Ashton Community Science College – CC – –
2 Preston Muslim Girls’ School Mus VA G 2011–
3 Priory Sports & Technology College – CC∗ – –
4 Walton-le-Dale Arts College – CC – –
5 Lostock Hall Community High Sch. – CC∗ – –
6 Broughton High School – CC – –
7 Penwortham Girls’ High School – CC G –
8 Moor Park Business & Enterprise Coll. – CC – –
9 Our Lady’s Catholic High School RC VA – –
10 Corpus Christi Cath. Sports Coll. RC VA – –
11 Christ The King Cath. Mathematics Coll. RC VA – –
12 Brownedge St. Mary’s Cath. High Sch. RC VA – –
13 Hutton C. of E. Grammar School CofE VA B –
14 All Hallows Catholic High School RC VA – –
15 Archbishop Temple School CofE VA – –
16 Fulwood Academy – AC – –
Key: Mus-Muslim; RC-Roman Catholic; CofE-Church of England; CC-Community Controlled;
VA-Voluntary Aided; G-Girls; B-Boys; ∗School converted to academy during the study period.
Table 3.6: Blackburn Schools
ID Full name Denom. Type Gender Active Successor
1 Beardwood Humanities College – CC – –2010 11
2 Darwen Aldridge Community Academy – AC – –
3 Darwen Vale High School – CC – –
4 Our Lady & St. John Cath. High Sch. RC VA – –
5 Pleckgate High School – CC – –
6 St Bede’s RC High School RC VA – –
7 St Wilfrid’s C. of E. High School CofE VA∗ – –
8 Tauheedul Islam Boys’ High School Mus. Free B 2012–
9 Tauheedul Islam Girls’ High School Mus. AC G –
10 Witton Park High School – CC – –
11 Blakewater Coll./Blackburn Ctrl. – CC† – –
Key: Mus-Muslim; RC-Roman Catholic; CofE-Church of England; CC-Community Controlled; VA-Voluntary Aided;
Free-Free School; AC-Academy Converter; G-Girls; B-Boys; ∗School converted to academy during the study period;
†Converted to Foundation School and merged with Beardwood in 2010.
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Table 3.7: Oldham Schools
ID Full name Denom. Type Active Successor
Closing schools
1 Breeze Hill School – CC –2009 18
2 Counthill School – CC –2009 18
5 Grange School – CC –2009 16
6 Kaskenmoor School – CC –2009 8
12 South Chadderton School – CC –2009 8
9 Our Lady’s RC High School RC VA –2010 19
13 St Augustine of Canterbury RC RC VA –2010 19
Continuing schools
3 Crompton House CofE School CofE VA∗ –
4 Failsworth School – CC –
7 North Chadderton School – CC –
10 Royton and Crompton School – CC –
11 Saddleworth School – CC –
14 The Blue Coat CofE School CofE VA∗ –
15 The Hathershaw College of Tec – CC∗ –
17 The Radclyffe School – CC –
New schools
8 Oasis Academy Oldham – SA 2010–
16 Oldham Academy North – SA 2010–
18 Waterhead Academy – SA 2010–
19 Blessed J.H. Newman RC Coll. RC VA 2011–
Key: RC-Roman Catholic; CofE-Church of England; CC-Community; VA-Voluntary Aided;
SA-Sponsored Academy; ∗Converted to Academy during study period.
Chapter 4
Indices of segregation and market
structure
This chapter presents exploratory empirical analyses of allocations data that can be per-
formed without imposing a structural model of parental preferences. Each of these analy-
ses makes use of some notion of schools’ spatial catchment areas. In the first analysis the
relevant notion is the Voronoi neighbourhood of each school – that is, the neighbourhood
of geographical points for which that school is the nearest school. This catchment area
is used to construct a counterfactual experiment to disaggregate residential sorting from
post-residential sorting and evaluate the strength of evidence for the latter. The second
and third analyses construct a catchment area for each school by using kernel-smoothed
counts of pupils in each location. This catchment area is used to analyse the structure
of school markets in terms of choice and competition.
4.1 Post-residential segregation: Nearest-school counterfac-
tual analysis
One of the main processes to be understood in this study is the uneven sorting of pupils
into schools along ethnic and socio-economic lines. Chapter 2 summarised the extensive
quantitative literature measuring and analysing socio-economic and ethnic segregation,
both in the UK and internationally. Two substantive questions stand out in this litera-
ture: the question of trends – whether segregation tends to be increasing or decreasing
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over time; and the question of causes – whether in-school segregation is primarily a re-
flection of segregated neighbourhoods, or whether there are additional causes in addition
to residential segregation.
Many of the studies addressing these questions have used various indices to measure
segregation (Duncan and Duncan, 1955; Massey and Denton, 1988; Gorard, 1999; Burgess
et al., 2005). When addressing the second question – the existence of post-residential
segregation – the main strategy has been to compare indices of segregation for schools
to indices of segregation on similarly-sized geographical units. However, these studies
have had to contend with the Modifiable Areal Unit problem. This means that indices
are highly sensitive to the choice of geographical units. The Index of Dissimilarity is
sensitive to the size of units, since smaller units tend to be more homogenous and hence
more segregated. In order to deal with this problem Allen (2008) compares segregation
indices for schools, to a counterfactual in which all students are re-allocated strictly by
distance. In the following section a similar, although not identical, strategy is used to
assess segregation in schools.
The main index used to measure segregation since Duncan and Duncan (1955) is the
Index of Dissimilarity (D). For two disjoint sub-groups of the population indexed by
t ∈ {0, 1} representing, for example, white and minority pupils, and G non-overlapping







where ng,t is the number of group t in unit g, and Nt is the total population of group t
across all units.
The Index of Dissimilarity takes the form of a scaled absolute (or L1) distance metric
between two discrete distributions1. If D takes its maximum value of 1, this implies that
no two members of different sub-groups share the same geographical unit; that is, the
support of the two distributions is entirely disjoint. At its minimum value of 0, D implies
that the empirical distribution of each sub-group is identical to that of the other. In the
context of school market analysis, the measure can also be characterised as comparing the
group-specific market share distributions of schools, and asking how similar the market
1D is similar to the Euclidean Hellinger distance for discrete distributions.
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structure is for the two groups. The index has an intuitive interpretation as the proportion
of either of the groups who would have to move between geographical units, to equalise
the spatial distributions of the two groups.
Although popular in the segregation literature, D, when used as an estimate of underlying
unevenness, is known to be upward-biased for finite samples. The reason for this is that
random variation in proportions does not cancel out in the sum of absolute differences,
and so the observed D is the sum of unevenness caused by segregation, and unevenness
caused by random variation. This problem is especially acute when numbers of one or
both groups are small in some geographical units. Several bias-corrections have been
proposed to deal with this. Bootstrap bias-correction was compared to other methods
by Allen et al. (2015) and found to be insufficient. Both Allen et al. (2015) and Mazza
and Punzo (2015) proposed corrections based on a large sample approximation of the
absolute difference between proportions to a folded normal distribution.
The correction in Allen et al. (2015) begins by calculating, for each geographical unit,
the observed proportions pobsg,t = ng,t/Nt as estimates of the population parameters pig,t.
Since the proportions are modelled as arising from a multinomial distribution, in large
samples the random variable Zg = |pobsg,0 − pobsg,1 |/σˆg has approximately a folded normal
distribution with mean µg and variance σ2g . The variance is estimated by plugging in
σˆ2g =
pobsg,0 (1− pobsg,0 )
N0
+
pobsg,1 (1− pobsg,1 )
N1
,
and the mean by maximum likelihood:
µˆg = arg max
µg∈R+
{φ(Zg − µg) + φ(Zg + µg)} ,
where φ(·) is a standard normal density function. Since µg = |pig,0 − pig,1|/σg then the







For any Zg ≤ 1, that is, whenever the observed absolute difference is smaller than the
standard deviation of the estimate, the density corrected estimate of unevenness at that
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site is zero, and as Zg grows, µg approaches Zg. All results below use this method of
calculating D.
In this analysis the geographical units g are schools, and the groups are drawn from
any two disjoint ethnic or socio-economic groups defined by indicators in the NPD. For
the purpose of this analysis, “White” includes white British, but excludes other white.
“Asian” includes Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and any mixtures of these with white,
but excludes Chinese and other East Asian. “Black” includes pupils of African and
Caribbean origin, and any mixed ethnicity including black. “FSM” includes children who
were eligible for Free School Meals.
In order to assess the degree to which D reflects post-residential, rather than underlying
residential segregation, the observed values of D will be compared to those calculated
under a simulated scenario in which all children attend their nearest school. In this sce-
nario, all segregation is residential, so the difference between the actual measured levels
of segregation, and the levels measured under this counterfactual, should indicate the
extent of post-residential segregation. This method is very similar to that described by
Allen (2008); the main difference lies in the way that the counterfactual is operationalised
with respect to school capacities.
In order to treat school capacities as exogenously fixed, Allen uses a first-preferences-first
matching mechanism (as described in Chapter 8) in which all schools’ priorities and all
pupils’ preferences correspond strictly to distance. This means that if a school has a
small capacity, it may not admit all those pupils for whom it is the closest school. A
consequence of this is that under this mechanism, and with fixed capacity, there may be
some pupils who are allocated to schools which are much more distant than their nearest
school. In fact there is no guarantee that some pupil will not be allocated to his or her
furthest school.
What is more, pupils who tend to miss out on nearest school allocation under this
model may tend to come from some groups rather than others. Although in general
the residential location of pupils is not entirely exogenous, it is plausible that residential
locations with respect to the de facto catchment boundaries induced by school capacities
are even more sensitive to fine sorting, in that house prices may respond to probability
of admission to a popular school. Any counterfactual that fixes school capacities may
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incorporate this sub-neighbourhood sorting.
Nor is this mechanism necessarily the optimal mechanism for respecting capacities whilst
allocating pupils as close as possible to home. Assuming that pupils preferences are
simply proximity ranks, First-Preferences-First is weakly Pareto optimal, meaning that
no pupil could be allocated closer to home without allocating some other pupil further
away. However, there is no reason why distances must be converted to ranks, and the
cardinal information within distances could not be used, such as in a combinatorial
optimisation algorithm (see, for example Aksoy et al. (2013)).
By removing the requirement of fixed capacities, the matching becomes much simpler,
and each pupil is simply allocated to his or her nearest school. De facto catchment areas
are simple to visualise as the Voronoi neighbourhood of each school. This does mean
that the sizes of some schools may be very different under the counterfactual. However,
because the total number of students in the area, and the number of units remains the
same, the average size of geographical units is the same in the counterfactual as in the
actual allocation.
An advantage of D as a measure of segregation is that it is additive; for a given set of
sites the calculated index can be decomposed into elements of unevenness arising from
different causes. Therefore, the difference between the observed D and the counterfactual
estimates the value of post-residential segregation in the same units as D. The inter-
pretation is that this is the proportion of either group who would have to relocate to
remove post-residential segregation. Since it is a signed difference, it is also possible that
post-residential segregation is negative; that is, schools are less segregated than their
catchment areas.
4.1.1 Results
Table 4.1 shows the calculated density-corrected indices of dissimilarity for both the
actual intakes and the simulated counterfactual. In most cases D is lower under the
counterfactual, implying that actual school intakes are more segregated than they would
be if all pupils were allocated to their nearest school. At a regional level the difference is
very small, reflecting the fact that at a larger scale patterns of segregation are dominated
by the clustering of ethnic minorities within some towns and cities. Reallocating pupils
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to schools cannot make much difference to this larger scale segregation. However, it
appears that within Oldham and Blackburn at least, segregation is at least partly post-
residential. In Preston, on the other hand, the effect of school choice appears to be to
reduce segregation for most comparisons.
The total segregation of Asian pupils is about twice that of black pupils, and also about
twice that of FSM pupils. This pattern broadly holds when each town is considered.
Asian pupils are most segregated in Blackburn schools, where segregation is 0.712. How-
ever, when only residential segregation is considered this reduces to 0.531. On the coun-
terfactual measure of residential segregation, Oldham is slightly more segregated (0.566).
We can calculate the proportional contribution of post-residential segregation to total
segregation of Asian pupils: in Blackburn post-residential segregation explains 25% of
total segregation, whereas in Oldham it is only 11%. In the region as a whole it is 1.2%.
Table 4.2 presents year-on-year Indices for Asian segregation. In Blackburn and Oldham
post-residential segregation appears to be increasing each year, whereas the residential
part of segregation is not increasing. The effect of structural changes in Oldham appears
to have been to reduce the residential segregation of school catchments by a quite large
amount, from 0.665 in 2009 to 0.496 in 2012. The post-residential element of segregation
has gone up from 0.036 in 2009 to 0.091 in 2012. This may have been caused by families
continuing to choose the “local” school, even though it has changed location. In Preston,
in contrast, there is no clear trend in post-residential desegregation. Table 4.3 provides
the same comparisons for FSM segregation, but no clear patterns emerge.
Table 4.4 sub-divides Asian pupils into individual ethnicities: Pakistani; Bangladeshi;
and Indian. In Preston, the pattern of post-residential desegregation appears to hold
for each individual group. Of the three ethnicities, Pakistani students have the least
post-residential segregation overall, but in terms of overall segregation the three towns
differ in terms of which group is the most segregated. There are some small counts in
this table, so some of the calculated Indices cannot be relied upon.
Each town has two substantial Asian communities: Preston and Blackburn have Pakistani
and Indian communities; whereas Oldham has Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities.
Total school segregation between Indian and Pakistani pupils in Blackburn and Preston
is quite low (0.204 and 0.226, respectively) with low post-residential segregation (0.036
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and 0.045). In contrast, both total segregation (0.536) and post-residential segregation
(0.106 – 20% of total) between Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils in Oldham is higher.
Segregation between Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils in Oldham is almost as high as
that between white and Asian pupils.
Finally, the post-residential segregation between black and Asian pupils in Preston (0.153
– 36% of total) and Oldham (0.213 – 39% of total) is very high, especially as the pairwise
residential segregation of these two groups is not very high in Preston and Oldham –
0.262 and 0.335, respectively.
4.1.2 Discussion
Although the calculation and analysis of segregation indices appears to be the domi-
nant mode of segregation analysis in the literature, this kind of modelling is limited in
several ways. First, it is not easy to embed segregation indices within a statistical frame-
work, to perform statistical inference such as producing interval estimates and calculating
probabilities. The work of Allen et al. (2015) ameliorates this concern considerably, pro-
viding confidence intervals and significance tests for the index, but it is not clear whether
the multinomial model they describe is entirely compatible with a capacity-constrained
school system in which allocations are realisations of the equilibria of complex matching
mechanisms. The model could possibly be extended to accommodate this, but that may
be conceptually and computationally difficult.
Second, reducing a complex phenomenon such as segregation to a single metric, whilst
useful for exploratory purposes, hides a lot of the detail that would be useful in under-
standing the geographically and temporally specific patterns of sorting that lie behind
the index. D is a dissimilarity measure between spatial distributions, but it does not
encode any other information about the distributions themselves. Nor does it illuminate,
for example, whether a given value is the result of small discrepancies in market share at
many schools, or large discrepancies at a couple of schools.
Third, and most importantly, assuming that the causes of segregation operate at the level
of individuals – either as decision-makers or objects of the strategic decision-making of
others – an aggregate metric such as the Index of Dissimilarity cannot model mecha-
nisms. In order to dissaggregate decision-making, structure and supply-side factors, it is
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necessary to find a way to use data in such a way that preferences are revealed, whereas
D only measures the aggregate effects of preferences, constraints, and market structure.
Table 4.1: Indices of Dissimilarity: comparison of actual intakes (2009–2012) to nearest-
school counterfactual
Comparison Actual Nearest Difference N1 N2 Group 1
School Proportion
White vs non-White
Region 0.579 0.574 -0.005 75285 16825 0.82
3towns 0.554 0.509 -0.045 14361 6953 0.67
Preston 0.401 0.450 0.049 5379 1497 0.78
Oldham 0.549 0.508 -0.041 6225 3169 0.66
Blackburn 0.686 0.530 -0.156 2757 2287 0.55
Asian vs non-Asian
Region 0.659 0.651 -0.008 13345 78765 0.14
3towns 0.611 0.552 -0.060 5909 15405 0.28
Preston 0.424 0.493 0.069 1103 5773 0.16
Oldham 0.636 0.566 -0.070 2659 6735 0.28
Blackburn 0.712 0.531 -0.181 2147 2897 0.43
Black vs non-Black
Region 0.352 0.332 -0.020 1637 90473 0.02
3towns 0.269 0.234 -0.035 480 20834 0.02
Preston 0.278 0.219 -0.059 163 6713 0.02
Oldham 0.202 0.101 -0.101 267 9127 0.03
Blackburn 0.415 0.216 -0.199 50 4994 0.01
FSM vs non-FSM
Region 0.306 0.250 -0.056 14130 77980 0.15
3towns 0.319 0.272 -0.046 3670 17644 0.17
Preston 0.321 0.297 -0.024 850 6026 0.12
Oldham 0.342 0.269 -0.073 1919 7475 0.20
Blackburn 0.221 0.240 0.019 901 4143 0.18
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Table 4.2: Indices of Dissimilarity: Year-on-year comparison of D for Asian vs non-Asian
intake.
Comparison Actual Nearest Difference N1 N2 Group 1
School Proportion
Preston
2009 0.432 0.489 0.057 265 1436 0.16
2010 0.502 0.518 0.016 285 1431 0.17
2011 0.399 0.443 0.045 230 1429 0.14
2012 0.429 0.505 0.077 323 1477 0.18
Oldham
2009 0.700 0.665 -0.036 637 1722 0.27
2010 0.661 0.615 -0.046 656 1708 0.28
2011 0.606 0.493 -0.113 644 1664 0.28
2012 0.587 0.496 -0.091 722 1641 0.31
Blackburn
2009 0.697 0.543 -0.154 499 791 0.39
2010 0.698 0.538 -0.160 505 724 0.41
2011 0.720 0.535 -0.184 546 693 0.44
2012 0.727 0.543 -0.184 597 689 0.46
Table 4.3: Indices of Dissimilarity: Year-on-year comparison of D for FSM vs non-FSM
intake.
Comparison Actual Nearest Difference N1 N2 Group 1
School Proportion
Preston
2009 0.388 0.284 -0.104 196 1505 0.12
2010 0.295 0.324 0.028 217 1499 0.13
2011 0.281 0.314 0.033 200 1459 0.12
2012 0.290 0.290 0.000 237 1563 0.13
Oldham
2009 0.416 0.273 -0.143 457 1902 0.19
2010 0.308 0.316 0.008 485 1879 0.21
2011 0.322 0.233 -0.089 492 1816 0.21
2012 0.316 0.237 -0.080 485 1878 0.21
Blackburn
2009 0.215 0.276 0.061 257 1033 0.20
2010 0.261 0.273 0.012 230 999 0.19
2011 0.257 0.198 -0.059 195 1044 0.16
2012 0.157 0.220 0.062 219 1067 0.17
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Table 4.4: Indices of dissimilarity: Detailed ethnicity and inter-ethnic comparisons
Comparison Actual Nearest Difference N1 N2 Group 1
School Proportion
Pakistani
Region 0.686 0.681 -0.006 6817 85293 0.07
3towns 0.585 0.571 -0.014 2471 18843 0.12
Preston 0.416 0.488 0.071 229 6647 0.03
Oldham 0.594 0.587 -0.007 1274 8120 0.14
Blackburn 0.448 0.382 -0.066 968 4076 0.19
Bangladeshi
Region 0.810 0.789 -0.021 1849 90261 0.02
3towns 0.780 0.749 -0.031 1283 20031 0.06
Preston 0.455 0.529 0.074 15 6861 0.00
Oldham 0.683 0.585 -0.098 1223 8171 0.13
Blackburn 0.552 0.395 -0.157 45 4999 0.01
Indian
Region 0.758 0.770 0.012 3033 89077 0.03
3towns 0.667 0.665 -0.003 1697 19617 0.08
Preston 0.431 0.508 0.077 648 6228 0.09
Oldham 0.379 0.272 -0.107 37 9357 0.00
Blackburn 0.579 0.473 -0.106 1012 4032 0.20
Indian vs Bangladeshi
Region 0.906 0.900 -0.006 3033 1849 0.62
3towns 0.929 0.933 0.004 1697 1283 0.57
Preston 0.460 0.555 0.095 648 15 0.98
Oldham 0.525 0.383 -0.142 37 1223 0.03
Blackburn 0.389 0.191 -0.198 1012 45 0.96
Indian vs Pakistani
Region 0.667 0.663 -0.004 3033 6817 0.31
3towns 0.504 0.507 0.003 1697 2471 0.41
Preston 0.226 0.181 -0.045 648 229 0.74
Oldham 0.426 0.331 -0.095 37 1274 0.03
Blackburn 0.204 0.169 -0.036 1012 968 0.51
Pakistani vs Bangladeshi
Region 0.640 0.585 -0.055 6817 1849 0.79
3towns 0.637 0.570 -0.067 2471 1283 0.66
Preston 0.269 0.551 0.281 229 15 0.94
Oldham 0.536 0.430 -0.106 1274 1223 0.51
Blackburn 0.241 0.239 -0.002 968 45 0.96
Asian vs Black
Region 0.541 0.450 -0.091 13345 1637 0.89
3towns 0.554 0.393 -0.161 5909 480 0.92
Preston 0.415 0.262 -0.153 1103 163 0.87
Oldham 0.548 0.335 -0.213 2659 267 0.91
Blackburn 0.606 0.394 -0.212 2147 50 0.98
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4.2 Analysis of spatial market structure: choice and com-
petition
The thesis’ third research question asks how sorting affects the ability of the market
to offer choice to parents and to impose competition upon schools. When asking such
questions about the character and effects of choice and competition in education, it is
necessary to take into account the varied nature of choice and competition as they are
actually experienced by families and schools. Choice and competition are not homogenous
forces that operate in the same way in all places at all times – they are rather a convenient
shorthand for all of the interactions between families and schools, and between schools
and other schools, that arise as part of the allocation process. For families, ideally these
interactions are experienced as choice, and for schools, as competition.
The geographical specificity of school markets has been recognised in much of the em-
pirical economics literature on quasi-markets. Bradley et al. (2001) evaluate the effect
of the number of local competitors on secondary school efficiency, estimated using Data
Envelopment Analysis. Gibbons et al. (2008) and Bayer and McMillan (2010) provide
a more nuanced empirical definition of competition, defining it as the local elasticity of
demand with respect to quality, distinguishing it from choice as that which makes schools
compete on quality. However, in the economics literature there has been little attention
given to the question of how to visually represent market structure.
A handful of papers in geographical economics have used methods to visually represent
the geographical distribution of choice (Gibbons et al., 2006; Singleton et al., 2011; Harris
et al., 2016). Visual representations of market structure are worthwhile because, despite
the existence of choice, school markets are very localised – distance to school matters
much more than it does for, say, choice of hospital, because the choice that is made
dictates the daily commute for the next five to seven years. Furthermore, visualisations
have intuitive exploratory power, and aid in hypothesis generation. They allow the
analyst to pinpoint areas for further investigation. Visualisation techniques also have
applications in policy; a matter of some interest to policy-makers currently is the existence
of “cold spots” – locations where there is less choice of good schools2.
2Based on conversations with civil servants at the Department for Education.
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4.2.1 Spatial variation in effective choice
A key concept in market structure research is market concentration, the extent to which
a local market is dominated by one or a small number of providers. A commonly-used
measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl (or Herfindahl-Hirschman) Index, H.








where ns,gNg is the market share of school s at site g. In contrast to the notation for the
Index of Dissimilarity, in this context g is not a school, but a geographical area. The
Herfindahl Index takes values in [ 1Ns , 1], where Ns is the total number of schools. The
closer the index to one, the more concentrated is the market. A related measure which
we will call the Effective Choice Index, ES, defined as the reciprocal of the Herfindahl
index, is used to represent the effective amount of choice in the market; it takes values
between one and Ns. If all schools’ catchments were distributed uniformly over the entire
space the effective number of schools operating in each location would be equal to Ns.
The more one school dominates in a particular location, the closer ES is to one at that
location.
In order to analyse local variations in the amount of choice available to families, the
geo-coded region-wide intake data has been counted into a regular 500m grid, and the
Effective Choice Index, ES, calculated for each grid square. Although this level of
granularity allows detailed spatial analysis, the gridded counts become very sparse, with
many zeroes; this means that the Herfindahl Index and the Effective Choice Index are only
defined on a handful of grid squares. For this reason the gridded counts were smoothed
using a Kernel Density smoother. The function image.smooth in the R package fields
was used (Nychka et al., 2015). The smoother treats the count in each square as a point
mass in the centre of the square, and replaces this point mass with a density shared
between the original square and other squares, based upon the distance between grid
centroids. The density, and the bandwidth of the density, are chosen by the researcher.
The density and the bandwidth were chosen by eye to obtain coverage of the map, whilst
avoiding oversmoothing. Densities with bounded support did not provide coverage of
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the map. A relatively heavy-tailed sigmoid kernel was used, as this appeared to cover
the map whilst maintaining detail in urban areas. The sigmoid kernel has unnormalised
density K(x) = 1/[exp (x) + exp (−x)] (where x is the squared distance between grid
centroids). A bandwidth of 500m was considered to provide a minimum feasible amount
of smoothing. Gaussian, Epanechnikov and Logistic kernels were tested with several
different bandwidths, with very similar results. For each school, these gridded counts
represent a smoothed estimate of the de facto catchment area of that school.
Figure 4.1 presents the local Effective Choice Indices for the whole region in 2012. Al-
though much of the pattern in the figure is caused by the underlying distributions of
families and schools, there are a few points of interest. Firstly, Preston stands out
clearly as a hotspot, and this does not appear to be simply a function of population
and the number of schools since Blackpool and areas of Greater Manchester have similar
populations but do not appear to have as much local mixing. Second, it is possible to
compare schools that are similarly remote but have very different local market structures.
For example, Garstang High School, halfway between Preston and Lancaster, appears to
have a slightly more mixed local market than Carr Hill High School, halfway between
Preston and Blackpool.
There appear to be some schools, even in urban areas, that act as local monopolies,
repelling competition from other schools. There is an example in Blackpool of a school
with a ring of blue around it. It is not clear from the figure whether this is caused by
the popularity of the school, or some unseen barriers to accessing other schools in the
locality. Unfortunately the market structure of Oldham cannot be read at face value from
the plot, because Oldham is at the boundary of the dataset, and the smoothed counts
do not adjust for boundary effects. It is probable that there are schools in the areas to
the south and east of Oldham that provide additional choice to families in Oldham, but
are not observed in the data.
4.2.2 Analysis of pairwise competition between schools
The second analysis visually represents the competitiveness of the market in terms of the
pairwise competition between any pair of schools. To represent the pairwise competition,
the smoothed, gridded counts of pupils from the previous analysis have been used to
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represent each school’s de facto catchment area. The catchment areas each pair of schools
have been compared using the index of Dissimilarity D to measure the separateness of
the two spatial distributions. In this context g is a grid square, and t indexes the two
schools. Pairs of schools whose catchments overlap to a large degree will have a small
pairwise D. It is expected that D between two schools will correlate closely, but not
exactly, with distance, and it is the exceptions to this rule that are of most interest.
These pairwise dissimilarity indices can be presented in a symmetric matrix. To aid
visual inspection the rows and columns of the matrix can be permuted so that small
dissimilarities are closer to the main diagonal. This reveals cliques – sets of schools with
dense pairwise interactions defined by overlapping catchment areas. The permutation
was accomplished using anti-Robinson optimisation by simulated annealing, using the R
package seriation (Hahsler et al., 2008).
Figure 4.2 shows the dissimilarity matrix for North and East Lancashire, and Figure
4.3 shows the matrix for South Lancashire and Greater Manchester. Figure 4.2 reveals
clear clique structure, but also some overlap between Preston and schools in Leyland,
Longridge, Garstang and Lancaster. It can be seen that pupils travel from schools in
Preston to attend Lancaster Royal Grammar School and to a lesser extent Lancaster
Girls’ Grammar. This is probably explained by the lack of state grammar schools in
Preston.
In the previous chapter it was shown that the catchment area of schools in Preston ex-
tends into Blackburn. Figure 4.2 reveals that almost all of this overlap is explained by
Walton-le-Dale Arts College, in the south east of Preston, which has a catchment that
extends to Blackburn. Schools in Blackburn have catchments that overlap with schools
up the Calder Valley towards Burnley. There is some evidence that faith schools, in par-
ticular Church of England schools (for example St Wilfrid’s CofE School in Blackburn),
have larger catchment areas than community schools.
Figure 4.3 suggests that the school markets in the more densely-populated south of
the region are less self-contained. Nevertheless schools in Oldham form a clear clique.
Two schools in Oldham, The Blue Coat CofE School and The Crompton House CofE
School, have larger catchment areas than the other schools, which extend north into the
neighbouring authorities Rochdale and Bury.
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4.2.3 Discussion
The analyses of choice and competition in this section are intended to provide model-
free visual insights into market structure. Whilst they have provided some tentative
insights into choice and competition, an evaluation of the usefulness of these methods
must contend with several weaknesses. First, although the analyses were intended to be
model-free and hence, in some sense, objective, several design decisions were necessary
– for example, in the choice of kernels and bandwidths – to operationalise the analysis.
Second, the resulting visualisations are sensitive to the underlying distribution of the
population. It is not clear, for example, how to read areas of relatively abundant school
choice that fall in rural areas in between two or more urban areas. These rural areas
clearly benefit from the choice of more than one urban school market, but they also suffer
from the increased distance to schools and lack of public transport options.
In general it is difficult to disaggregate the effects of sorting from purely spatial struc-
ture. This could perhaps be remedied by comparing visualisations of observed data with
equivalent visualisations calculated using a nearest-school counterfactual.
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Effective number of schools in local market
Figure 4.1: The heat map shows the “effective number of schools” available in each grid square,
calculated as the reciprocal of the Herfindahl Index. Underlying pupil counts were smoothed using a
kernel smoother, before calculating the plotted values. Crosses are locations of schools.
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Figure 4.2: Dissimilarity indices between the gridded, KDE-smoothed catchment distributions of pairs of schools in North
and East Lancashire. Matrix indices have been permuted using anti-Robinson optimisation to reveal clusters.
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Figure 4.3: Dissimilarity indices between the gridded, KDE-smoothed catchment distributions of pairs of schools in




The analyses presented in Chapter 4 – segregation indices, effective choice sets and
competition networks – provided useful insights into associations between geography,
choice, sorting and competition. However, the implicit aim of all three analyses was
to illuminate the causal factors underlying these themes. To this end, the analyses
were suggestive of causal effects. For example, the segregation indices gave evidence for
post-residential sorting in urban neighbourhoods. However, according to the framework
for sorting laid out in Chapter 2 there are several causal factors that could lead to
post-residential sorting. Similarly, with the other analyses it was difficult to disentangle
geography from other factors underlying patterns of choice and competition. The analyses
fell short of illuminating causal explanations because they were not based on a model of
the underlying causal processes, of which arguably the most important is the decision-
making of families.
Given that the field is called School Choice, there have been surprisingly few attempts
to model family choices of school explicitly, as opposed to modelling the effects of choice.
The main barrier has been the lack of good quality choice data. Of the studies reviewed
in Chapter 2, only a couple (Hastings et al., 2005; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2015) have
managed to obtain stated preferences data from the allocation process. Burgess et al.
(2015) use a large longitudinal survey, linked to data from the National Pupil Database.
Bayer and McMillan (2010) and Gibbons et al. (2013) use house price data to analyse
Tiebout choice. Having only observed allocations data, Caetano and Maheshri (2013)
and Gallego and Hernando (2009) assume that supply is perfectly elastic, and allocations
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therefore represent choices (which may be a reasonable assumption in their contexts).
But school preferences cannot be ignored, however difficult it may be to obtain revealing
data. Choices underlie sorting, directly via peer-preferences, and indirectly through the
way that some families’ choices constrain other families choices. Choices also underlie
quasi-market competition. School markets are defined by schools competing against other
schools to achieve and maintain market share. Market share is simply the aggregate of
family decision-making. This implies that those qualities of schools, families and the
interaction between the two, that affect the choices families make, may help to explain
both sorting and competition. What is more, understanding school choices may also
lead to insights into how competition affects sorting (which has been the aim of studies
such as Epple and Romano (1998)), and also – which has been less well studied – how
sorting may affect competition. In short, family decision-making is the glue that links
competition and sorting.
There are two main post-residential choice processes that may contribute to sorting
and competition effects. The first process is the differentiation of preferences by socio-
economic circumstances. There is increasing econometric evidence from several countries
(eg. Hastings et al., 2005; Gallego and Hernando, 2009; Burgess et al., 2015) that, al-
though in general parents from all backgrounds value school performance as measured
by test scores, middle-class parents tend to place a greater weight on test scores, and less
weight on proximity when choosing a school. Burgess et al. (2015) use the Millenium
Cohort Study to analyse parental preferences for primary schools, finding that parents
value proximity and educational performance as measured by test scores. They also
find that the relative weight of these two factors is differentiated by the socio-economic
background of the family, as measured by SES variables included in the survey. These
elements of preferences are important in understanding competition, as “quality-seeking
behaviour” plays a central role in creating the necessary conditions for raising standards
in market-like systems. Moderated preferences for quality may also play a role in sorting;
in a school market with moderated preferences for test scores, sorting on SES would arise
simply because higher-SES families are more likely to travel further to attend a school
with good academic performance.
The second process concerns the importance of the ethnic demographics of the school in
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the formation of school preferences. Alongside proximity, quality and other factors, par-
ents may consciously or unconsciously evaluate the prevalence of different ethnic groups
at a school, and weigh this in choosing a school for their child. We can evaluate the
relative strength of preferences of each group; this would shed light on the extent to
which preference-induced sorting is one-sided (“vertical”) or mutual (“horizontal”). It is
also important to allow for the possibility that peer preferences are not linear. Perhaps
parents would prefer a mixed school, rather than either a white or minority “monocul-
ture”. It is necessary to specify peer preferences in such a way that various hypotheses
can be accommodated.
A handful of studies of school choice have allowed for preferences for peer groups (Elacqua
et al., 2006; Hastings et al., 2009; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2015; Burgess et al., 2015). Of the
econometric papers, Caetano and Maheshri (2013) is worthy of note, as the authors not
only estimate a model for ethnic in-group preferences (homophily) but also empirically
estimate a model of tipping points leading to segregation.
Although we have chosen to focus on socio-economic groups for the first question, and
ethnic groups for the second, this is primarily for practical rather than substantive rea-
sons. There is no reason a priori why we shouldn’t expect peer preferences for SES, and
moderation of preferences for quality by ethnicity. However, with the data we have it
would be difficult to simultaneously identify the moderation of preferences for quality
and peer preferences for the same set of groups. This is because the correlation between,
say, the socio-economic composition of, and the academic performance of schools is so
great that it is difficult to distinguish between the two types of preference. By studying
only one type of preference phenomenon in relation to each category, we in effect set up
an exclusion restriction that enables stable estimation. For this reason we follow previ-
ous studies in focussing on SES in relation to the question of preferences for quality, and
ethnicity in relation to peer preferences.
These two processes – peer preferences and moderated preferences for quality – are our
primary focus in modelling school preferences. We will also account for preferences for
proximity, and preferences for religious schools.
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5.1 Discrete choice models
The statistical modelling of choice for a person faced with several discrete alternatives
was studied in the field of psychology by Thurstone (1927), axiomatised by Luce (1959),
and further refined and popularised in the field of Economics by McFadden (1974, 1981).
Discrete choice models are based on a representation of decision-making agents as aiming
to maximise the utility of their decision. Each agent has a utility function, that maps
relevant choice criteria and idiosyncratic preferences to a latent quantity called utility,
quantifying the value of each choice to the agent. The agent chooses the option that
maximises his or her utility. A stochastic element in the utility function converts a
deterministic decision problem into a statistical model. For this reason, discrete choice
models are also called Random Utility Models (RUMs).
In the terminology of econometrics, RUMs are structural models, meaning that the model
parameters are equated to parameters of a theoretical economic model. In the case of
RUMs, the corresponding economic models are models of human behaviour under un-
certainty. It is possible to elaborate on RUMs by drawing on economic theories that
aim to predict the decision-making behaviour of agents, or normatively specify optimal
behaviour, based on rationality (expected utility theory) intertemporal optimality (dy-
namic discrete choice; see Aguirregabiria and Mirak (2010) for a recent review), bounded
rationality (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or other elaborations. However, discrete
choice models can also be used agnostically as descriptive models of behaviour, without
adopting utility-based behavioural theories of choice.
In the context of school choice, a typical utility function for a family might look like








where das is home-school distance, xs are observable school characteristics, and xas are
interactions between pupil and school characteristics. as are terms relating to unobserved
preference heterogeneity assumed to follow some parametric distribution, say N(0, 1).
The model is parametrised by β. For compactness we can write this as Uas = fas+ as =
xTasβ + as, bearing in mind that xas subsumes das and contains a mixture of covariates
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that vary by school only and by pupil and school. Note that neither pupil characteristics,
nor an intercept term, enter into pupils’ utility functions on their own.
The parametric random utility model model allows the estimation of the relative im-
portance of different factors in the decision-making process, as well as the probabilities
of a family choosing each school from a known choice set, and the aggregate demand
that each school would enjoy under counterfactual scenarios. It is therefore a very useful
model for our purposes.
The Maximum Likelihood estimator for the random utility model when choices are ob-



















as < fam(a) + e− fas
) pam(a)(e) de.
In this notation Na is the number of students in the sample, and m(a) is the index of
the alternative chosen by student a – in the context of school choice, the “match” of a.

















where φ(·) is the standard normal density, and Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF. This
is known as the multinomial probit discrete choice model.
Another important variant of the model occurs when the stochastic part of utility is
distributed Extreme Value Type-II (Gumbel). Due to the properties of the Gumbel







This is known as the multinomial logit (MN-logit) discrete choice model.
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There are three main conditions for identification of a discrete choice model:
1. Only differences matter (Train, 2009). It is clear from the model above, that the
likelihood contribution of each observation depends only upon the differences in




. Adding a term that is con-
stant for all options for each pupil, such as an intercept term, or a term depending
only on pupil characteristics, would not affect this difference, and therefore such
terms are not identifiable.
2. Utilities are scale-invariant (Train, 2009). Scaling the utilities by a constant does
not affect the choice probabilities. This means that σ2 must be fixed, to allow the
estimation of β. In the MN-probit model σ2 is usually fixed at one, whereas the
MN-logit model usually has σ2 = pi2/6 ≈ 1.6.
3. Non-separation of differences. This condition is not usually discussed in relation
to discrete choice models specifically, but separation is a well-known phenomenon
in modelling dichotomous outcomes more generally. In the context of the discrete
choice model, separation would occur when, for some covariate, the distribution




does not have support on both sides
of zero. If such differences are all positive or all negative, the likelihood function
for the corresponding parameter is not bounded and the MLE for that parameter
is infinite. This condition is mentioned now as it will be relevant in discussing
identification for two-sided choice models.
5.1.1 Aggregate demand and substitution
A common use of discrete choice models is to predict the aggregate demand for or market
share of alternatives under different counterfactual scenarios. Such scenarios involve the
exogenous alteration of observable characteristics of the alternatives, or the distribution
of observable characteristics in the population, or both. Given an estimated model,
the aggregate demand for alternative s is defined as the sum over all predicted choice
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For the evaluation of counterfactuals involving characteristic xs, either the derivative of





= ∂ logDs∂ log xs may be of interest.





. These estimable quantities describe how strongly the market demand for t re-
sponds to changes in observable characteristic xs. The cross-derivatives and -elasticities
describe the pairwise dependence of each alternative on the other alternatives for demand.
If xs changes, such that demand for alternative s goes down, the cross-derivatives
∂Ds′
∂xs
describe how families substitute other schools for school s. These patterns of substitu-
tion are often an important output of market analysis, so it is important that they are
accurate. However, discrete choice models as described above are limited in their ability
to model complex patterns of substitution, as they do not allow for unobserved system-
atic variation in tastes leading to correlated errors as across alternatives for a given
individual. For example, there may be an unobservable (to the researcher) characteris-
tic of schools, say the smartness of their uniforms, and a certain sub-group of parents
who value smart school uniforms highly. If they move away from a school with smart
uniforms they are more likely to substitute another school with smart uniforms. This
shared unobservable variation in tastes would cause the error terms for the two schools
to be correlated, and this correlation would not be captured by the model, leading to
inaccurate patterns of substitution. There are two ways to deal with this problem: ei-
ther ensure that all relevant variation in tastes is captured by observable characteristics
within the model; or allow the error terms to be correlated. The latter option would
usually require computationally difficult numerical integration.
5.2 The two-sided matching model
By modelling school choices we can uncover the determinants of family decision-making
to explain processes of sorting and competition. The problem with this approach is
that discrete choice estimation requires data relating to choices that relate simply to
underlying preferences. In the context of school choice, the allocation of a child to a
school is not always a direct reflection of the family’s preferences, as some proportion
of children do not get into their first choice school. The more supply of school places is
constrained, the greater the proportion of parents who will not receive their first choice
Chapter 5. Studying parental choices 83
of school, and the greater the potential for bias from treating school allocations as if they
revealed first preferences. In previous international literature (Caetano and Maheshri,
2013; Gallego and Hernando, 2009) this issue has been ignored on the rationale that
supply of school places is reasonably elastic and the majority of parents achieve their first
preference school. However, in the UK the supply of school places is highly constrained
and the strategy of using a naive choice model risks introducing an unacceptable amount
of bias.
In the terminology of the discrete choice literature, the constrained matching problem
corresponds to each family having a choice set that is both endogenous and unobserved.
Each party’s choice set is only defined in equilibrium and is not visible to the researcher1.
This is in contrast to traditional discrete choice models, which rely on the assumption
that the choice set, and all relevant characteristics of all available options, can be ob-
served. Any solution to this problem must therefore deal with unobserved variables and
endogeneity.
To deal with this problem, we have developed a structural model based on the game-
theoretic properties of school allocations as two-sided matchings. The model and as-
sociated estimation method draw on a branch of game theory and mechanism design
known as Stable Matching Theory, introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). The theory
analyses two-sided matching problems known as the Marriage Problem and the College
Admissions Problem, and develops a relevant solution concept known as stability. Chap-
ter 8 discusses the background and relevance of stable matching theory in greater detail.
The particular relevance of stable matching theory for school choice stems from the
widespread use of concepts from stable matching theory in designing centralised school
allocation mechanisms.
Chapter 9 motivates the “stability” partial likelihood model in greater depth; in this
section we briefly describe the model and method. The model begins with the assumption
that an observed school matching (a set of data on pupils allocated to schools, with
pupil and school characteristics) is a stable matching. This assumption is justified by the
predominant use by LEAs, of centralised allocation algorithms designed to return a stable
matching2. Given a stable matching, it is possible to derive a set of preference relations or
1See Section 8.3 in Chapter 8 for a full discussion of the concept of “stable choice sets.”
2Existing legislation does not mandate the use of stable-matching mechanisms by admissions clearing-
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inequalities on underlying utilities. These revealed inequalities provide information about
the parameters of underlying Random Utility Models in a way similar to the inequalities
that allow identification in standard discrete choice models.
In order to implement the model, it is necessary to specify random utility models for
both sides of the matching – that is, for both pupils and schools. This is problematised
by the fact that in educational quasi-markets such as in England, schools do not express
preferences for pupils in the strictest sense. However, schools do use over-subscription
criteria, codified in each school’s admissions policy, to rank pupils when the school is
oversubscribed. It is these criteria that we model as “pseudo-utilities”. We can do this
by setting up a random utility function for schools, such as Vsa = g(dsa, za, zsa; δ) + ηsa,
where g(·) is a linear model of observable characteristics, and ηsa is an unobservable
random term distributed according to a known parametric distribution, say N(0, 1). δ
denotes a set of parameters, and these are combined with the pupil-side parameters in
θ = (β, δ). The pseudo-utility function does not contain terms relating only to charac-
teristics of the school, as these would only shift each school’s utility for all options, and
would therefore not affect preference formation. There are no other restrictions on the
inclusion of observables in either the pupils’ or schools’ utility functions. In particular
the two utility functions may contain some or all of the same covariates, as long as the
identification restrictions already mentioned are met. Identification is further discussed
in Chapter 9.
A market is an ordered triple (A,S, pi), where A is a set of pupils, S is a set of schools,
and pi is a full set of (pseudo-)preferences on both sides of the market – a preference
profile. The function m(·) maps each pupil or school to his/her/its set-valued “match” on
the other side of the market3. Letm denote a matching – that is, a full set of pupil-school
matched pairs. The set of all possible matchings for a given market is denoted by M
and the subset of matchings that are stable with respect to a given market are denoted
byM∗. Dependence ofM∗ upon the market, and especially upon the preference profile,
is implicit.
Informally, stability of a matching m is equivalent to the condition that each school-
houses. However, the Admissions Code 2007 did outlaw a popular form of non-stable-matching algorithm,
which has led most LEAs to adopt stable-matching algorithms (Pathak and Sönmez, 2011)
3We abuse notation slightly by allowing s = m(a) rather than {s} = m(a), which enables the use of
the function in indices.
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student pair who are not matched would not mutually prefer to match with each other
than their current matches. Let Ua = Uas : {s} = m(a). This is the student’s utility for
her allocated school. Similarly, let Vs = mina∈m(s){Vsa} be the utility of the worst student
matched with school s. For each unmatched pair (a, s), the pair blocks the matching if
and only if Uas > Ua and Vas > Vs. If there are no such pairs, the matching is stable.
For a given matching m, the probability of pairwise stability is equivalent to the proba-
bility that no unmatched pair (a, s) blocks the matching. The conditional likelihood of
stability, given the matching, the parameters and the matched utilities is defined as
Pr
(
m ∈M∗|θ,V,U) = ∏
(a,s)/∈m
{
1− Pr(Uas > Ua)Pr(Vsa > Vs)} ,
and marginalising over U gives
Pr
(








The integrals over pUa(u) (a standard normal density given the Probit model) are easily
approximated using gaussian quadrature rules. The joint probability distribution of
stability and the unobserved V is
Pr(m ∈M∗,v|θ) = Pr(m ∈M∗|θ,V)∏
s∈S


















The estimation method we adopt to estimate the parameters θ using this likelihood
function is described below.
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5.2.1 Specification of the pupil utility model
The pupil utility model must take into account the factors potentially influencing school
choice that were discussed earlier – peer preferences and moderated preferences for aca-
demic performance. It must also take account of proximity, as parents have obvious
incentives to prefer closer schools over schools further away, all things being equal. The
NPD data contains the postcodes of both schools and pupils as well as the Ordnance
Survey northings and eastings of the postcode centroids. The OS co-ordinates are used
to calculate the linear distance between each pupil’s postcode and each school in kilo-
metres. Since postcode is the lowest-level geographical identifier, the measurement error
in using postcode centroid to approximate location is considered negligible and is not
accounted for in the model.
Previous discrete choice studies of school choice have assumed that utility is linear in
distance from school. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2015) stated that this assumption allowed
distance to be used as a “numeraire” to set a scale for utility comparisons in the absence
of money. We wish to accommodate the possibility that utility for proximity is non-
linear. However, a polynomial specification for distance, such as a quadratic or cubic, is
too constraining. A quadratic specification, for example, may be influenced too much by
the extremes of distance where choice probabilities are very low. To allow for non-linear
preferences for proximity we have specified a model in which utility for proximity is piece-
wise linear, with the “knots” chosen so that they fall roughly at the quartiles of allocated
distances across all samples; the knots (including boundary knots) are at {0, 2.5, 4, 6, 22}
kilometres. This allows the gradient of the proximity utility function to change at each
quartile. The piecewise linear terms were parametrised as a B-spline to minimise cor-
relation between terms for computational reasons. The R functions splineDesign and
bs were used to create the B-spline design matrices (R Core Team, 2016). In addition,
a dummy for the closest school to the pupil is included to allow for the possibility that
families give additional weight to their nearest school, which is not accounted for by
proximity alone.
To operationalise peer effects pupil ethnicities and data on the ethnic mix at schools
are used. In the urban samples of pupils the predominant ethnic groups are: white
British; Indian; Pakistani; and Bangladeshi; with much smaller proportions of other eth-
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nic groups. Because the estimation of peer preferences requires reasonably large group
sizes, ethnicity is re-categorised into three groups: white British; Asian (including In-
dian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi but excluding ‘other asian’); and Other (including ‘white
other’ and ‘asian other’). In the context of the three urban school markets, this categori-
sation is appropriate as south asian pupils tend to form the main minority ethnic group
in all three markets.
School ethnic mix is represented by two-year lagged mean proportions of White and
Asian categories at each school (whole-school population). Proportions are calculated
as the mean of proportions at y − 2 and y − 1, where y is the year of entry. Lagged
mean percentages have been divided by 10 so that they take values between one and 10
and parameter estimates represent the change in utility per 10 point change in ethnic
composition. The lagged means are designed to represent parents’ qualitative recogni-
tion of the relative ethnic compositions of schools, gleaned from direct observation and
social networks, as opposed to a precise knowledge of ethnic proportions, which are not
published. Lagged mean proportions are interacted with pupil ethnicity dummies, such
that only white pupils have a term for the white composition of schools, and likewise
for asian pupils. In this way homophily (preference for one’s in-group) is modelled ex-
plicitly, but xenophobia (dis-preference for another group) is not modelled. Linear and
quadratic terms on these interactions are included in the pupil utility function to allow
for non-linear peer preferences. Peer preferences for the Other category are not modelled
as the group size is too small.
Academic performance is operationalised as the % of children in each year achieving five
or more A*–C at GCSE (5AC). During the sampled period this measure was the main
raw performance measure used in performance tables published by the government and
in league tables. This raw performance measure was used rather than a value-added
measure such as Contextualised Value-Added (CVA) for two reasons. First, there is
evidence from empirical studies that parents focus on raw performance when choosing
schools, rather than value-added measures (Wilson et al., 2006). Second, value-added
measures used in performance tables changed during the study period, whereas the 5AC
measure remained unaltered4. Using a measure that has not been altered during the
sampled period facilitated the combination of estimates across years. As with ethnic
4The 5AC measure has recently been superceded by Progress 8.
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preferences, the two-year lagged mean of 5AC was used to represent parents’ weighing
several information sources (including out-of-date word of mouth as well as up-to-date
statistics). The measure was standardised in each sample, so that parameter estimates
could be interpreted per standard deviation change in 5AC.
Measuring socio-economic status (SES) using data from the NPD is problematic. The
two variables that are widely used as proxies for SES are Free School Meals eligibility
(FSM) and the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI). Each has been
criticised for different reasons. FSM indicators denote that a child is, or has been at some
point in the past six years, eligible for a free school meal because the family receives
certain state benefits. However, this is not an indicator of poverty per se and it has
been criticised on the grounds that it contains an element of arbitrariness and fails to
measure the working poor (Hobbs and Vignoles, 2007). IDACI, on the other hand, is
a geographically-imputed variable – that is, a composite of the prevalence of certain
indicators of deprivation in census tracts, that has been assigned to each pupil based
on the pupil’s postcode. This means that, rather than measuring the pupil’s income
deprivation, it assumes that the pupil’s circumstances are explained by the pupil’s home
location. As a geographically-imputed variable, IDACI is only valid as a proxy for pupil
SES to the extent that residential sorting on SES exists.
Each of these proxies for SES is problematic. Crawford and Greaves (2013) compared
several proxies for SES and concluded that at a school level, the proportion receiving
FSM was a better predictor of “educational disadvantage” than IDACI. However, we
require a proxy for SES that has good properties at the level of an individual pupil,
and for this purpose there are several reasons to prefer IDACI. First, FSM codifies a
single administrative rule based on somewhat arbitrary criteria, whereas IDACI at least
averages over several rule-based classifications, and many census respondents, leading to
an estimate of deprivation that should be expected to be more stable and less sensitive
to arbitrary rules. Second, IDACI allows more finely-grained classification into five (or
any number of) levels, whereas FSM only allows binary classification. A single ‘outlier’
may be more influential when using FSM than IDACI quintiles, since the influence of a
single case on the estimate for one quintile will not affect neighbouring quintiles.
The IDACI variable is a proportion of households in each census tract experiencing in-
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come deprivation. These were transformed into a national rank, and thence into national
quintiles. The reason for this transformation was that transforming IDACI into an or-
dered factor variable avoids having to assume linearity in the effect of IDACI on utilities.
Finally, to allow for the moderation of preferences for academic performance by SES, the
standardised 5AC measure was interacted with IDACI quintiles. In one model IDACI
quintiles were replaced by an indicator of FSM eligibility.
The final part of the pupil utility model was a term interacting the Christian religious
denomination of the school with the religious denomination of the pupil’s primary school.
Separate terms are estimated for Church of England (CofE) and Roman Catholic (RC)
schools. The CofE term takes a value of one if the secondary school has a CofE denomi-
nation and the pupil’s primary school also has a CofE denomination, zero otherwise. The
RC term is defined similarly. The substantive interpretation of this measure is the extent
to which families who send their children to faith primary schools prefer faith secondary
schools, or if primary school denomination is viewed as a proxy for faith, the extent to
which people of faith prefer schools of that faith. The practical reason for the inclusion
of the terms is that they appear in the school utility model; we therefore avoid adding
an additional exclusion restriction to the set of assumptions. By including this term in
both the pupil and the school models we allow for the possibility that sorting based on
religious denomination is by choice as well as constraint.
The existence of all-boys schools and all-girls schools means that for both boys and girls
there are some schools that are not available, and should not be considered to be part of
the choice set. To account for this, cases corresponding to a girl’s probability of forming
a blocking pair with a boys’ school, or a boy with a girls’ school, are simply excluded
from the log-likelihood function.
The following pupil utility functions have been estimated. The first, model A, specifies
a linear function for distance and ethnic mix, and uses IDACI:




β5j(5ACs × IDACI.Qaj) + β6(CofEs × CofEPrimarya) + β7(RCs × RCPrimarya) + as,
where IDACI.Qa are a set of dummy variables indicating which IDACI quintile the pupil
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belongs to. Model B allows quadratic peer preferences:
Uas = β1distanceas + β2closestas + β3(Asiana × %Asians) + β8(Asiana × %Asians)2
+ β4(WhiteBra × %WhiteBrs) + β9(WhiteBra × %WhiteBrs)2+
5∑
j=1
β5j(5ACs × IDACI.Qaj) + β6(CofEs × CofEPrimarya) + β7(RCs × RCPrimarya) + as.




β1iBi(distanceas) + β2closestas + β3(Asiana × %Asians) + β8(Asiana × %Asians)2




β5j(5ACs × IDACI.Qaj) + β6(CofEs × CofEPrimarya) + β7(RCs × RCPrimarya) + as,
where Bi() is a linear B-spline basis function. The final specification, model D, features
linear distance and quadratic peer effects, and uses FSM in place of IDACI:
Uas = β1distanceas + β2closestas + β3(Asiana × %Asians) + β8(Asiana × %Asians)2




β5j(5ACs × FSMaj) + β6(CofEs × CofEPrimarya) + β7(RCs × RCPrimarya) + as.
In addition to the specifications above, we also undertake a sensitivity analysis using
model B (quadratic ethnic preferences) whereby all Islamic schools are removed and the
model is re-estimated. Islamic schools, of which there is one in Preston and two in
Blackburn, tend to have large proportions of Asian students. They also have faith-based
admissions criteria for at least part of their intake. The sample does not contain any
information about feeder schools, regular worship, or other criteria that constitute the
admissions criteria, so it is possible that religious preferences, and religious constraints,
may be confounded with ethnic preferences. For this reason we exclude Islamic schools
to test the influence of these schools on results.
One aspect that is missing from the pupil utility model, that is often included in discrete
choice models, is a school fixed effect (a dummy variable for each school) whose pur-
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pose would be to mop up any unobserved systematic variation in school popularity, not
explained by school-level covariates. Although theoretically identifiable in many-to-one
two-sided structural models, we found that in practice adding fixed effects to the model
led to correlation and local optima in the likelihood function, hindering stable estimation.
This appears to be due to the fact that the two-sided method already includes a latent
variable for each school that mops up some unobserved variation in the popularity of
schools, since less popular schools tend to have lower threshold utilities V. Fixed effects
interact with these latent variables to produce local optima in the likelihood function,
which makes estimation problematic. Excluding fixed effects should not affect the un-
biased estimation of other pupil utility parameters, but is relevant to the accuracy of
aggregate demand estimation for policy analysis.
Assuming that as are uncorrelated across schools implies that the model does not allow
for substitution in the sense defined by Train (2009) – that is, non-proportional substitu-
tion in the individual choice probabilities, conditioning on observables. In other words,
the model does not allow for the possibility that there is some unobservable characteristic
shared by schools s and s′ such that people who like school s would be more likely to
like school s′, and vice-versa. However, a more important question for policy analysis
is whether the model allows for realistic patterns of substitution in aggregate demand
for schools, averaging over observables. This is indeed the case; by specifying a model
that richly interacts school characteristics with pupil characteristics (location, ethnicity,
SES and primary school denomination), rich patterns of substitution are possible. The
presence of non-proportional substitution can be confirmed by analysing cross-elasticities
of demand for a school with all other schools, and checking that they are not all equal.
5.2.2 Specification of the school pseudo-utility model
Admissions policies are differentiated by school, and generally rank pupils on the basis of
faith, siblings, catchment areas and distance. Looked after children, or children who have
been adopted from care, receive the highest priority. In addition, pupils with Special
Educational Needs (SEN) are allocated on the basis of an assessment of their needs,
independently of capacity. However, the data does not contain indicators of looked after
children or special educational needs as these data are too sensitive. This raises the
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issue that there might be pupils in schools who appear to live, for example, too far away
to gain acceptance, but are higher priority for those schools than they appear to be,
because they are either looked-after children or have SEN. The model is sensitive to
outliers who influence a school’s apparent threshold of acceptance. However, the model
is not as sensitive to missing pupils when those pupils are high priority and therefore not
at or near the threshold. For this reason, the NPD team were requested to identify and
exclude SEN and looked after children from the sample.
The sibling rule is usually the most important element of rankings in terms of the number
of children admitted under that rule, but siblings are not observed at all in the sample. We
do not have data on catchment areas. This means that the observed pupil characteristics
available to model school pseudo-utilities are necessarily limited. Distance appears as
a tie-breaker in almost all admissions policies. Similarly to the pupil utility model, we
use the straight-line distance between the pupil’s address and the school’s address. A
separate term is allowed for community schools and faith schools, to allow for the fact
that faith schools use faith criteria in addition to distance, and therefore accept pupils
from a wider area.
We do not directly observe the faith of pupils, but we do observe the primary school that
was attended. Use of this information as a proxy for faith is justified on the grounds that
gaining admission to a faith primary school often requires the same kind of evidence of
religious practice as that required for admission to a faith secondary school. In addition,
faith secondary schools, particularly Catholic schools, often include attendance at feeder
primary schools in their admissions criteria.
The school utility function is specified as follows:
Vsa = δ1(Distancesa × FaithSchs) + δ2(Distanceas × [1− FaithSchs])
+ δ3(CofEs × CofEPrimarya) + δ4(RCs × RCPrimarya) + ηsa,
where FaithSchs is an indicator of whether the school is a faith school.
The school pseudo-utility function represents all supply-side constraints that limit the
ability of families to choose the school they would prefer. The school model incorporates
distance and faith feeder schools, but not ethnicity or SES; this exclusion restriction
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implies that ethnicity and SES do not enter directly into the constraints that families
face in accessing schools. However, ethnicity and SES may affect admission probabilities
indirectly to the extent that they are correlated with residential location and the primary
schools attended by pupils. Although it would be possible to add ethnicity and SES into
the supply-side model, it was decided to only account for those pupil characteristics
that may reasonably be expected to be visible to schools, as schools are prohibited from
interviewing pupils or asking for information about their ethnicity or socio-economic
background.
An implicit assumption in the model is that each school’s intake is equal to its capacity.
This is a strong assumption, since in a given market there may be one or more schools
that have spare capacity. However, the assumption is unavoidable as we do not have
data on school capacities. If capacity data were available, knowing that a school is
not at capacity would be equivalent to knowing that its threshold utility Vs is equal to
the utility of the outside option – Vs0. Since in England schools are not permitted to
keep spare capacity voluntarily if there are students who wish to go to the school, this
implies that the utility of the outside option must be lower than the utility of any child –
therefore Vs = Vs0 = −∞. It is not clear how sensitive estimation would be to the exact
value of Vs if it were fixed at some large negative value, however simulation evidence
(not presented) suggests that estimates of θ are somewhat robust to misspecifications of
threshold utilities or capacities. In practice, setting Vs for some s to a low value would
imply that some preference inequalities on the pupil-side would be certain, rather than
contingent on the school-side.
5.2.3 Estimation
The stability likelihood model contains two sets of latent variables: U and V. The model
marginalises over the former, using numerical integration (Gaussian quadrature), leaving
the latter as nuisance variables. There are several possible strategies for eliminating these
nuisance variables and obtaining estimates of the parameters of interest, all of which are
computationally demanding. The strategy we have adopted produces accurate point
estimates with a moderate computational cost, at the expense of assuming normality,
which may impact upon interval estimation. The Maximum h-Likelihood Estimator
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(MhLE) jointly maximises the log-likelihood over both θ = (β, δ) and V. The properties
of this estimator are discussed in Chapter 9.
Estimation of parameters on combined datasets was achieved using the Expectation
Propagation (EP) algorithm described in Chapter 9. The EP algorithm permits the
use of a prior on θ, to regularise estimation – i.e. to reduce collinearity and improve the
stability of optimisation. An appealing property of the EP algorithm is that priors can be
used that are informative for each individual dataset but not informative enough to affect
the combined approximate posterior. Priors were used liberally during the development
of the model to stabilise estimation. However, the only informative prior used in the
final models was a weakly informative ridge prior on the feeder school parameters, with
diagonal elements equivalent to σFeeder0 = 0.5. The purpose of this prior was to reduce
the collinearity of these parameters in the pupil-side and school-side of the model. A
diffuse ridge prior with mean 0 and precision matrix 0.01I was used for all of the other
parameters.
Finally we briefly describe the method for numerically integrating out the latent variables





where z is a latent variable and φ() is the distribution of z, which is assumed to be a
standard normal distribution. Gaussian quadrature replaces the integral with a weighted





where wi are the weights, and each term is evaluated setting the variable of integration
to a particular value hi, known as the node. The weights and nodes are chosen to
optimise the accuracy of the approximation, and the optimal choice of weights and nodes
depends upon the analytical form of the integrand. For integrands weighted by a normal
distribution, the method known as Gauss-Hermite quadrature provides the correct nodes
and weights. The function gauss.quad.prob in the R package statmod (Smyth et al.,
2015) calculates the weights and nodes for Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
Chapter 6
Results of the two-sided model
This chapter presents the empirical results from estimating the four model specifications
described in the previous chapter (plus the estimation of model B with Islamic schools
removed). The estimated weightings are described and compared. These weightings
shed light on the relative importance of different decision-criteria for families, and al-
low decision-weightings to depend on family membership of socio-economic and ethnic
groups. Lastly, simulation evidence is presented to assess the fidelity with which the
estimated model parameters predict observed joint distributions of matched pupil and
school characteristics.
6.1 Empirical findings
Table 6.1 shows the estimated co-efficients from the model with linear peer preference
effects. The first column of estimates are the combined estimates from estimating the
model on all 12 samples, and the other three columns present the results from estimating
the model on the four cohorts of each town separately. All results are estimated using the
Expectation Propagation (EP) algorithm. Distance co-efficients are of similar magnitude
in the three towns; the co-efficient for Oldham is the largest, at -0.754, and the combined
co-efficient is the smallest, at -0.613. The similarity of linear estimates of the proximity
effect, robust across all the estimated models, is encouraging since the distance effect
serves as a numeraire, setting the scale for the other parameters of systematic utility. The
similarity suggests that the overall scale of variation in systematic preferences, relative
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Table 6.1: Estimates from model A with linear preferences.
All Blackburn Oldham Preston
Demand-side: Est SD Est SD Est SD Est SD
Distance (km) -0.613 (0.00998) -0.652 (0.0269) -0.754 (0.0209) -0.639 (0.015)
Closest school 0.213 (0.0256) 0.435 (0.0551) 0.117 * (0.0413) 0.278 (0.0435)
Ethnic (10% increase):
Asian 0.254 (0.0122) 0.208 (0.0129) 0.296 (0.0174) 0.469 (0.0372)
White Brit. 0.189 (0.00759) 0.318 (0.0157) 0.112 (0.0101) 0.0916 (0.013)
% 5 or more A∗–C (SDs)
× IDACI q. 1 1.01 (0.0283) 0.761 (0.0758) 1.88 (0.0913) 1.04 (0.0380)
× IDACI q. 2 0.867 (0.0290) 0.546 (0.0775) 1.27 (0.0605) 0.956 (0.0414)
× IDACI q. 3 0.547 (0.0282) 0.106 * (0.0584) 1.09 (0.0547) 0.533 (0.0421)
× IDACI q. 4 0.213 (0.0225) -0.342 (0.0400) 0.806 (0.0437) 0.204 (0.0306)
× IDACI q. 5 -0.0700 (0.0197) -0.506 (0.0394) 0.348 (0.0330) 0.0255 * (0.0267)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.182 (0.0575) 0.361 (0.0688) -0.208 * (0.116) 0.666 (0.107)
Roman Catholic 1.69 (0.0441) 2.09 (0.101) 2.73 (0.136) 1.71 (0.0628)
Supply-side:
Distance (km):
Comprehensives -0.512 (0.0139) -0.223 (0.0229) -0.597 (0.0190) -0.453 (0.0311)
Faith Schools 0.00813 * (0.00636) -0.153 (0.0177) 0.160 (0.0105) -0.0943 (0.00794)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.926 (0.0609) 0.0449 * (0.481) 1.06 (0.0665) 0.280 (0.0895)
Roman Catholic 2.10 (0.0820) 2.60 (0.215) 1.02 (0.101) 1.60 (0.0730)
# pupils 21,313 5,044 9,393 6,876
# school-years 153 39 52 62
* |θˆ| < 3σˆ
to the random term, is similar across markets. Estimates for the closest-school dummy
are more variable.
When peer preferences are linear, in Preston and Oldham they are larger for Asian
families than for white families. However in Blackburn peer preferences are stronger for
Asian families. In general, peer preferences exist on both sides, suggesting horizontal
sorting along ethnic lines. The linear model for peer preferences, estimated on all three
markets, implies that an Asian family will be willing to send their child 0.41 km further
for a 10% increase in Asian children at school, whereas a white family will send their
child 0.31 km further for a 10% increase in white children at school.
There is a clear pattern of socio-economic status (represented by quintiles of IDACI)
moderating preferences for raw academic performance (represented by “% 5+ A*–C at
GCSE”). In model A, preferences for academic performance are strongest in Oldham, and
weakest in Blackburn. For the highest 40% of IDACI, estimated preferences for academic
performance are negative in Blackburn, implying that those families avoid schools with
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better GCSE grades. Estimates from the combined model imply that those living in the
most aﬄuent areas (IDACI quintile 1) will be willing for their child to travel 1.65 km
further for a one-standard-deviation improvement in test scores, whereas those living in
the least aﬄuent areas (IDACI quintile 5) will send their child 0.11 km further for a
one-standard-deviation reduction in test scores!
The final group of parameters in the pupil-side utility model is a set of parameters
interacting probability of choosing faith secondary schools, with faith primary school
attendance. In general the estimates for the interaction of Church of England (CofE)
school choice with CofE primary school attendance are smaller and more variable than
the Roman Catholic (RC) co-efficients. The latter are large, and similar in magnitude
across the three markets. The combined model implies that a family attending a Catholic
primary school will send their child 2.76 km further to attend a Catholic secondary school.
On the school side, coefficients for proximity are more variable, possibly reflecting the
fact that in each market there is only a small number of schools and hence the effect
of the spatial distribution of individual schools has a greater influence on estimates.
The distance co-efficient for faith schools is smaller than the distance co-efficient for
comprehensives, and is negligible in the combined model, suggesting that selection in
faith schools is dominated by faith criteria and distance does not play an important role
as a tie-breaker.
It is not as informative to interpret the parameters of the school-side model, except
perhaps to calculate the probability of a student being ranked higher than another student
given a fixed difference in proximity. For example, with the combined model estimate of
-0.512 (s.d. 0.0139), if one pupil is 1 km closer to a community school than the other,
the model implies that the probability of the school ranking the closer student higher
than the further student is 0.641 [0.634,0.649]. Given that the actual admissions rule
is deterministic, this implies that only a small proportion of the variation in admissions
probabilities is explained by distance. However, attending a Catholic primary school
confers a probability of 0.931 [0.915,0.945] of being higher-ranked at a Catholic secondary
school than someone who did not.
Model B, presented in Table 6.2, presents the estimates from the model with quadratic
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Figure 6.1: Pupil utility functions for lagged mean ethnic composition. Dashed lines denote
linear specification, while solid lines denote quadratic specification. Tick marks on x-axis show
the distribution of observed lagged mean ethnic proportions.
peer preferences for ethnicity. The model is otherwise identical to model A. Figure 6.1
plots estimates from model B (quadratic) against estimates from model A (linear). In
general, model B indicates slightly inverse-U shaped utility functions for the ethnic in-
group. This is consistent with a hypothesis that families may be strongly averse to schools
where their child is an isolated minority, but at the same time be more indifferent to in-
group dominance, or have weak preferences for integration. In the combined results, the
Asian utility function is slightly steeper, but also more non-linear, than the white utility
function suggesting that Asian families may have stronger preferences for integration.
However, the estimates seem to support a hypothesis of broadly similar preferences for
in-groups for both white and Asian families.
Apart from the peer preference estimates, the main difference between Tables 6.1 and 6.2
is that IDACI-moderated estimates of preferences for academic performance in Blackburn
and Preston are larger, and are no longer negative for high-IDACI quintiles in Blackburn.
The estimated test score co-efficients are now more similar across markets.
When a piecewise linear utility function for distance is introduced in model C (Table
6.3) the estimates of other parameters are not substantively altered. The only material
change is in the closest-school dummy effects, which are all attenuated. Figure 6.2 plots
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Table 6.2: Estimates from model B with quadratic peer preferences for ethnicity.
All Blackburn Oldham Preston
Demand-side: Est SD Est SD Est SD Est SD
Distance (km) -0.636 (0.0104) -0.657 (0.0305) -0.751 (0.0210) -0.738 (0.0192)
Closest school 0.252 (0.0251) 0.318 (0.0568) 0.124 (0.0409) 0.404 (0.0509)
Ethnic (10% increase):
Asian 0.803 (0.0289) 1.03 (0.0797) 0.784 (0.0467) 1.11 (0.0759)
Asian Sq. -0.0651 (0.00265) -0.0818 (0.00695) -0.0618 (0.00434) -0.0962 (0.00828)
White Brit. 0.744 (0.0345) 0.793 (0.0773) 0.601 (0.0596) 1.13 (0.0904)
White B. Sq. -0.0462 (0.00264) -0.0415 (0.00635) -0.0413 (0.00485) -0.082 (0.00667)
% 5 or more A∗–C (SDs)
× IDACI q. 1 1.08 (0.0289) 1.31 (0.105) 1.94 (0.0902) 1.31 (0.0528)
× IDACI q. 2 0.942 (0.0294) 1.25 (0.108) 1.33 (0.0620) 1.20 (0.0535)
× IDACI q. 3 0.629 (0.0288) 0.760 (0.0900) 1.15 (0.0564) 0.679 (0.0508)
× IDACI q. 4 0.298 (0.0223) 0.308 (0.0585) 0.837 (0.0444) 0.312 (0.0374)
× IDACI q. 5 0.0221 * (0.0188) 0.101 * (0.0499) 0.339 (0.0339) 0.122 (0.0336)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.195 (0.0598) 0.594 (0.137) -0.185 * (0.117) 0.733 (0.116)
Roman Catholic 1.94 (0.0482) 2.14 (0.0912) 2.90 (0.146) 2.04 (0.0790)
Supply-side:
Distance (km):
Comprehensives -0.569 (0.0155) -0.456 (0.0473) -0.611 (0.0187) -0.203 (0.0147)
Faith Schools 0.0124 * (0.00612) 0.0266 * (0.0123) 0.149 (0.0105) -0.0946 (0.00766)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.863 (0.0586) 0.546 (0.129) 1.04 (0.0681) 0.273 (0.0775)
Roman Catholic 1.70 (0.0586) 2.79 (0.178) 0.953 (0.0862) 1.41 (0.0648)
# pupils 21,313 5,044 9,393 6,876
# school-years 153 39 52 62
* |θˆ| < 3σˆ
the linear distance utility functions from model B against the piecewise linear utility
functions of model C. Of the three towns, the piecewise utility function for Oldham
appears to be the most similar to the linear utility function, and the piecewise utility
function for Blackburn appears to be the most different, although this may be misleading
as the actual substantive difference between utility functions depends upon the underlying
distribution of pupil-school distances. For the combined result, the maximum divergence
is at 2.5 km, where the difference between the piecewise utility and the linear utility is
2.5(−0.93) − 2.5(−0.64) = −0.73. The main regularity from the piecewise estimates is
that the utility function for distance is decreasing more quickly in the first 2.5 km, and
thereafter is less steep.
Model D replaces IDACI quintiles with Free School Meals (FSM) indicators. Preferences
for academic performance of families where the child is in receipt of Free School Meals are
much lower than those for the rest of the population. In the combined model the absolute
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Table 6.3: Estimates from model C with piecewise linear preferences for proximity.
All Blackburn Oldham Preston
Demand-side: Est SD Est SD Est SD Est SD
Closest school 0.0235 * (0.0292) -0.0241 * (0.0575) -0.138 (0.0459) 0.26 (0.059)
Distance B-spline components:
B1(das) -2.32 (0.057) -2.67 (0.121) -2.68 (0.0969) -2.15 (0.11)
B2(das) -3.3 (0.0594) -3.19 (0.126) -3.68 (0.103) -3.47 (0.113)
B3(das) -4.07 (0.0732) -3.94 (0.199) -4.55 (0.143) -4.57 (0.135)
B4(das) -14.5 (0.437) -8.44 (1.34) -17.0 (0.914) -13.8 (0.648)
Distance gradients by segment:
0 – 2.5 km -0.927 (0.0228) -1.07 (0.0485) -1.07 (0.0388) -0.86 (0.0438)
2.5 – 4 km -0.656 (0.0248) -0.347 (0.0538) -0.67 (0.0426) -0.882 (0.0434)
4 – 6 km -0.385 (0.0248) -0.376 (0.0714) -0.434 (0.0484) -0.551 (0.0399)
6 – 22 km -0.654 (0.0268) -0.281 (0.0847) -0.777 (0.0578) -0.578 (0.0383)
Ethnic (10% increase):
Asian 0.788 (0.0288) 0.868 (0.0679) 0.753 (0.0452) 1.11 (0.0758)
Asian Sq. -0.065 (0.00264) -0.0692 (0.00595) -0.0601 (0.00419) -0.0967 (0.00843)
White Brit. 0.783 (0.0367) 0.647 (0.0641) 0.579 (0.055) 1.13 (0.0914)
White B. Sq. -0.0484 (0.00278) -0.0303 (0.00531) -0.0388 (0.00448) -0.0816 (0.00673)
% 5 or more A∗–C (SDs)
× IDACI q. 1 1.12 (0.0308) 1.13 (0.0914) 1.82 (0.0806) 1.32 (0.0531)
× IDACI q. 2 0.955 (0.0305) 0.869 (0.0895) 1.25 (0.0588) 1.22 (0.0542)
× IDACI q. 3 0.617 (0.0286) 0.611 (0.0769) 1.08 (0.0523) 0.68 (0.0508)
× IDACI q. 4 0.296 (0.0226) 0.192 (0.052) 0.818 (0.0424) 0.316 (0.0381)
× IDACI q. 5 -0.0000476 * (0.019) 0.00963 * (0.0454) 0.322 (0.0327) 0.109 (0.0336)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.101 * (0.0593) 0.486 (0.14) -0.473 (0.108) 0.733 (0.115)
Roman Catholic 1.97 (0.0482) 2.04 (0.0844) 2.78 (0.131) 2.01 (0.0778)
Supply-side:
Distance (km):
Comprehensives -0.497 (0.015) -0.459 (0.0572) -0.59 (0.0194) -0.214 (0.0141)
Faith Schools 0.0055 * (0.0059) 0.0287 * (0.0156) 0.131 (0.0113) -0.102 (0.00763)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.92 (0.0613) 0.606 (0.168) 1.21 (0.0769) 0.288 (0.0767)
Roman Catholic 1.72 (0.0565) 3.04 (0.198) 1.01 (0.0893) 1.46 (0.0665)
# pupils 21,313 5,044 9,393 6,876
# school-years 153 39 52 62
* |θˆ| < 3σˆ
value of the effect is smaller than one standard deviation. For those not in receipt of FSM,
families are willing to travel 0.98 km further for a one-standard-deviation improvement
in test scores. The estimates of other parameters are not materially different from model
B.
Finally, a sample has been constructed in which the Islamic faith schools have been
removed. This is intended to check sensitivity of estimates to the presence of Islamic
schools, which tend to have faith-based admissions criteria for at least part of their intake,
and also might conflate ethnic peer preferences with preferences for religious education.
Table 6.5 presents the estimates from this model. Although the results are qualitatively
similar, in general, the removal of Islamic schools alters the coefficients relating to ethnic
peer preferences in Blackburn and Preston (Oldham has no Islamic state schools). In
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Figure 6.2: The top figures show pupil utility functions for distance from school (km). Dashed
lines denote the linear specification, while solid lines denote the piecewise linear specification.
The bottom figures show the estimated gradients and confidence intervals for each line segment,
compared to the linear specification.
Blackburn, the linear part of white families’ peer preferences is attenuated from 0.793
to 0.374, and the linear part of Asian peer preferences is increased slightly, making peer
preferences slightly more unbalanced. In Preston, peer preferences on both sides are
increased. In Blackburn, the pupil-side distance co-efficient is decreased from -0.657 to
-0.519, while the school-side distance coefficient for comprehensives is increased from
-0.456 to -0.863. However, apart from these changes the estimates are reasonably stable.
6.2 Model comparison and checking
The purpose of this section is to comparatively evaluate the predictive fidelity of the
models with respect to the observed data. There are three parts to this. First, we wish
to know whether one model specification from models A–D fits the data more parsimo-
niously than the others. Second, for a given model specification, it would be convenient
if a single set of estimated parameter values were sufficient to summarise the analysis,
without having separate estimates for each market. The apparent stability and similar-
ity of estimates across markets suggests that using a single combined estimate, rather
than market-specific estimates, might be reasonable. The third task in comparatively
evaluating the estimated models is to evaluate whether any of the models captures the
essential features of the data well enough to be of use in counterfactual analysis.
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Table 6.4: Estimates from model D (Free School Meals (FSM) status).
All Blackburn Oldham Preston
Demand-side: Est SD Est SD Est SD Est SD
Distance (km) -0.622 (0.00984) -0.573 (0.0248) -0.688 (0.0196) -0.744 (0.0203)
Closest school 0.193 (0.0244) 0.225 (0.0539) 0.133 (0.0395) 0.216 (0.0460)
Ethnic (10% increase):
Asian 0.924 (0.0308) 1.28 (0.0736) 0.874 (0.0526) 1.16 (0.0769)
Asian Sq. -0.0741 (0.00282) -0.104 (0.00654) -0.0656 (0.00482) -0.101 (0.00853)
White Brit. 0.692 (0.0346) 0.695 (0.0649) 0.504 (0.0527) 1.16 (0.0939)
White B. Sq. -0.0429 (0.00264) -0.0386 (0.00506) -0.0311 (0.00428) -0.0862 (0.00710)
% 5 or more A∗–C (SDs)
× FSM 0.0140 * (0.0231) 0.107 * (0.0597) 0.216 (0.0404) 0.114 * (0.0428)
× No FSM 0.609 (0.0155) 0.662 (0.0604) 0.871 (0.0358) 0.750 (0.0288)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.363 (0.0597) 0.686 (0.130) -0.000267 * (0.107) 0.885 (0.104)
Roman Catholic 1.91 (0.0468) 2.14 (0.0823) 2.42 (0.124) 2.19 (0.0871)
Supply-side:
Distance (km):
Comprehensives -0.630 (0.0152) -0.758 (0.0603) -0.651 (0.0190) -0.203 (0.0157)
Faith Schools 0.0290 (0.00636) 0.0322 * (0.0126) 0.165 (0.0112) -0.0985 (0.00787)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.734 (0.0528) 0.426 (0.123) 0.968 (0.0688) 0.292 (0.0754)
Roman Catholic 1.69 (0.0592) 2.95 (0.190) 1.15 (0.099) 1.19 (0.0625)
# pupils 21,313 5,044 9,393 6,876
# school-years 153 39 52 62
* |θˆ| < 3σˆ
Table 6.6 presents the AIC statistics for each set of model estimates. The AIC for market
i and year y is defined as





where p is the number of parameters used in the model. Model C clearly dominates
for every sample, with the ranking – AICC < AICB < AICA < AICD – consistent
throughout. Since the markets are independent, it is also possible to use the sum of the
AIC statistics for the three markets, estimated individually, to give a rough comparison
of the performance of estimating market-specific models compared to estimating a single
model for all markets. Since each AIC statistic contains a penalty term for the number
of parameters, the sum of the unpooled models contains a penalty that is equal to 6p,
whereas the AIC for the pooled model is only penalised by 2p. Even so, estimating a
model for each market dominates estimating a single pooled model.
A more detailed analysis of the predictive performance of the estimated models requires
simulating data according to the models. This kind of model checking is called posterior
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Table 6.5: Estimates from model B with quadratic peer preferences for ethnicity (Islamic
faith schools removed).
All Blackburn Oldham Preston
Demand-side: Est SD Est SD Est SD Est SD
Distance (km) -0.614 (0.0101) -0.519 (0.0243) -0.753 (0.021) -0.727 (0.0194)
Closest school 0.296 (0.025) 0.42 (0.0556) 0.122 (0.0409) 0.458 (0.0515)
Ethnic (10% increase):
Asian 0.838 (0.0304) 1.18 (0.0739) 0.785 (0.0467) 1.47 (0.1)
Asian Sq. -0.0693 (0.00285) -0.0969 (0.00664) -0.0619 (0.00435) -0.2 (0.0149)
White Brit. 0.552 (0.0366) 0.374 (0.0589) 0.6 (0.0596) 1.35 (0.116)
White B. Sq. -0.0331 (0.00275) -0.017 (0.00463) -0.0412 (0.00485) -0.0955 (0.00828)
% 5 or more A∗–C (SDs)
× IDACI q. 1 1.08 (0.0283) 1.08 (0.0823) 1.95 (0.0902) 1.31 (0.0537)
× IDACI q. 2 0.944 (0.0283) 0.998 (0.0686) 1.33 (0.062) 1.19 (0.0544)
× IDACI q. 3 0.637 (0.0282) 0.687 (0.0714) 1.15 (0.0564) 0.671 (0.051)
× IDACI q. 4 0.317 (0.0219) 0.332 (0.0489) 0.837 (0.0444) 0.294 (0.0379)
× IDACI q. 5 0.0358 * (0.0196) 0.129 * (0.0482) 0.339 (0.0339) 0.112 * (0.0342)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.0358 (0.0611) 0.408 (0.138) -0.181 * (0.117) 0.749 (0.117)
Roman Catholic 1.9 (0.0462) 2.1 (0.0849) 2.91 (0.146) 2.04 (0.0806)
Supply-side:
Distance (km):
Comprehensives -0.588 (0.016) -0.863 (0.0686) -0.611 (0.0187) -0.195 (0.0148)
Faith Schools 0.0193 * (0.00643) 0.0466 (0.0151) 0.149 (0.0105) -0.0942 (0.00778)
Feeder schools:
Church of Eng. 0.966 (0.0626) 0.632 (0.137) 1.03 (0.0681) 0.267 (0.0778)
Roman Catholic 1.8 (0.0596) 2.96 (0.171) 0.95 (0.0862) 1.42 (0.0669)
# pupils 20,721 4,595 9,393 6,733
# school-years 146 34 52 60
* |θˆ| < 3σˆ
predictive checking (Gelman et al., 2015), because it involves simulation of matchings
from the posterior predictive distribution of the matching, defined as
Pr
(
mRep|m ∈M∗) = ∫ Pr(mRep|θ) p(θ|m ∈M∗) dθ.
where mRep is a hypothetical replication of a matching from the same sample (i.e. with
the same observable characteristics). In the above distribution, p(θ|m ∈M∗) is the
posterior distribution of the parameters of interest, conditioning on the stability of the
observed matching. We approximate the posterior with the multivariate normal approx-
imation g(θ) produced by the EP algorithm. Once simulated, the joint distribution of
matched pupil and school characteristics can be plotted to assess whether the estimated
model faithfully recreates the main features of the data.
In the case of the stability model this is made more complicated by the fact that the
model does not describe the full data generating process of the data, as the method
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Table 6.6: Comparison of Models on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
Model A B C D
All 54,564 53,782 53,488 55,077
Blackburn 11,520 11,496 11,305 11,692
Oldham 23,674 23,432 23,279 23,967
Preston 18,088 17,869 17,793 18,599
Sum of unpooled models 53,282 52,797 52,377 54,258
for selecting a matching from M∗ is not specified. It is necessary to choose an explicit
matching algorithm, and the choice may affect the posterior predictive distribution of
matched characteristics. For this reason in simulating from the posterior predictive
distribution both the Pupil-Optimal Stable Matching (POSM) algorithm and the School-
Optimal Stable Matching (SOSM) algorithm were used to select a stable matching (see
Chapter 8 for a description of these algorithms). A well-known result in stable matching
theory is that the two algorithms produce matchings that are at opposite extremes of
M∗ in terms of pupil and school welfare, so this choice of equilibrium-selection rules is
likely to reveal any sensitivity of the model to stable-matching selection.
Simulating a matching from the posterior predictive distribution entails sampling a pa-
rameter vector θ′ from the multivariate normal approximate posterior, sampling a set
of utilities on both sides of the matching conditional upon θ′, which induces a full pref-
erence profile piRep, and then using one of the stable matching algorithms to compute
a matching that is stable for those preferences. Matchings simulated thus are used to
examine the joint distribution of matched pupil and school characteristics. We have cho-
sen three comparisons, to capture the main dimensions of sorting: the joint distribution
of pupil ethnicity and school ethnic composition; the joint distribution of pupil IDACI
quintile and school academic performance; and the distributions of matched distance in
each school. Gelman et al. (2015) suggests using the data to calculate a simulated sig-
nificance test. However, the data can also just be used to provide a visual indication of
the performance of the model.
One possible criticism of the use of posterior predictive visual checks is that they are
not out-of-sample checks, which means that the same data are used to estimate the
model and to check its predictive fidelity. This may lead to optimistic evaluation of the
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predictive accuracy of the model when applied to new datasets. However, in this exercise
the intention is only to assess the fit of the model to the data it was estimated on, for
which these graphical checks are appropriate.
Results for Oldham in 2012 and Preston in 2012 are presented here. Figure 6.3 shows
the distribution of school and pupil ethnic characteristics from 100 simulations, overlayed
with the observed joint distribution in Oldham in 2012. The three rows of the figure
correspond to models A–C. The simulations in the left-hand column use the named
model, estimated on all datasets, whereas the simulations on the right-hand side use the
named model, estimated using only the four cohorts of Oldham data. All of the models
produce simulated data that is reasonably similar to the observed data, with no single
set of estimates outperforming the others in all circumstances. The simulations based
on estimates from all samples tend not to be able to reproduce the Asian proportion
at North Chadderton school (no. 7), Oasis Academy (no. 8) and The Radclyffe School
(no. 17), whereas simulations based on market-specific estimates are more faithful for
these schools, but tend to not to be able to reproduce the ethnic distribution at The
Hathershaw school (no. 15).
Figure 6.4 again presents the results of 100 simulations, focussing on the proportions of
high-IDACI pupils (the top two quintiles) matched to schools by academic performance.
Again patterns of sorting in North Chadderton School (no.7) are not as faithfully re-
produced. The models also fail to exactly match up Oldham Academy North (no.16)
and Waterhead Academy (no.18). The observed and simulated distributions are close in
general. Differences between the simulation and the model may be explained by some
source of heterogeneity that is not modelled. Probably the inclusion of fixed effects for
schools, if feasible, would improve the fit.
The final visual comparison plots the distribution of matched distance by school. Figure
6.5 presents this comparison for Oldham in 2012. Five simulated datasets are compared
to the actual distribution, for models B and C (model A is not compared). Although
all models perform well, the combined-market estimates fail to capture the distance
distribution of The Bluecoat School (no.14), which has a wider catchment than other
schools. This is probably because the school is popular, but without fixed effects the
estimated models cannot capture popularity that is not correlated with observable school
Chapter 6. Results of the two-sided model 106





























































































































































































































































Key to schools: 3 − Crompton; 4 − Failsworth; 7 − NthChadderton; 8 −
OasisAcad; 10 − RoytonCrompton; 11 − Saddleworth; 14 − BlueCoat; 15 −
Hathershaw; 16 − OldAcadNth; 17 − Radclyffe; 18 − Waterhead; 19 − BlessedJHN
Figure 6.3: 100 Simulations from the joint posterior predictive distribution of school Asian
proportion in the full population, and the proportion of Asian pupils in the intake, at schools in
Oldham in 2012.
characteristics. Interestingly, model B appeared to capture the distribution of no.14 more
faithfully than model C.
Two of the posterior predictive plots for Preston in 2012 are presented because they
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Model A fitted to all markets



















































Model A fitted to this market's data



















































Model B fitted to all markets



















































Model B fitted to this market's data



















































Model C fitted to all markets



















































Model C fitted to this market's data












































Key to schools: 3 − Crompton; 4 − Failsworth; 7 − NthChadderton; 8 −
OasisAcad; 10 − RoytonCrompton; 11 − Saddleworth; 14 − BlueCoat; 15 −
Hathershaw; 16 − OldAcadNth; 17 − Radclyffe; 18 − Waterhead; 19 − BlessedJHN
Figure 6.4: 100 Simulations from the joint posterior predictive distribution of school academic
performance and the proportion of high-IDACI pupils in the intake, at schools in Oldham in
2012.
reveal a generally poor fit of the models to the observed matching in Preston in 2012.
Figure 6.6 shows that models A–C fail to capture the matched distribution of ethnicity
for Preston Muslim Girls’ School (no.2), Moor Park School (no. 8), Hutton Grammar
CofE Boys’ School (no. 13) and Archbishop Temple CofE School (no.15). The predicted






























































































































Key to schools: 3 − Crompton; 4 − Failsworth; 7 − NthChadderton; 8 −
OasisAcad; 10 − RoytonCrompton; 11 − Saddleworth; 14 − BlueCoat; 15 −
Hathershaw; 16 − OldAcadNth; 17 − Radclyffe; 18 − Waterhead; 19 − BlessedJHN
Figure 6.5: The distribution of each school’s catchment in Oldham in 2012, compared to five
simulations for each set of estimates.
ethnic proportion for no.2 is smaller than the actual proportion, whereas the predicted
ethnic proportion for Moor Park is higher. The predicted ethnic proportions for no.13
and no.15 (both high-performing CofE schools) are lower than the actual proportions. It
may be the case that the models do not capture a positive interaction between belonging
to an Asian ethnic group and preferences for test scores that would explain the lack of
fit to these two schools.
Figure 6.7 reveals that the models do not capture the fact that almost all of the, predomi-
nantly white British, pupils who travel from Blackburn to Preston attend Walton-le-Dale
Arts College (no.4). The models distribute these long-distance pupils over several schools,
particularly Lostock Hall Academy (no.5), biasing the distributions of these other schools.
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The models appear not to be able to capture the joint distributions of matched charac-
teristics in Preston. This indicates that caution is required in interpreting counterfactual
analyses undertaken on data for Preston. Results for Blackburn are more encouraging,
although Oldham appears to be the market for which the models have achieved the best
fit.
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Key to schools: 1 − Ashton; 2 − Mus−Girls; 3 − Priory; 4 − Walton−lD; 5 −
Lostock; 6 − Broughton; 7 − Penworth; 8 − MoorPk; 9 − OurLadys; 10 − CorChri;
11 − ChrTKing; 12 − Brownedge; 13 − Hutton; 14 − AllHallws; 15 − ArchBTemp; 16
− Fulwood
Figure 6.6: 100 Simulations from the joint posterior predictive distribution of school Asian
proportion in the full population, and the proportion of Asian pupils in the intake, at schools in
Preston in 2012.






















































































































































Key to schools: 1 − Ashton; 2 − Mus−Girls; 3 − Priory; 4 − Walton−lD; 5 −
Lostock; 6 − Broughton; 7 − Penworth; 8 − MoorPk; 9 − OurLadys; 10 − CorChri;
11 − ChrTKing; 12 − Brownedge; 13 − Hutton; 14 − AllHallws; 15 − ArchBTemp; 16
− Fulwood
Figure 6.7: The distribution of each school’s catchment in Preston in 2012, compared to five
simulations for each set of estimates.
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6.3 Discussion
The general similarity of estimates from the three markets, estimated independently, and
from the four model specifications is encouraging as it suggests that the structural model
has successfully identified so-called “deep” parameters (i.e. behavioural parameters that
are not contingent on details of the market). Identification of deep or policy-invariant
parameters is necessary if we intend to use estimated parameters to simulate counterfac-
tuals. The most important regularities are:
1. Peer preference coefficients are positive in all models. Coefficients for both Asian
and white families are similar in magnitude, suggesting that homophily is not
confined to one group, and that “horizontal” sorting may be present. Both sides
exhibit steep preferences for ethnic peer groups when the proportion of their own
group is small, and no increase in utility after the proportion of their own group
passes about 60%. However, Asian families tend to have slightly more non-linear,
inverse-U shaped utility for ethnic peers, suggesting that Asian families prefer for
their child not to be part of an extreme majority.
2. There is a strong socio-economic gradient in preferences for raw academic per-
formance, measured as standardised % achieving five or more GCSEs at A*–C.
This is robust across all specifications and samples. Parents from low-IDACI (i.e.
high-SES) neighbourhoods would typically be willing to send their children 1–3km
further for a one-standard-deviation improvement in test scores, whereas parents
from neighbourhoods with the highest quintile of IDACI have muted or negligible
preferences for test scores.
3. All models imply that those attending Catholic primary schools strongly prefer
Catholic secondary schools, and are also much more likely to be accepted if they
apply. Preferences are typically equivalent to about 2.5-3km distance. For those
who attended a Church of England primary school, preferences are less strong and
more variable, but the effect on probability of acceptance is more stable and about
half as strong as that for Catholic schools.
4. Distance is an important term in explaining admissions probabilities to non-faith
schools, but is not an important term in explaining admissions probabilities for
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faith schools. This suggests that faith schools are able to select all or almost all
of their pupils on the basis of faith, and in relation to Muslim schools means that
there is effectively no systematic component in the model for acceptance.
All models imply both “horizontal” ethnic peer-preferences and socio-economic modera-
tion of preferences for academic performance. This is consistent with all of the existing
discrete choice evidence on school choice (Hastings et al., 2009; Abdulkadiroğlu et al.,
2015; Caetano and Maheshri, 2013), and constitutes an answer to our first research ques-
tion. The final point implies that caution must be used in inferences about preferences
for Muslim schools. Refitting model B to the data with Muslim schools removed did not
reveal any major sensitivities, but ethnic peer preferences were affected.
It is not clear why the models we have estimated have failed to achieve a consistently
good fit to data from Preston. It is possible that the market is just too large and
dispersed for the distance parameters to be able to capture the spatial arrangement
of pupil allocations. However, it is also possible that underlying ethnic preferences are
weaker in Preston, leading to uncertainty in the model for preferences. However, whatever
the reason for the poor fit, it implies that caution must be used in applying substantive
conclusions from Preston. In general the models appeared to achieve the best fit to data
from Oldham.
Chapter 7
The implications of preferences for
sorting and competition
Having estimated random utility models of parental preferences for schools in the last
chapter, thus answering the first research question, the purpose of this chapter is to put
those models to work to help answer the second and third research questions. For the
second research question we wish to investigate the potential for heterogeneous prefer-
ences for ethnic peers to contribute to cumulative sorting processes. The third research
question asks whether, and to what extent, heterogeneous preferences affect the amount
of choice parents enjoy, and the amount of competitive pressure schools face. Since in-
vestigating each of these questions requires the use of a concept of aggregate demand,
and since it is more convenient to define the aggregate demand in relation to competition
on quality, the chapter deals with these questions in reverse order, analysing preferences
and competition first, and then preferences and sorting.
7.1 Preferences and competition
A central concern in the study of school choice is the extent to which choice induces
competition between schools to raise standards. As we have seen, the idea of introducing
competitive discipline into the operation of schools is often cited as one of the most
important justifications for school choice policies. The literature attempting to quantify
the effect of school choice on school performance is huge, much of it adopting experimental
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and quasi-experimental techniques (eg. Epple and Romano, 2012b; Sahlgren, 2013).
However, within this literature, with its focus on arguments for or against quasi-markets
as a whole, there has been little attempt to enumerate or quantify the structural con-
ditions under which quasi-markets can be expected to function optimally. At the same
time, it has been argued that the local structure of school markets, and particularly
demand-side variation caused by local demographics, has a significant impact on local
competitiveness. Allen and Burgess (2010) argue that “competitive markets work best
where the social mix at schools is reasonably similar” (Allen and Burgess, 2010, p10).
Among quasi-market studies, Bayer and McMillan (2010) go further, explicitly opera-
tionalising competition in terms of a structural model of aggregate demand for quality.
They characterise functioning school quasi-markets as depending upon: (i) responsive-
ness of parental demand to observable aspects of school performance, which they signal
through their choices; and (ii) responsiveness of schools to these parental demand signals.
Their model extends the previous literature by explicitly allowing competition to depend
on demand at the local level.
In contrast, previous work such as Hoxby (2000) and Bradley et al. (2001) operationalised
choice/competition by measuring the density of local schools. Bayer and McMillan ex-
plicitly distinguish between choice and competition, and claim it is the latter that drives
the quasi-market pressure that incentivises school improvement. Gibbons et al. (2008)
also distinguish between choice and competition in primary school markets. Studies in
UK school choice that have calculated elasticities of demand, for example Burgess et al.
(2015) have not modelled spatial variation in these elasticities at a local level.
In Chapter 4, we used spatial overlap of de facto catchment areas as a proxy for pairwise
competition between schools. Using this method, schools were clearly arranged in cliques
geographically, although there was some evidence of popular schools with very broad
catchments (e.g. Lancaster grammar schools). Now, having estimated a random utility
model for school choice, we are in a position to operationalise competition between schools
in terms of demand.
An advantage of this approach is that, in defining competition in terms of demand,
we can be explicit about what aspects of “quality” schools are competing on, and can
isolate the level of competition on quality from competition on any other aspect such
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as, say, ethnic or socio-economic composition of intakes. Another advantage is that
we can evaluate counterfactual demand functions by altering model parameters, and
counterfactual market structures by setting observables to different levels.
7.1.1 Conversion to logit co-efficients
Since normally-distributed errors have been used in the stability likelihood, the estimated
parameters are structurally equivalent to those from a multinomial probit discrete choice
model. This means that it is possible to calculate choice probabilities using the probit
probability formula. However, the probit model requires integration to calculate choice
probabilities and derivatives.
The logit model, on the other hand, has a simple analytical expression for both the
probability and the derivatives. It is well known that the two models are virtually em-
pirically interchangeable, in that there are few substantive differences between inferences
derived from each one. This means that parameters estimated using either model can be
converted to the other model by rescaling to account for the fixed standard deviation of
errors, σ.
The probit model has σ = 1, whereas the EV1 distribution usually has σ =
√
pi2/6 ≈ 1.3
(Train, 2009). This means that by multiplying the probit parameters by about 1.3 we can
use the logit model and benefit from the tractability of results. In effect, we have used the
probit model for its convenience with respect to gaussian integration, and so converting
the estimates to make use of the convenience of the logit model is reasonable. In the
analyses that follow the estimated parameters have been converted into logit parameters,
and the logit model is used.
7.1.2 The model for quality-responsiveness
We define the notional aggregate demand that each school faces, as the expected number
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The aggregate demand is defined as a function of some vector of school quality measures,
Q and estimated parameters, with a parametric form determined by the random utility
model adopted.
Note that the notional aggregate demand is not the only way of conceptualising demand
in constrained markets. The dependence of the allocation on fixed school capacities means
that demand can be defined in at least three ways. In addition to notional demand, the
realised demand is defined as the number of pupils allocated to school s in equilibrium,
and the effective demand is defined as the size of the school’s “stable choice set” – that is,
the number of pupils allocated to school s, plus the number of pupils who would prefer
s to their allocated school1 (see Chapter 8 for a full discussion of the stable choice set).
The question of whether schools respond to aggregate demand, and if so whether they
respond to notional demand or some other type of demand, is an important empirical
question, albeit one outside the scope of this work. Bayer and McMillan (2010) find a
quite strong response to local elasticities of demand. We assume that schools respond
to notional demand. This is not an unreasonable assumption, since schools have access
to, and may be expected to monitor and evaluate, the number of first preferences they
receive. Notional demand may be thought of as the “safest” measure of demand to
monitor from a school’s perspective, since it is the only demand that is not contingent
on other schools maintaining capacity constraints.
In defining the notional demand in terms of Q, all other school and pupil characteristics
that affect choices are implicitly fixed at their observed values in the sample. Note that
for each s, Ds(Q; θˆ) is a function of the full vector Q, since the quality measures of all
schools enter into the demand for each school. We can therefore define the marginal
change in demand for school s1, given a change in quality at s2 (where s1 may equal s2)












(Uas′)|Qs2 ,Q−s2 ,X, θˆ
)
.
1As well as preferences, realised and effective demand also depend to different extents on the details
of the market and mechanism. The realised demand depends on the capacities of all schools, but does
not depend on the specific stable matching algorithm used, due to a result in stable matching theory
known as the Rural Hospitals Theorem (Roth, 1986). The effective demand, on the other hand, does
depend on the stable matching algorithm if the size of the set of stable matchings is greater than one.
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Pas1(1− Pas1) if s1=s2,
−∂fas2∂Qs2 Pas1Pas2 otherwise.
If the utility model is linear in Qs, then ∂fas∂Qs is simply βQ.
Combining the demand functions for each school produces the vector-valued total demand
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The diagonal elements of the matrix are the marginal responses of each school’s demand
to a change in its own quality, and the off-diagonal elements are the marginal responses
of each school’s demand to a change in another school’s quality. The matrix can be
thought of as describing the flow of demand from one school to another as observable
measures of quality change. This characterisation explains a couple of properties of
the matrix that are not common to all Jacobian matrices. First, the sum of each col-
umn is zero; since each flow to a school must be a flow from another school, therefore
∂Ds/∂Qs = −
∑
s′ 6=s ∂Ds′/∂Qs. Second, and less obviously, the matrix is symmetric –
that is, ∂Ds/∂Qt = ∂Dt/∂Qs ∀(s, t). This property follows from the fact that “only
differences in utility matter” (Train, 2009). Due to this property of discrete choice mod-
els, we can restate the partial derivative ∂Ds/∂Qt as ∂Ds/∂(Qt−Qs). But since changes
to (Qt −Qs) only affect s and t, using the column-sum rule we can see that
∂Ds













This symmetricity is true of the matrix of partial derivatives. However, if we were to
use instead arc derivatives – that is, responses of demand to a non-infinitesimal change
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in quality – the resulting matrix would not be symmetric, since the aggregate demand
function is non-linear.
The Jacobian matrix can be used in analysis as a model-based alternative to the catch-
ment overlap matrices calculated in Chapter 4. The off-diagonal elements capture the
amount that each pair of schools competes on quality. Similarly to the catchment overlap
matrix, geographical distance causes the cross-derivative to shrink. However the model-
based Jacobian matrix also captures variation in levels of competition not correlated with
proximity.
Studying the marginal response of demand to quality allows us to investigate the effect of
sorting and social factors on competitiveness between schools. This is the case because
aggregate demand, and the rate at which aggregate demand changes in response to
changes in school performance, can be affected by existing sorting patterns.
In the two-school example in Figure 7.1 the marginal response of demand to quality (the
slope of the curve) depends on the existing pairwise demand between the two schools. It
is greatest when demand for the two schools is already fairly evenly matched (i.e. when p
is close to 0.5). If demand for two schools is very unbalanced, due to large differences in
test scores or any other reason, the flow of demand resulting from a change in test scores
may be small. Intuitively, the return to expending effort to improve test scores may
be small for either popular or unpopular schools, or both, in very unbalanced markets,
incentivising “coasting” strategies at both ends of the performance spectrum.
Furthermore, since the aggregate demand is defined by the sum of heterogenous individual
choice functions, the response of the aggregate demand to quality may be lower than the
overall market shares suggest. If overall pairwise demand is balanced, but the population
can be split into subgroups, within each of which the demand is very unbalanced towards
one school, then a small change in test scores may not be enough to overcome sorting.
Such a situation may arise when neighbouring schools have very segregated intakes, for
example, or when neighbouring schools serve different faiths. The demand model can
therefore predict the effect on competition of both vertical sorting (stratification) and
horizontal sorting (segregation).
In order to operationalise the model, we used “% achieving 5 or more A*-C” as the
quality measure Q. The estimated parameters from model C estimated on each market,




























Test score difference s1 − s2
Figure 7.1: At an individual level, the marginal response of demand to quality (the slope of the
pictured function) depends on the existing balance of choice probabilities between alternatives.
as reported in Chapter 6, were logit-converted by multiplying by 1.34. Although the
logit derivative is tractable, we choose to calculate the Jacobian numerically using the R
package numDeriv (Gilbert and Varadhan, 2015). The reason for this is that it is then
much easier to adapt and reuse the code for the analysis in the next section. The quality
of the numerically-estimated Jacobian can be checked by confirming that the row and
column sums are all zero, and that the matrix is symmetric.
To aid interpretability of results and comparison across markets, the demand function
has not been normalised, so that the demand estimates are reported in terms of pupil
headcount, and the derivatives are in units of pupil flow per unit change in quality. The
original units of quality are percentage points, and the derivatives have been multiplied
by five to provide a linearised approximate demand response for a five percentage point
increase in Qs.
Two counterfactual scenarios are considered:
1. To analyse the effect on competition of ethnic peer preferences, the first counter-
factual sets the corresponding parameters in the random utility model to zero, and
re-estimates cross-derivatives of demand.
2. In order to evaluate the impact on competition of large discrepancies in test scores
caused by sorting, that is correlated with sorting on SES, the second counterfactual
equalises all test scores and re-estimates cross-derivatives of demand.
Neither of these counterfactuals are strictly policy counterfactuals, as they are not as-
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pects of the market that can be exogenously altered by policy-makers. Nevertheless, they
capture the main elements of sorted markets that may impact upon market competitive-
ness.
7.1.3 Results
Table 7.1: Mean response of notional aggregate demand at school s to a 5 point increase
in quality at s.
Mean demand response Counterfactual %




Cf 1 9.3 5.8
Cf 2 8.9 1.6
2012
Actual 11.3
Cf 1 11.8 4.3




Cf 1 15.2 3.7
Cf 2 16.3 11.4
2012
Actual 19.4
Cf 1 21.0 8.0




Cf 1 16.7 0.6
Cf 2 19.8 19.3
2012
Actual 18.7
Cf 1 19.2 2.8
Cf 2 20.7 10.6
“Cf 1” – counterfactual experiment with ethnic preference parameters switched off.
“Cf 2” – counterfactual experiment with all quality measures set equal.
Table 7.1 shows the mean response of demand corresponding to a five percentage point
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improvement in test scores in each market. In each market, the competitiveness appears
to increase over the period 2009–2012. For example, in Oldham in 2009 the average
school, in response to a 5 point improvement in test scores, gains notional demand
equivalent to 14.7 pupils. However, by 2012 this has risen to 19.4 pupils. However, this
is probably explained by the larger average size of schools in 2012 than in 2009.
In most cases, equalising test scores has a greater effect upon the competitiveness of
markets as a whole than removing peer preferences. A closer look at the Jacobian of cross-
derivatives of demand in Oldham in 2012 (see Tables 7.2) reveals that peer preferences
have a large affect on competition for a small number of schools with large minority ethnic
populations. For example, the demand response for Oldham Academy North increases
from 3 to 8 if peer preferences are removed, and the demand response for Waterhead
increases from 8 to 14. In contrast, equalising test scores affects all schools to a certain
degree, and the most popular schools experience a reduction in the competitive response
under the counterfactual.
Table 7.2 also illuminates the effect of sorting upon the overall integration of the market.
The top panel has one school, The Blue Coat School, that spans the market, but other-
wise the market appears to be split into two cliques containing the schools in the south
and west of Oldham (North Chadderton, Oasis Academy, etc.) and the schools in the
north and east (Royton Crompton, Waterhead, etc.). Oldham Academy North does not
appear to compete effectively with any other schools. This is interesting because Oldham
Academy North is not geographically-isolated, but has the largest Asian population (at
92.5%) in 2012. In the third panel the split between the north-east and south-west of
Oldham is not apparent, as schools compete across Oldham.
Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 present the estimated aggregate demand and estimated demand
response in 2012 for each school in Blackburn, Oldham and Preston respectively. In Table
7.3, the first counterfactual has a large effect on demand for high-performing Tauheedul
Islam Girls’ School, whose demand almost doubles from 126 to 220. In contrast demand
for Witton Park school goes down from 112 to 67.
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RoytonCrompton 15 -1 -1 -7 -4 -2
Waterhead -1 8 -1 -1 -4 -1
Saddleworth -1 -1 12 -3 -7
Crompton -7 -1 -3 36 -15 -7 -1
BlueCoat -4 -4 -7 -15 53 -9 -1 -1 -6 -4 -2
NthChadderton -2 -7 -9 32 -1 -3 -3 -6 -1
OasisAcad -1 -1 8 -3 -1 -1
Radclyffe -1 -3 11 -1 -3 -2
Failsworth -6 -3 -3 -1 20 -5 -1
BlessedJHN -1 -4 -6 -1 -3 -5 24 -2
Hathershaw -1 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 10
“colour-blind” counterfactual
OldAcadNth 8 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1
RoytonCrompton -1 14 -1 -6 -3 -1
Waterhead -1 14 -2 -2 -7 -1
Saddleworth -2 12 -3 -6
Crompton -2 -6 -2 -3 36 -13 -7 -1 -1
BlueCoat -2 -3 -7 -6 -13 56 -8 -2 -2 -5 -5 -4
NthChadderton -1 -1 -7 -8 31 -1 -4 -2 -5 -1
OasisAcad -2 -1 9 -1 -3 -2 -2
Radclyffe -1 -2 -4 -1 14 -2 -3 -1
Failsworth -5 -2 -3 -2 21 -5 -3
BlessedJHN -1 -1 -5 -5 -2 -3 -5 24 -2
Hathershaw -1 -4 -1 -2 -1 -3 -2 14
Equal test scores counterfactual
OldAcadNth 4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
RoytonCrompton -1 36 -5 -2 -14 -6 -4 -1 -1 -2
Waterhead -1 -5 24 -4 -2 -7 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2
Saddleworth -2 -4 11 -1 -2 -1 -1
Crompton -14 -2 -1 28 -3 -4 -1 -2
BlueCoat -6 -7 -2 -3 29 -3 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1
NthChadderton -1 -4 -1 -4 -3 26 -2 -4 -1 -6 -1
OasisAcad -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 24 -1 -10 -5 -2
Radclyffe -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4 -1 18 -1 -5 -2
Failsworth -1 -1 -10 -1 22 -6 -2
BlessedJHN -1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -6 -5 -5 -6 32 -2
Hathershaw -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 14
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Table 7.3: Market Response results: Blackburn, 2012
Actual CF 1 CF 2∗





TauheedulBoys 60 50 4 83 7 77 3
DarwenVale 51 57 10 58 9 88 16
Pleckgate 54 105 9 95 10 128 12
WittonPk 51 112 11 67 7 101 17
TauheedulGirls 96 126 9 220 19 106 5
OurLadyStJohn 44 150 9 140 7 183 17
Blakewater 49 156 8 103 7 129 12
StWilfrids 64 161 21 167 18 162 18
DarwenAldridge 57 165 11 154 11 159 12
StBedes 72 204 21 199 23 152 17
∗ Q = 50 for all schools.
Table 7.4: Market Response results: Oldham, 2012
Actual CF 1 CF 2∗





OldAcadNth 46 73 3 100 8 159 4
RoytonCrompton 54 92 15 96 14 154 36
Waterhead 46 119 8 121 14 224 24
Saddleworth 70 142 12 140 12 118 11
OasisAcad 35 145 8 169 9 230 24
Radclyffe 50 176 11 119 14 152 18
NthChadderton 70 194 32 181 31 124 26
Failsworth 52 231 20 230 21 232 22
BlessedJHN 53 249 24 242 24 266 32
Crompton 80 282 36 287 36 160 28
Hathershaw 50 302 10 225 14 246 14
BlueCoat 76 356 53 453 56 298 29
∗ Q = 50 for all schools.
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Table 7.5: Market Response results: Preston, 2012
Actual CF 1 CF 2∗





Fulwood 44 24 3 24 3 75 19
Mus-Girls 71 44 4 83 10 73 3
Priory 60 53 13 49 12 87 26
Lostock 52 63 16 66 16 102 23
Penworth 72 65 17 61 17 47 14
Ashton 60 66 9 66 9 104 19
Walton-lD 50 73 14 74 15 105 21
CorChri 47 74 7 72 7 163 30
Hutton 78 74 14 73 13 48 10
Broughton 86 86 19 86 19 50 11
MoorPk 50 117 7 89 6 132 14
ChrTKing 46 135 11 132 12 198 24
Brownedge 57 184 27 184 28 185 30
AllHallws 72 212 42 219 43 169 35
OurLadys 78 234 40 239 42 170 30
ArchBTemp 91 296 57 283 56 93 21
∗ Q = 50 for all schools.
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7.2 Preferences and sorting models
One of the central motivations of the thesis has been to assess the extent of, and under-
stand the causes of, post-residential ethnic sorting in schools. Chapter 2 examined the
“ingredients” of sorting, without elaborating on the mechanisms that might lead to the
concentration of different ethnic groups in different schools. It is clear that residential
sorting plays a part in school sorting, but the analysis of indices of dissimilarity in Chap-
ter 4 suggested that residential sorting was not the whole story. Having estimated our
choice model, we have evidence that preferences for peers play a role as well.
An important aspect of sorting that the causal framework in Chapter 2 did not discuss,
especially in the light of peer preferences, is the potential for cumulative sorting dynamics
due to the endogeneity of school composition with respect to choice. If, as our estimates
suggest, it is true that the demographics of a school enter into a family’s choice process,
then this affects the group-level aggregate demand function for that school, which in turn
determines the demographics upon which future cohorts base their choices. In this way
preferences for peer groups may have multiplier effects that lead to greater sorting than
a single-period model would predict.
Models predicting such sorting dynamics or tipping dynamics have a long history in
economics, beginning with the work of Schelling (1972). More recent approaches to so-
called social interaction models include Becker and Murphy (2003) and Card et al. (2008).
Clotfelter (1976) studied models of sorting dynamics in relation to schooling. More
recently Caetano and Maheshri (2013) used a similar model with structural estimation
of parameters to estimate tipping points and segregated equilibria in US schools. The
model adopted in this section is similar to both of these models.
7.2.1 The tipping model
The tipping model again uses the definition of notional aggregate demand as described in
the previous section, except that demand is now defined as a function of the proportion
of minority ethnic pupils in the school’s population, rather than quality. In addition, the
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where Ag is the set of pupils in ethnic group g, pgs is the proportion of the population of
school s who are of group g, and pg is the vector of group g proportions at all schools.
The parametric form of each term in the aggregate demand is determined by the random












This definition implies a number of simplifying assumptions. First, it conflates the intake
with the whole-school population. In reality a single year’s intake is only about one fifth
(excluding sixth form) of the entire school population. Second, it treats the elements of
the vector pg as independent, as though we can exogenously adjust one pgs whilst holding
the others constant. If there are a large number of schools the impact of this assumption
will be less serious. Third, the model assumes that decision makers at time t observe the
ethnic proportions in each school at t with no lag or error. Finally, the model ignores
capacity constraints and admissions policies, and assumes that realised demand is equal
to notional demand.
Accepting these simplifications, for the moment, the model implies that in a given ad-
missions year t, pgs,t is equal to pi
g
s,t−1. As long as pi
g
s,t 6= pgs,t, demand for school s will
not be stable across years, and will tend to shift towards a point such that pigs,t = p
g
s,t.
These fixed points constitute the equilibria of the model, and come in two varieties: sta-
ble equilibria; and unstable equilibria or “tipping points”. The tipping points separate
the regions of attraction of multiple equilibria (if multiple equilibria exist). In plotted
curves such as Figure 7.2 stable equilibria can be distinguished from tipping points as
the former cross the 45 degree line from above, whereas the latter cross from below. As
Figure 7.2 shows, the model can predict multiple segregated equilibria and tipping points
in the presence of linear preferences for school composition on ethnic or socio-economic
groupings. With non-linear peer preferences more complex equilibria and dynamics may
arise.
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Figure 7.2: The curve plots pms against pims for school s. The curve is induced by linear utilities
for composition by both white and minority families. Of the three fixed points, A and C are stable
equilibria, and B is a tipping point. The arrows show how the school’s composition, starting from
a point out of equilibrium (p0), may move towards a stable equilibrium over a period of several
admissions cycles.
7.2.2 Results
The same datasets and estimated parameters were used as in the previous analysis.
Applying the model to the data was made slightly more complex by the fact that we
have not used a dichotomous coding for ethnicity, instead using the coding (white British,
South Asian, Other). However, the proportion of ‘Other’ ethnic groups in the population,
and in all schools, was small, so we treated this proportion as fixed, and allowed the
‘White British’ proportion to be 1−%other−%Asian. Both Ds and pigs were treated as
functions of pgs only, with all other schools’ compositions fixed.
The predicted school composition was also calculated using a counterfactual choice model,
with the parameters relating to ethnic peer preferences set to zero. This prediction is not
a function of the composition and is plotted alongside the estimated tipping curves as a
single point. This prediction provides an indication of the effect of residential segregation
and other factors on the expected composition of the school.
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Figure 7.3 displays the estimated tipping curves for Oldham schools in 2012. These
results suggest that for some schools, such as Royton Crompton and Oldham Academy
North, tipping dynamics induced by peer preferences have explanatory power beyond
that of the baseline model. However, other schools such as The Radclyffe School and
Waterhead Academy appear far from the equilibrium predicted by the tipping model.
There are several possible explanations for this. First, the compositions might simply be
transitioning to a new equilibrium after some shock to the composition of the market, or
to demand, or both. It is worth noting that the populations of at least some of Oldham’s
schools have been radically altered in the period 2010–2012, with the express purpose of
disrupting a segregated equilibrium. The case of Waterhead Academy is the most high-
profile (Nye, 2011; Edmonds, 2015), but other new academies in Oldham have intakes
drawn from two or more parent schools. Given that in reality only a fifth of each school’s
population is renewed at a time, any re-equilibration might be expected to take a number
of years.
Second, supply-side constraints might make some equilibria more difficult or impossible
to attain; for example, where admissions criteria related to faith may have implications
for the ethnic composition of the school; or where a school’s capacity cannot grow enough
to accommodate the predicted demand.
The final reason why school compositions may not correspond to the equilibria of the
tipping model is that the difference may reflect an inadequacy of the underlying choice
model to accurately predict demand. The tipping model is quite sensitive to the speci-
fication of the choice model. See, for example, the estimated tipping model for the Blue
Coat School, whose curve only just fails to intersect with the 45 degree line near ps ≈ 0.2.
Given that the choice model is quite simple, and does not account for unobservable vari-
ation in school popularity, it is unlikely that the true tipping points and stable equilibria
are all accounted for.
It is worth noting that, because each tipping curve is created independently of the others,
they may predict segregated equilibria for all schools, whereas in reality the schools
interact so that if, say, one school’s Asian proportion becomes large, another school’s
Asian proportion must become smaller.
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ps observed pis model w'out peer preferences
Figure 7.3: Estimated tipping curves for Oldham schools in 2012. The actual proportion of
asian pupils in the school, and the proportion predicted from the non-ethnic “null” model, are
plotted on the x-axis.
7.2.3 Simulation evidence
The tipping model results suggest that the estimated ethnic peer preferences may create
sorting dynamics leading to complete segregation in some schools. However, a more
realistic model might account for the constrained nature of the market, which may impact
upon sorting dynamics. Using both the demand and supply sides of the two-sided model,
and Deferred Acceptance matching algorithms, we can computationally simulate intakes
and the effect of these on ethnic composition and hence demand.
For the purposes of the simulation, the capacity of each school was assumed equal to its
current intake, and each schools’ population “rolled through” a five-year cycle. It was
assumed that families could observe the composition of a school perfectly, without any
lag2.
Table 7.6 presents the results of this model, while Figure 7.4 shows the trace of the
2Note that the parameters of the choice model were estimated on 2-year lagged data.
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Table 7.6: Simulation Results















































Figure 7.4: Simulated sorting dynamics for Oldham schools, initialised with the 2012 intake.
Asian proportions. As Figure 7.4 makes clear, the school compositions do not necessarily
converge quickly to a segregated equilibrium; school ethnic compositions appear to settle
down after 30–40 years! The model predicts that, without any shocks or demographic
changes, Oldham schools will gradually become more segregated. In 2092 the difference
between the Asian proportions of Oasis Academy and Waterhead is about 40 points.
However, the model does not predict complete segregation. This is possibly due to
capacity constraints and location.
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7.3 Discussion
This chapter has presented evidence based upon structural models of aggregate demand,
the parameters of which were provided by the estimates of the random utility model.
Models of parental decision-making enable investigations of market structure that are
analogous to the investigations based on various indices – notably the Herfindahl Index
and the Index of Dissimilarity. Where the structural approach excels, however, is in
allowing the researcher to undertake investigations of counterfactual hypotheses. This
approach offers considerable flexibility in the design of computational experiments to test
theories of sorting and competition.
However, the validity of a structural counterfactual analysis is limited by the predictive
accuracy of the random utility model it is based upon. In the case of the models estimated
in this thesis the lack of choice data, and the lack of school fixed effects, means that there
is no guarantee that the predicted aggregate demand for a school is accurate even in the
baseline scenario, let alone the counterfactuals. For this reason the potential for detailed
quantitative predictions from these models is limited.
What the models offer is convincing evidence of qualitative regularities, such as the poten-
tial for cumulative sorting dynamics, or the association between sorting and competition.
These “stylised facts” provide general answers to the second and third research questions,
without justifying firm predictions about the size of effects. However, there is every rea-
son to believe that methods based upon choice models, with a richer random utility model
and better data, are capable of providing accurate predictions of not only the existence,
but also the extent, of the influence of preferences on sorting and competition.
A final avenue for extension of the structural approach is in the quantification of parental
choice, and especially spatial variations in parental choice. This part of the final research
question has not been addressed in this chapter. Chapter 4 presented a visual analy-
sis of parental choice based on Herfindahl Indices. Although not implemented here, it
would also be possible to estimate spatial variation in choice using the expected value of
the choice set, otherwise known as the inclusive value, for each location (Train, 2009).
Although computationally-difficult in general, the logit model provides a tractable ex-
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This quantity could be calculated at a grid of locations, to produce a visualisation reveal-
ing “cold spots” of effective choice. An advantage of this method would be that it takes
account not only of the quantity of schools, but also the quality of schools. A difficulty
arising with such a method would be the value judgements that are implicit in selecting a
utility function to represent the rational or normative utility of school choice, given that
the model would produce different utilities for members of different groups. However,
it would be a useful method to illustrate how members of different groups perceive the
choice available to them. As with all methods based on structural random utility mod-
els, it would enable the analysis of counterfactuals in which either details of the school
market, or parameters of individual preferences have been changed.
Chapter 8
Stable matching theory
In previous chapters theoretical considerations relating to mechanism design and stable
matchings have been treated lightly, so as not to interrupt the development of the sub-
stantive investigation. In this chapter and the following chapter we return to theoretical
and methodological issues with two main purposes: first, to more thoroughly motivate
and justify the structural econometric methodology adopted in this thesis; and second,
to provide an informal review of a topic that is intrinsically interesting, and directly
relevant to school choice.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section introduces the branch of
game theory and mechanism design known as stable matching theory. The development of
the field is traced alongside its relevance to real situations in school choice. The following
section enumerates a handful of results from stable matching theory and mechanism
design that are either key to our econometric strategy, or especially relevant to our study
of school markets. The final section provides a motivation to econometric uses of stable
matching theory by investigating the empirical content of one-sided matching models,
that use knowledge of ranked preferences on one side of a matching market to infer
preferences on the other side of the market.
8.1 Theory of Stable Matchings
The problem of matching agents with heterogeneous preferences for institutions, to insti-
tutions with heterogeneous preferences for agents, has been studied formally in economics
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as the game theoretical “college admissions problem”. An important aspect of many such
situations is that, although they are often described as markets in an economic sense,
money does not change hands between agents and institutions, which deprives these mar-
kets of a price mechanism for obtaining an allocation in equilibrium1. Gale and Shapley
(1962) were the first to define this class of problems formally and derive a solution con-
cept, called stability, to characterise feasible matchings. They proved that, under certain
not-too-restrictive conditions on preferences, a stable matching always exists, and that a
given preference profile may admit several different stable matchings. Furthermore, they
described a matching algorithm, called “deferred acceptance” (often referred to as the
“Gale-Shapley” algorithm) that is guaranteed to produce a stable matching.
Part of the appeal of stable matching theory comes from the fact that, whilst the moti-
vating solution concept, stability, is conceptually simple and intuitive, the theoretical in-
sights it enables are descriptively rich and practically useful in many real-world contexts.
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) is credited with popularising the theory and demonstrating
its applicability to improving the operation of real world matching mechanisms, leading
to a significant re-invigoration of the field of mechanism design.
8.1.1 The College Admissions problem
In order to motivate the school choice problem we will first consider the original college ad-
missions problem. Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , aA} be a set of students, and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cC}
be a set of colleges. Each student wishes to attend a college, and each college wishes to
accept its quota qc of students. Each college is assumed to act as a single agent with
a unique preference ordering over students. Each student ranks the colleges in order of
preference, excluding only those colleges s/he would not attend under any circumstances,
even if it meant not attending college at all. Likewise each college ranks all potential
students in order of preference, excluding only those it would never accept, even if it
meant not achieving its quota. For students, not attending college is always an option,
and for colleges there is always an option to leave seats unfilled, rather than accept
“unacceptable” students.
1Although originally studied in relation to money-less matching markets, stable matching theory is
easily extended to allow endogenous prices, such as for example in job markets, although this branch of
the theory is not discussed here.













































































∗: Matching is not stable for these preferences. ∆: stable matching is not unique.
Figure 8.1: All possible preference profiles in a 2×2 matching {(a, s), (a′, s′)}. Arrows represent
preferences. There are nine preference profiles for which the matching is stable, and seven for
which it is unstable. Unstable matchings are characterised by the presence of blocking pairs,
represented here by diagonal arrows that are “reciprocated”.
Assuming for the moment that the number of students is equal to the number of available
places at colleges, such a situation necessarily introduces conflicts of interest, not only
between students and colleges, but also amongst colleges as competitors for students,
and amongst students as competitors for college places. Without imposing hierarchical
priority relations over students or colleges, it is not clear how these conflicts should be
resolved to come up with an allocation that represents a good compromise.
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed a solution concept based on a hypothetical situation
that should be avoided by any feasible matching. In this hypothetical situation, there
exists some pair of college and student who are not matched, who would both benefit
from dissolving their existing match to match with each other. In the case of colleges this
would mean expelling some student to create a spare place, and in the case of students
this would mean leaving their college to take up the new place. Since such a coalition
could destabilise an allocation, a matching in which there are no such “blocking” pairs is
called a stable matching.
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Figure 8.1 demonstrates stable and unstable matchings in a hypothetical school system
with two schools and two pupils. It can be seen that, although stability is a property of
the matching as a whole, because it is defined by the absence of a particular preference
relation between pairs, it is easy to verify whether a given matching is stable by checking
for blocking pairs.
Note that stability is a feasibility condition rather than an an optimality condition.
Stability does not imply that the matching is optimal in relation to the preferences of
either the colleges or students. Stability only implies that that there is no match that
any college or student would prefer, that is available to them given the preferences of the
other colleges and students.
Under certain regularity conditions Gale and Shapley proved that a stable matching al-
ways exists. It is only assumed that the preferences are strict (i.e. no college is indifferent
between two or more students, or vice-versa), responsive (i.e. institutions only consider
preferences over individuals and not sets of students) and transitive (i.e. no preference
cycles). In fact, in balanced matching markets such that the number of places equals the
number of students there will often be several distinct stable matchings.
As part of a constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching, Gale and Shapley
described an algorithm that was guaranteed to produce a stable matching: the deferred-
acceptance (DA) algorithm. In the algorithm one side of the market takes the active role
of “proposer” and the other side takes the passive role of “accepter”. There are thus two
variants of the algorithm: student-proposing DA; and college-proposing DA.
The student-proposing algorithm works as follows. In the first round, each student
applies to his or her favourite college. Then, each college considers all applications, and
provisionally accepts its preferred students up to its quota. In each subsequent round, all
students who are not provisionally matched apply to the next college on their preference
list, crossing colleges off as they apply to them. After each round of proposals, colleges
consider all new proposals in combination with their current provisional list, and update
their provisional list, rejecting previously-accepted students as necessary to make room
for preferred students. Thus each student may be on a college’s list and then rejected
in later rounds. This process continues until there are no students who are not on a
college’s list, who have colleges left to apply to.
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The college-proposing algorithm is essentially the same in reverse. In the first round,
each college offers places to preferred students up to its quota. Each student considers all
offers s/he has received and provisionally accepts the preferred offer. In each subsequent
round, each college that has not filled its quota makes offers to students, working down
its preference list to make up the difference between current matches and its quota.
Each student considers new offers in combination with its current provisionally accepted
offer, and accepts the best of these, rejecting the currently accepted offer if necessary.
The process ends when all colleges have either filled their quotas or exhausted their
preference lists.
Both variants of the algorithm are guaranteed to produce a stable matching, but these
matchings are not usually identical unless there is only one possible stable matching.
In fact, when there is more than one possible stable matching the two algorithms will
produce matchings that have very different implications for the two sides. Gale and
Shapley showed that for a given preference profile, student-proposing DA will produce
the best possible stable allocation for the students, in that no student can improve on
the matching without making some other student worse off or violating stability. This
kind of optimality condition is called Pareto optimality2. At the same time, this student-
optimal stable matching will be the worst possible stable matching for the colleges, in
that any other stable matching can improve the result for at least one college without
making any other colleges worse off.
The same result is true in reverse when a stable matching is found using college-proposing
DA, which turns out to produce the college-optimal and student-pessimal stable match-
ing. In fact, the set of possible stable matchings for a given preference profile follows
a highly ordered lattice-like structure. Within this structure there is a unique college-
optimal matching, and a unique student-optimal matching, which only coincide if there is
a unique stable matching; in between these two extremes every Pareto improvement for
one side is to the detriment of the other side. Thus the interests of colleges and students
are always in opposition.
2Pareto optimality or efficiency is a criterion whereby no-one can be made better off without making
someone else worse off. An allocation is Pareto optimal if this condition holds. If an allocation is not
Pareto optimal it is possible to make improvements such that at least one person is made better off
without making anyone else worse off. These improvements are called Pareto improvements. Pareto
efficiency is a useful concept when dealing with preferences, where it may not be possible or desirable to
trade off one person’s utility against another’s.
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At this point it will be useful to introduce some terminology and notation. A match
is a pair (a, c) where student a is matched to college c, and vice versa. However, it is
also possible that students do not obtain a college place, (a,_), or colleges have unfilled
places, (_, c). We use the notation m(a) to denote the match of student a, and m(c) to
denote the set of students matched to college c3. A set of orderings describing the full
preference sets of all students and all colleges is called a preference profile, denoted by pi.
A market is a triple (A, C, pi). A matching m is a full set of matches for a market, and
M is the set containing all possible matchings for a given market. For each market the
set of stable matchingsM∗ forms a subset ofM.
The set of stable matchings,M∗, follows a highly ordered lattice-like structure. Within
this structure there is a unique college-optimal matching, and a unique student-optimal
matching, which only coincide ifM∗ is a singleton; in between these two extremes every
Pareto improvement for one side is to the detriment of the other side. Thus the interests
of colleges and students are always in opposition. Since the paper of Gale and Shapley,
other algorithms have been proposed to produce matchings from the interior of M∗
that compromise between the welfare of the two sides. However, in the original paper
the authors advocated using the student-proposing algorithm, on the basis that colleges
exist for the benefit of students rather than the other way round.
8.1.2 The school choice problem
The college admissions problem described above is a good description of many real life
situations where agents with diverse preferences need to be allocated to institutions which
also have preferences for agents, but which are not allowed to charge money for admission,
or at least are not allowed to set prices. The problem of public school allocations is
slightly different. In public school choice markets there are students who have, or at
least their parents have, preferences for different schools. There are also schools with
limited capacity, however it is problematic to think of them as assigning places according
to their preferences. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) summarised the distinction thus:
“The central difference between college admissions and school choice is that
3It is common to use s = m(a) rather than the more correct {s} = m(a). We exploit this slight abuse
of notation to use m(·) within indices.
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in college admissions, schools themselves are agents which have preferences
over students, whereas in school choice, schools are merely ‘objects’ to be
consumed by the students.” (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003, p.731)
For Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, this distinction arises for ethical reasons; the idea of an
education market in which schools pick-and-choose students to achieve their own ends
is, for them, an example of what Roth (2007) terms a “repugnant market”. For this
reason, Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez propose a model whereby institutional preferences
are replaced with priorities. Unlike preferences, school admissions priorities may be
prescribed by law or by local authorities; they are usually based on explicit objectively-
verifiable criteria such as distance to school or residence within a catchment area. Also,
unlike colleges, schools do not have the option of leaving places unfilled if they have spare
capacity.
Given a set of preferences on the student side and a set of priorities on the school side,
the problem is essentially the same as the college admissions problem. Priorities can be
treated in the same way as preferences, and a stable matching can be reached using the
student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. However, if respecting school priority
rules is considered less important than respecting student preferences, it is possible to
obtain unstable matchings that Pareto dominate the student-optimal stable matching
by allowing students to “trade” priorities. This idea rests on a formulation of priority
at a given school as an endowment possessed by a student; if the student does not
require the priority (such as if the student prefers another school) s/he can trade it for
priority at another school. In practice, priorities can be traded using the Top-trading
Cycles mechanism, otherwise known as the Efficient Transfer Mechanism; this mechanism
improves on simple bilateral priority trading by allowing complex cyclical trades involving
multiple students. The TTC mechanism was implemented by the New Orleans Recovery
School District in 2012.
Another potential difference between the college admissions problem and school choice
is that schools often do not have strict priorities over all students. In many contexts,
especially in the US, school priority rules may only specify that a group of students is
within the catchment area, and another group of students is outside the catchment area.
Within each priority group, the school is indifferent between students. Tied preferences
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are often broken using some kind of lottery, but this creates new problems since the
student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is no longer guaranteed to be Pareto
efficient for students. The reason for this is that the lottery creates pseudo-priorities
that may block matches that would otherwise be stable and would be preferable from
the point of view of students.
Abdulkadiroğlu (2013) acknowledges that many school choice markets contain a mixture
of schools that are not in control of admissions, and schools that control their own ad-
missions and act to a greater or lesser degree as strategic agents. In these cases hybrid
mechanisms can be used that allow the trading of flexible priorities, but restrict the trad-
ing of fixed priorities. In England and Wales school choice can be said to operate within
a hybrid mechanism in that schools have differing levels of control over their own admis-
sions priorities, although successive legislation, most recently the 2007 Admissions Code,
has ensured that no state-funded school has complete freedom in assigning admissions
priorities.
8.1.3 Strategy-proofness and the Boston mechanism
Before mechanism designers began to take an interest in school choice, the preferred allo-
cation mechanism in many public school markets was some variant of a first-preferences-
first algorithm, which was dubbed the Boston mechanism by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez
(2003), after the Boston public schools district where it was first studied. In the UK,
first-preferences-first was used by many local authorities until the rule was outlawed in
the 2007 Admissions Code (Coldron et al., 2008).
The Boston mechanism begins by each school assigning seats to students who have ranked
that school as first choice. Each school assigns seats to as many students as possible
according to its admissions rules, until either there are no seats left or all first-choice
students have been assigned. In the next round, each school assigns remaining seats to
students who have ranked the school second, again according to its admissions rules. In
general, in the i’th round, each school considers only the students who ranked the school
in i’th place. This continues until all students have been assigned. This mechanism is
similar to student-proposing deferred acceptance, except that school assignment in each
round is firm rather than provisional.
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Although intuitively appealing as it aims to respect first preferences, the Boston mecha-
nism has been shown to have a number of unappealing qualities. First, it is not a stable
matching algorithm. To see this, consider a student a who is ranked first by school s,
but prefers another school, s′, and ranks s second. Say the student is not allocated to s′
in the first round, and school s managed to fill its quota in the first round. Now student
a cannot get into school s even though a prefers s to all available schools, and school s
prefers student a to all of the students it has admitted under the first-preferences-first
rule. Student a and school s form a blocking pair that make the matching unstable.
Second, the Boston mechanism is not strategy-proof. This means that students can
benefit from misrepresenting their true preferences. Clearly, in the preceding example
student a would have been better off if she had stated school s as her first preference,
even though this would have not been true. This is a particularly undesirable property
for school choice, because it necessitates sophisticated school choice strategies on the part
of parents. This may lead to some groups of parents being advantaged over others with
undesirable consequences for equity.
Strategy-proofness is also an important property for the estimation of choice models.
If stated preferences are not honest then there is little hope of inferring parameters
of underlying random utility models with any kind of data. It is therefore important to
verify that mechanisms in use are actually truth-revealing. Fortunately, first-preferences-
first mechanisms are no longer used in the UK. The majority of local authorities use
deferred acceptance algorithms.
Even then, it has been shown that implementations of deferred acceptance algorithms
vary in their vulnerability to manipulation (Pathak and Sönmez, 2011). Student-optimal
DA is strategy-proof under ideal conditions; however there are three features of real
admissions systems that may compromise this. First, many local authorities limit the
number of preferences that can be expressed. This compromises incentive compatibility
because if parents are only allowed to express a handful of preferences, they may be
incentivised to choose a “safe option” as the last choice, to avoid being allocated to an
unlisted school. Since the 2007 Admissions Code each local authority has to allow parents
to express at least three preferences. This means that while the first two preferences
should be expressed truthfully, the third preference may be chosen to be a safe option.
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The second reason mechanisms may not be strategy-proof in practice is that, although
there is a clear advantage to using student-proposing DA, in fact some local authorities
have implemented the school-proposing variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. According
to stable matching theory, only the student-proposing variant is incentive-compatible for
students. Intuitively, this is because when a mechanism is used that does not select the
optimal stable matching for students, it is always possible for students to manipulate their
preferences to obtain another stable matching within the core that is preferable. However,
in large and diverse matching markets, and without knowledge of other preferences, it
is unlikely that any family would be able to devise a strategy to improve their match
within the set of stable matchings. This hypothetical manipulability is in contrast to
the previously discussed issues, where strategic manipulations are obvious and probably
widely understood.
The final reason why some families may not be expressing preferences truthfully under the
current system is that the truth-telling property of the matching mechanisms has not been
widely publicised. That is, some parents may still be operating under the misconception
that school places are allocated according to a first-preferences-first rule, and may be
inappropriately applying redundant strategies. Evidence from informal conversations
with parents suggests that at least some parents still believe that they should adjust
their stated preferences to accommodate first-preferences-first rules.
8.2 Results and observations from stable matching theory
Although our interest in stable matchings is primarily motivated by our econometric
methodology, there are nevertheless a handful of less-well-known results motivated by
stable matching theory that will prove useful in what follows, and it is therefore con-
venient to introduce them here. These results have applications in two contexts in the
thesis. First, stable matchings provide a basis for our estimation strategy, and there
are certain facts that support the validity of this strategy, and help us to predict its
performance in real life situations. Second, some of these results and observations have
substantive interest as they shed light on the impact of mechanism design on the welfare
of students.
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8.2.1 Size of M∗
Much of the early literature in stable matchings studied hypothetical stable marriages
(that is, one-to-one matchings) where the number of men equalled the number of women,
and preferences were generated uniformly from the set of all possible preference lists. In
these conditions, researchers found, not only that a stable matching always exists, but
also that the size ofM∗ grows large as the number of participants grows (Knuth, 1976). In
large, balanced, one-to-one matchings there are typically many possible stable matchings,
and the implications of men-proposing and women-proposing DA for the welfare of men
and women are very different. Arguably, this early work, and the continuing popularity
of “toy problems” in the mechanism design literature, inspired an emphasis on optimising
the mechanism itself, rather than studying the effect of other properties of the market.
However, when researchers began to study real matching markets they found that M∗
is often not large at all. For example, when Roth and Peranson (1999) analysed the
clearing house for US medical interns, and simulated matchings based on actual stated
preferences, they found that the choice of DA algorithm did not make any difference to
the result, indicating a unique stable matching.
Using a combination of simulations and analysis, Ashlagi et al. (2013) investigated the
behaviour of unbalanced markets, where the number on one side of the market is greater
than the number on the other side. In school choice markets this corresponds to a
situation where there are either more available places than students, or more students
than available places. Surprisingly, they found that even slight imbalances in the market,
in the order of one in one thousand participants, caused M∗ to collapse. They showed
that, not only were there only a very small proportion of participants who had multiple
stable matchings, but also that the difference in welfare between the school-optimal and
student-optimal stable matchings was typicially small.
Furthermore, Ashlagi et al. used simulations of matchings with preferences drawn from
various random utility models to demonstrate that almost any deviation from uniform
random preferences also leads to a small or singletonM∗. In a school choice setting, this
includes models where students’ preferences for schools are correlated, or where students
tend to prefer schools that also prefer them. Both of these correlation structures are
plausible in real settings. Azevedo and Leshno (2016) prove that in many-to-one matching
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markets, as the number of students in each school grows large there is a unique stable
matching. This follows from the results for correlated preferences, since a many-to-one
market can be represented as a one-to-one market where each school is represented by a
set of q agents, each with identical preferences. Taken together, these results imply that
we cannot expectM∗ to be large in real school choice markets.
8.2.2 Welfare implications of capacity
As well as showing thatM∗ is small in unbalanced markets, Ashlagi et al. demonstrated
that unbalanced markets benefit the short side of the market (i.e. the side with less
participants) at the expense of the long side. Surprisingly, they found that even a tiny
imbalance in the numbers of participants had dramatic implications for the comparative
welfare of the two sides. As an example, they showed that in a hypothetical marriage
market with 1,000 men and 1,001 women, men are matched on average with the 7th
woman on their preference lists, while women are matched with their 145th most-preferred
man (Ashlagi et al., 2013, p3).
Although Allen and Burgess (2010) and others have discussed the role of capacity con-
straints in the success of school choice policies, there do not appear to have been any
studies that quantitatively analyse the welfare effects of different levels of capacity. The
problem is complicated by correlated preferences, since any increase in capacity at un-
popular schools is unlikely to have much effect on student welfare.
8.2.3 The effect of subsetting a matching
In both the mechanism design literature and the literature on estimation, it is often
assumed that an entire matching market is observed. In real situations, including school
choice, it is very difficult to observe a self-contained matching market. Therefore, for
estimation strategies based on stability to be valid, it is necessary to show that stability
holds for subsets of a matching market.
Claim 1: Let m be a many-to-one matching between a set of students, A and a set of
schools S. Let S ′ ⊂ S, and let m′ ⊂ m, such that all matched pairs corresponding
to schools in S ′ are retained, and all other matched pairs are removed. Assume that
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the removal of schools does not affect students’ rankings of the remaining schools, and
symmetrically for schools’ preferences. Then, if m is stable, m′ is also stable.
This follows from the definition of stability. Stability is defined by the absence of blocking
pairs: pairs of student and school such that the student prefers the school to her allocated
school, and the school prefers the student to at least one of its allocated students. If there
are no blocking pairs in m, there will be no blocking pairs in m′. In order for subsetting
the matched pairs to create a blocking pair there would have to be some student matched
to s ∈ S ′ in m′, who prefers some s′ ∈ S ′, and s′ either has an available place or prefers a
to at least one of its allocated students. However, if s′ has an available place in m′ then
s′ also had an available place in m, since the set of students in m(s′) has not changed.
Similarly, if s′ prefers a to some allocated student in m′, then s′ also preferred a to one
of its allocated students in m. Therefore (a, s′) would have been a blocking pair in m,
which is not true therefore (a, s′) cannot be a blocking pair in m′. 
Subsetting the matching in other ways, such as removing a subset of students without
decreasing the corresponding schools’ quotas, or removing a subset of schools but not
removing the students, may destabilise the matching, since there would be some schools
with available places, or extra unmatched students, that were not previously available.
Although the subsetted matching is also a stable matching, subsetting the market may
remove blocking pairs, and in so doing change the size and properties ofM∗. Counter-
intuitively, subsetting a market may actually increase the number of possible stable
matchings for the participants in the subset, by removing pairs that blocked certain
matchings. Or, in the context of markets where only a subset is observed, it may create
the appearance that more stable matchings were possible for the subset than were actually
possible, because of unobserved blocking pairs.
This is best demonstrated with an example. Three students a, b and c are to be allocated
to three schools s1, s2 and s3. Assume these are the only participants in the market.
Preferences are given below:
a : s2  s1  s3 s1 : a  c  b
b : s1  s2  s3 s2 : b  c  a
c : s1  s2  s3 s3 : c  a  b
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By doing student-proposing and school-proposing DA on these preferences it is easy to
verify that there is only one stable matching, that is
m1 =
 s1 s2 s3
a b c
 .










which is the student-optimal stable matching. If we had only observed m2, without
knowing that it was a subset of m1 we may have concluded that welfare gains were
possible by using the student-proposing DA, where in fact no welfare gains were possible.
The above result suggests that, unless we observe a self-contained matching market, it is
not possible to use additional information about matchings produced by an algorithm,
other than stability, for estimation. For example, if it is known that school-proposing DA
was used we may wish to use this additional information to derive additional constraints
on the likelihood. However, the example above indicates that any such efforts may
produce misleading answers unless a self-contained market was observed, and stability is
the only property of a matching that is robust to subsetting. In practice a self-contained
market is almost never observed.
An additional implication is that one should be very careful when simulating from real
matching markets for the purpose of examining the welfare effects of mechanism design.
One may discover spurious welfare improvements from using different mechanisms, when
in fact unobserved aspects of the wider market would not allow those improvements.
As a final note, although the example above is a toy problem, it exemplifies a more general
phenomenon. When some students are matched to universally unpopular schools, such as
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(c, s3), or equivalently are unmatched, then pupils who have priority at those schools may
block pupils who have priority at more popular schools from making mutually beneficial
trades with other pupils. This phenomenon is discussed in a school choice context by
Calsamiglia and Miralles (2012). In the presence of “sink” schools, whose pupils may all
prefer to be at other schools, the amount of choice enjoyed by pupils at other schools
is diminished. They point out that the Top Trading Cycles algorithm allows the swaps
that would otherwise be blocked. This does not improve the situation for the unlucky
pupils at “sink” schools, but benefits all other pupils who may wish to trade priorities.
In the full market above, TTC would have resulted in
m4 =
 s1 s2 s3
b a c

which is not stable because (s1, c) and (s2, c) are blocking pairs, but is Pareto optimal
for students. It has also been conjectured (seminar discussion, 20134) that a similar
mechanism may be responsible for the large imbalance in welfare in unbalanced markets,
because unmatched agents on the long side may block mutually beneficial trades between
matched agents.
8.3 The empirical content of stable matchings
Although they have intrinsic interest for school choice from a mechanism design perspec-
tive, the main reason we are interested in stable matchings is the potential of the theory
for performing inference about choices. As a first step, this section asks what information
can be recovered about preferences on one side of a matching, when complete preferences
on the other side of the matching are known, given that we know or can assume that the
matching is stable.
To motivate the topic, let us introduce a simple example. Two students, a and b, are
matched to schools s1 and s2, respectively. We know that both schools would prefer to
swap, that is: s1 : b  a and s2 : a  b. We also know that the matching is stable. Does
this information about school priorities tell us anything about student preferences? Yes,
4Meeting of COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice at the Universidad Autonoma de
Barcelona, October 2013.
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in fact, in this simple system, it tells us everything about student preferences. Because
we know there are no blocking pairs, if school s1 “longs” for student b, then we know
that b does not reciprocate this longing, so b must prefer s2. Likewise, given that s2
“longs” for a, we know that a does not “long” for s2. In order to make the exposition
more expressive, hereafter the term “longing” will denote any preference on either side of
the market, for a match other than the realised match. Therefore, “reciprocated longing”
is synonymous with a blocking pair. The preferences inferred on the student side are
a : s1  s2 and b : s2  s1 which are indeed the complete preference lists of the students.
We will see that in general complete preference lists cannot usually be inferred.
The example above suggests that it is longing on the side with known preferences that
provides information about preferences on the other side. In fact, the key mechanism
is that when there is longing on one side of the market, we know that this longing is
not reciprocated. This implies that if every school were matched with its preferred stu-
dents, the matching and school preferences would provide no information about student
preferences.
To state this result formally, if m is a stable matching, and schools’ priorities are known,
then we have that




This result is symmetrical in the case where students’ priorities are known, except that
in this case m(s′) is a set of students, and [m(s′) s′ a] means that s′ prefers each of
its allocated students to a. Equivalently, if we denote by as the least preferred student
allocated to school s′, then [m(s′) s′ a] ⇔ [as′ s′ a]. That is, s′ prefers its least
preferred student to a.
To clarify this let us return to the example in Section 8.2. The unique stable matching
in the market with three students and three schools is represented diagrammatically in
Figure 8.2. The two panels represent two empirical situations. In panel (a) we have
observed the matching and the schools’ preferences, and in panel (b) we have observed
the same matching and the students’ preferences.
What can be learned about students’ preferences by observing schools’ preferences in















Figure 8.2: A stable matching with three schools and three students. In panel (a), schools’
preferences have been observed, whereas in panel (b) students’ preferences have been observed.
Solid arrows represent first preferences and dashed arrows represent second preferences.
panel (a)? The answer is nothing, since each school is matched to its first choice, there
are no longings on the school side to be used to infer preferences of the students. In panel
(b), however, no student is allocated to his or her first choice, and student c is matched
to his third choice. In fact there are four longings on the student side, which means that
we can infer four preference relations on the school side, out of a total of nine preference
relations in the schools’ full preference lists. The inferred preferences are:
[s1 b s2] ⇒ [a s1 b] [s2 a s1] ⇒ [b s2 a]
[s1 c s3] ⇒ [a s1 c] [s2 c s3] ⇒ [b s2 c]
which can be written more compactly as [s1 : a  {b, c}] and [s2 : b  {a, c}].
In fact, revealed preferences for some agent i in stable matchings always take the form
[m(i) i {. . . }], analogous to the revealed preferences in a classical discrete choice prob-
lem, with the realised match on the LHS and a set of other available options on the
RHS. In a classical discrete choice problem, the choice set contains all options, whereas
in a stable matching the “stable choice set” of each agent is determined by the matching
mechanism. The concept of stable choice sets leads to an alternative way to characterise
stable matchings, and is essential to the fixed point representation of stable matchings
of Adachi (2000), although he does not use this terminology. The stable choice sets on
each side of the matching correspond to a particular equilibrium. If a market has more
than one stable matching, each stable matching will imply a different set of stable choice
sets.
Observing the preferences on one side of the market reveals all stable choice sets on
the other side of the market. In our example, we have not learned anything about the
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preferences of s3, but we know that s3’s stable choice set in that particular (in this case
unique) stable matching contained only student c. Denote the stable choice set of a
under some stable matching m by Cm(a) ≡ {s : a s as}, of which m(a) is a subset.
Observing the stable matching and all schools’ preference lists reveals Cm ≡ {Cm(a)}a∈A,
and the set of preferences revealed is denoted by Rm ≡ {[m(a) a Cm(a) \ m(a)]}a∈A.
This applies symmetrically to revealed preferences of schools. Cm can be calculated in
(A+1)×S steps, by calculating as and then comparing the rank of as to each a ∈ A, for
each s ∈ S. If Ranks(a) ≤ Ranks(as), then s is added to C(a). The revealed preference set
Rm is used to derive inequalities for sampling from latent utilities in the LHN stability
Gibbs sampler described in the next chapter (Logan et al., 2008).
Chapter 9
Inference in two-sided matching
models
two
This chapter returns to the discussion of the structural estimation of two-sided matching
models, introduced in Chapter 5. The purpose of this chapter is to more thoroughly mo-
tivate the model and explore its inferential and computational properties, with reference
to other works focussing on similar models.
The first part of the Chapter synthesises the current state of knowledge concerning the
inferential properties of structural empirical models of two-sided matchings. As incom-
plete econometric models, the identification and unbiasedness of estimators derived from
these models cannot be taken for granted, and the existing literature contains examples of
contexts in which these conditions are, and are not, met. The second part of the Chapter
reviews possible methods for the estimation of two-sided matching models, and describes
in detail the methods used in the thesis. Finally, simulation evidence is presented to
evaluate the performance of estimators derived from our methods.
9.1 Existing literature on two-sided matching models
Econometric studies of two-sided matchings are not new; the field originated with the
work on assortative matchings of Becker (1974), and is related to empirical work on
152
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discrete games (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Tamer, 2003; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009).
However, models of assortative matching impose restrictive assumptions on the distribu-
tion of preferences for identification, and recently a small literature has arisen concerned
with estimating models of heterogeneous preferences based on the Gale-Shapley stable
marriage or college-admissions models (discussed in Chapter 8). These models seek to
estimate the parameters of random utility choice models for both sides of a matching.
These models can be divided into those that allow agents to maximise a joint utility or
surplus of the matching (called Transferable Utility or TU models) and those that focus
on situations where utilities on each side are private (called Non-Transferable Utility or
NTU models). Literature on estimation of the joint surplus in TU models is somewhat
more advanced1. However, there are many situations for which this model of matching
is clearly not appropriate since no transfer, monetary compensation, or sharing of utility
can take place. School allocation systems are a good example of this. In addition, TU
models do not allow the separate modelling of private utilities on each side, which may
be required even in cases where monetary compensation does take place.
These recent studies have addressed the fact that NTU stable matching models are
incomplete econometric models (Tamer, 2003). In statistical terminology, this means
that a probability model for stability alone does not describe the full data generating
process leading to an observed matching. This is the case because, as we saw in Chapter
8, stable matching games possess multiple equilibria for a given set of preferences, and a
model specifying stability does not specify how the observed stable matching has been
chosen from this set. This incompleteness potentially leads to bias in estimators if the
partial data generating model is substituted for the full data generating model without
additional restrictions.
There are several strategies adopted in the literature to deal with the incompleteness
of the model. Sørensen (2007) and Agarwal and Diamond (2013) make restrictions on
the form of utility functions to ensure that the model admits a unique stable matching.
Menzel and Salz (2013) treats the stability model as an upper bound on the likelihood
function, and derives a lower bound on the likelihood function to allow set-identification
of parameters (see Figure 9.12). Whereas the upper bound on the full likelihood is the
1See Fox (2009) for a review
2Menzel and Salz (2013) derives a Bayesian method. Figure 9.1 shows how set identification of an
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probability that the matching is stable, Menzel proposes as a lower bound the probability
that the observed matching is the unique stable matching. In a later paper, Menzel (2015)
adopts a different approach, arguing that two sided markets asymptotically approach a
limiting approximation with a unique equilibrium but restricted identification properties.
The issue of multiple equilibria is the most important limitation in estimating two-sided
stable matching models. However, at times it seems that other inferential issues are
not sufficiently acknowledged, or are even conflated with, the incompleteness issue. For
example, Echenique et al. (2013) claim to show partial (i.e. set) identification using
a method of moments estimator. However, for the 2 × 2 market they study, any bias
caused by multiple equilibria is negligible, because all but two of the 16 possible preference
profiles admit only a single stable equilibrium (cf. Figure 9.2). The partial identification
they demonstrate is caused by the use of information from only one 2×2 market. In this
case, as we show in the next section, point identification is impossible, because a single
2 × 2 market does not contain enough likelihood components to bound the parameter
space. This issue is not related to the multiplicity of equilibria, and is actually a variant
of the well-understood statistical separation issue for discrete choice models.
Similarly, Sørensen (2007), Logan et al. (2008) and Agarwal and Diamond (2013) have
pointed out that certain combinations of covariates on the two sides of the model are
not identified and lead to local maxima in the likelihood function/posterior distribution.
Local maxima are not necessarily a problem if, in large samples, we can expect a unique
global optimum to tend towards the true parameter value. This is the case for most
combinations of covariates including interactions (eg. distances). However, in the next
section we show that in one-to-one markets there are combinations of covariates that lead
to indistinguishable local optima and biased estimation. This non-identification is not
caused by multiple equilibria. Agarwal and Diamond (2013) uses a model with perfectly
correlated preferences and shows that many-to-one matchings contain additional infor-
mation that identifies parameters in this situation. In the next section this identification
issue is explored for a general random utility specification.
MLE might be achieved along similar lines.
Chapter 9. Inference in two-sided matching models 155






















Figure 9.1: Set identification of parameter θ by exploiting the stability part of the model
Pr(m ∈M∗|θ) as an upper bound on the likelihood, and the probability of a unique equilibrium
Pr({m} =M∗|θ) as a lower bound on the likelihood, as per Menzel and Salz (2013).
9.2 Comparison of full- and partial-likelihood models
In this chapter we take a different approach to the above authors; rather than using
restricted or approximate models to ensure a unique equilibrium (stable matching), we
study the conditions for obtaining bounded, yet biased, point estimates in finite samples
under a flexible random utility model specification. Then we ask, under which conditions
do estimates derived from the stability likelihood asymptotically approach those derived
from a full likelihood? At the same time we explore and clarify two inferential issues
that turn out to be independent of the incompleteness issue: obtaining bounds on the
parameter space; and non-identification of certain parameter combinations. In order to
understand the identification problems associated with using both the full and stability
models, it is useful to write down the full likelihood as an intractable sum over preference
profiles.
As described in Chapter 5 we set up a random utility function for pupils, such as
Uas = f(das,xa,xas;θ) + as, and a random utility function for schools, such as Vsa =
g(dsa, za, zsa; δ) + ηsa, where f() and g() are linear models of observable characteristics,
and (as, ηsa) are unobservable random terms distributed according to a known para-
metric distribution, say N(0, 1). The usual identification restrictions of a discrete choice
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model, described in Section 5.1, apply. Specifically, each agent’s utility function does
not contain terms relating only to characteristics of the agent, as these would only shift
each agent’s utility for all options, and would therefore not affect preference formation.
Denote by θ ≡ (β, δ) the set of parameters on both sides of the market.
θ indexes a distribution over the (Ns!Na)(Na!Ns) possible preference profiles pi for a given
set of pupils A and schools S. There is a many-to-one mapping between each pi and
M∗, which is defined as the set of all matchings m such that m is stable under (A,S, pi).
SoM∗ can be thought of as a random variable whose distribution is completely defined
by θ. The data generating process for a stable matching conditional upon θ can be
characterised as follows: first draw a preference profile given θ; then select a matching
from theM∗ of that preference profile. This implies the following likelihood function:




Pr(pi|θ)1{m ∈M∗(pi)}Pr(m|m ∈M∗(pi), θ) .
For each preference profile, the conditional probability can be written down as a discrete-
choice-type product over terms for each agent, but the sum over preference profiles is
already computationally difficult in the case of a 3 × 3 market, where there are 46,656
possible preference profiles. In addition, the assignment probability Pr(m|m ∈M∗(pi), θ)
depends upon the matching mechanism used. In the case where the matching is sampled
uniformly from M∗, this probability is simply 1/|M∗(pi)|. If the matching is the re-
sult of pupil-proposing DA then the corresponding term is 1{m is pupil-optimal for pi},
which is equivalent to the absence of stable improvement cycles in the bi-partite graph
representation of the matching.
In general, it is not possible to derive a tractable expression for the assignment mecha-
nism, and even if it were we often do not know with certainty which assignment mech-
anism was used. In Chapter 8 it was shown that when a subset of a stable matching
is used for inference, the stability property remains valid, but any properties associated
with the specific assignment mechanism are lost. This means that inference based on
the assignment mechanism may be sensitive to assumptions about the boundaries of the
market, or small variations in the configuration of the algorithm. Therefore in practice













































































∗: Matching is not stable for these preferences. ∆: stable matching is not unique.
Figure 9.2: All possible preference profiles in a 2×2 matching {(a, s), (a′, s′)}. Arrows represent
preferences. There are nine preference profiles for which the matching is stable, and seven for
which it is unstable. Of the stable preference profiles, all but no.s 4 and 13 have a unique stable
equilibrium, which is the current matching. (Copied from Figure 8.1)
it is not only extremely difficult, but probably not desirable to treat the assignment
mechanism as known.
For this reason we focus on the information that can be derived from the stability mech-
anism Pr(pi ∈ {pi′ : m ∈M∗(pi′)}|θ). To save space, denote by m˜ the event [pi ∈ {pi′ :
m ∈M∗(pi′)}].
It makes sense to compare the properties of the stability and full models in the context
of the only matching market for which both models are tractable, the market with two
schools and two pupils. In this market there are only 16 possible preference profiles.
In order to further simplify the model, each pupil and school’s utilities depend only on
the distance between the pupil and the school, and unobserved random variation. The
utility functions are Uas = βdas + as and Vsa = δdsa + ηsa with as, ηsa each distributed






Say, we observe a matching m = {(a, s), (a′, s′)} then the stability likelihood can be
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written as
Pr(m˜|θ) =Pr(s a s′ ∪ a′ s′ a)× Pr(s′ a′ s ∪ a s a′)
= {1− Φ(β(das′ − das)) Φ(δ(das′ − da′s′))}
× {1− Φ(β(da′s − da′s′)) Φ(δ(da′s − das))} .
Some tedious algebra confirms that this expression is equivalent to the sum over the
probabilities of the nine preference profiles for which the matching is stable.
If we know that the matching was selected using the pupil-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm then we can derive the full likelihood, which turns out to be the sum over the
eight preference profiles for which the matching is both stable and pupil-optimal. We
can simply subtract the probability of the one preference profile (no. 13 in Figure 9.2)
that is stable but not pupil-optimal from the expression above:
Pr(m|θ) =Pr(s a s′ ∪ a′ s′ a)× Pr(s′ a′ s ∪ a s a′)
− Pr(s′ a s ∩ s a′ s′ ∩ a s a′ ∩ a′ s′ a)
= {1− Φ(β(das′ − das)) Φ(δ(das′ − da′s′))} × {1− Φ(β(da′s − da′s′)) Φ(δ(da′s − das))}
− Φ(β(das′ − das)) Φ(β(da′s − da′s′)) Φ(δ(das − da′s)) Φ(δ(da′s′ − das′)) .
It would be reasonable to ask whether the parameters (β, δ) are identified from either
the stability-likelihood model or the full likelihood model. The answer to this question
depends only on the signs of the covariate differences ∆(d)i ≡ [dij − dim(i)] (where j is the
agent not matched to i), and is negative for both the full and the stability-only model,
as can be seen by plotting the likelihood components one at a time.
Figure 9.3 plots the first and second likelihood components of the stability model, as-
suming that ∆(d)a = 1 and ∆
(d)
s′ = 1. The joint MLE for the two parameters with one
component is not bounded, and the likelihood function with two components creates a
saddle point, rather than an optimum. So it is not possible to identify parameters on
both sides of a single 2 × 2 matching. Figure 9.4 shows that four independent likeli-
hood components are sufficient to provide bounds on both parameters, if and only if
the covariate differences ∆(d)a and ∆
(d)
s′ take every combination of positive and negative
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Figure 9.3: Contours of likelihood functions formed from the first and second no-blocking-pair
conditions from a single 2× 2 matching market.
values. Therefore the non-separation condition for identifiability in matching markets
is only slightly more restrictive than the non-separation condition in normal discrete
choice models. The non-separation condition holds as long as the joint distribution of
∆(d)a and ∆
(d)
s′ for all unmatched pairs (a, s
′) has support in all four quadrants of the
covariate-difference space.



























Figure 9.4: Contours of a likelihood function formed from four independent no-blocking-pair
conditions. The four components could be provided by, for example, observing two independent
2× 2 matching markets.
This observation sheds light on the non-identification result in Echenique et al. (2013),
where the example used was an identical replication of a single 2×2 matching. However,
Echenique et al. erroneously attribute the non-identification to multiple equilibria.
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Table 9.1: Simulated parameter values from 2×2 markets under two utility specifications.
Stability Model Full Model
Mean SD Mean SD
True parameters:
(β0, δ0) -0.500 -0.500
Specification 1:
β(d) -0.493 0.0543 -0.503 0.0547
δ(d) -0.499 0.0573 -0.510 0.0576
Specification 2:
β(x) -0.280 0.369 -0.497 0.115
δ(z) -0.180 0.332 -0.055 0.419
To compare the full and stability likelihoods for the 2× 2 case, it is necessary to observe
multiple independent markets. Then the full (stability) likelihood is the product over
the full (stability) likelihoods for each market:









In order to investigate the identification issues relating to certain combinations of covari-
ates, as noted by Sørensen (2007), Logan et al. (2008) and others, we will estimate two
different utility specifications. The first specification has utilities on both sides of the
market depending only on proximity as described above. The second utility specification
has Uas = βxs + as and Vsa = δza + ηsa, where (, η) are as before, xs is a school char-
acteristic, and za is a pupil characteristic. The model differs from the previous model
in that covariates (x, z) do not interact schools and pupils. For each specification we
simulate datasets containing 1,000 independent 2× 2 matching markets.
Table 9.1 shows the means and standard deviations after estimating both the full and
stability likelihoods 100 times for each specification. For the first specification, the in-
corporation of the additional information from the matching mechanism makes little
difference; both are identified. This is unsurprising, since the only difference between the
two likelihoods is that one is a sum over the probabilities of nine preference profiles for
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Figure 9.5: Likelihood contours for a single simulation of the second specification (x, z) with
1,000 markets. Dashed lines show the true parameter values
each market, and the other is the sum over the probabilities of eight preference profiles.
The second specification is not fully identified. This non-identification of uninteracted
parameters was as predicted by Sørensen, Agarwal and others. This non-identification
affects both the full and stability likelihood inferences. The reported means in Table
9.1 do not reveal that the stability-likelihood function for the second specification has
multiple optima, as shown in Figure 9.5.
The simulation of simple 2 × 2 markets reveals that in this context, the information
provided by stability is almost equal to the information provided by knowing the full data
generating process. In that case, the bias induced by multiple equilibria is negligible.
However, it does not allow us to investigate the behaviour of these models in larger
markets, where the sets of preference profiles satisfying stability diverge from the sets
satisfying the full data generating process.
This simple example also allows us to confirm that certain specifications of utility func-
tions on either side of the market are not identified, as noted by several authors. However,
Agarwal and Diamond (2013) prove that, with a specific restriction on preferences, many-
to-one markets provide identification of utility models similar to our second specification.
In order to test this result on unrestricted preference specifications it is necessary to look
at larger matching markets, and this will require tractable methods for estimation.
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9.3 Tractable stability-based models
This section focusses on tractable methods for large markets based on the stability like-
lihood. The other main studies employing the stability likelihood, as opposed to method
of moments estimators, are Logan et al. (2008) (hereafter LHN) and Menzel and Salz
(2013). In both cases a Gibbs sampler is used to implicitly sample from the stability
likelihood, by simulating draws from the latent utilities and parameters. The Gibbs
algorithm proceeds as follows:
The LHN Stability Gibbs Sampler:
1. Initialise θ ≡ (β, δ). Initialise U ,V |θ, s.t. m is stable.
2. Sample U |β,V , s.t. m is stable. This entails respecting inequality conditions on
as induced by conditioning on V (see discussion). In practice as is sampled from
truncated distributions.
3. Update β|U using a conjugate OLS update.
4. Sample V |δ,U , s.t. m is stable as above.
5. Update δ|V .
6. Repeat steps 2 to 5 until convergence.
The sampler exploits the fact that, if utilities (and hence rankings) on one side of the
market are known, a subset of preferences – Rm – on the other side of the market
is revealed. Section 8.3 discusses the revealed preferences from a one-sided matching in
more detail. Given this subset of preference relations, utilities are sampled from truncated
normal distributions to respect inequalities. For example, for a student a, the utility of
the matched school, Uam(a), is sampled such that it is greater than the maximum utility
of the revealed-dominated schools in the previous iteration. Then the utilities of the
revealed-dominated schools are sampled such that they are less than the current sampled
value of Uam(a).
This sampler is intuitive, and quick to implement. A disadvantage of the method is that
it requires sampling from the full set of latent utilities on both sides of the market, of
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dimension 2 × Na × Ns. In simulations, we found that the sampler could be slow to
converge.
To facilitate tractable estimation, we have rewritten the stability likelihood as an explicit
function of parameters and threshold utilities. Threshold utilities are defined as utility
of each agent for their marginal match – in the case of pupils, their allocated school,
and in the case of schools, their lowest ranked pupil. The advantage of this approach
is that there are only Na + Ns threshold utilities. The threshold utilities are defined
as: Ua = Uas : {s} = m(a), student a’s threshold utility; and, Vs = mina∈m(s){Vsa}, the
threshold utility of school s.
































This extended likelihood is a joint distribution over the parameters of interest θ, and the
random variables V. The random variables U have been integrated out using numerical






for inference about the parameters θ.
In order to obtain estimates of the parameters of interest we can either use MCMC
methods to integrate out V, or approximate the integral analytically. We have found
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that the first method, MCMC, does not work well without a good starting point and
proposal distribution, so that in practice even computational simulation of the integral
requires a method for analytical approximation of the integral as a starting point.
The Laplace approximation uses the curvature of the likelihood function at the optimum
to approximate the integral. Calculation of the Laplace log-likelihood for a given θ entails
finding
Vˆ(θ) = arg max
v∈RNs
{log Pr(m˜,v|θ)}
and then numerically estimating the matrix of second derivatives (the Hessian matrix)
H at (θ, Vˆ(θ)). The Laplace log-likelihood approximation is then







∣∣∣−H (θ, Vˆ(θ))∣∣∣ .
Since calculation of this approximation for a given value of θ requires numerical opti-
misation and numerically estimating the Hessian, optimising the Laplace log-likelihood
involves optimisation-within-optimisation and is therefore computationally demanding.
A cruder, but much less computationally-demanding, approximation can be derived by
omitting the Hessian term from the Laplace approximation. This is essentially the h-
likelihood approach to inference (Lee and Nelder, 1996; Lee et al., 2006). This approach
treats the random variables V in a similar manner to unknown population parameters,
and advocates estimators that simply jointly optimise the joint likelihood for (θ,V) rather
than (approximately) integrating out the random variables. The h-likelihood approach
has attracted controversy (see, for example, the responses to the discussion paper Lee and
Nelder (1996), and the theoretical exploration of Meng (2009)), especially in situations
where the number of units per group, and hence the amount of information available
to estimate random variables, is small and does not increase with sample size. In these
cases the bias arising from the approximation is not asymptotically negligible.
However, we argue that in the context of school choice, group size (i.e. the size of each
school’s intake) is large enough to make this approach a reasonable compromise. The
Maximum h-Likelihood Estimator is








Chapter 9. Inference in two-sided matching models 165
Care must be taken to ensure that the distribution of the latent variables is reasonably
unimodal and quadratic, and that they are specified on an appropriate scale, since the
location of the mode is not transformation-invariant in general (Meng, 2009). When h-
likelihood estimates were compared to estimates from the Laplace approximation, they
were almost identical.
We also implemented a Random-walk Metropolis type MCMC sampler. The sampler con-
verged quickly, achieving close-to-optimal acceptance rates (approx. 0.25) with a proposal







optimal scaling 2.382/(Nθ+Ns). However, sampling from the true posterior after estimat-
ing the approximate posterior in most cases did not produce point or interval estimates
that were sufficiently different to justify the additional computational cost. Additionally,
the MCMC sampler could not easily be scaled to multiple datasets in combination with
the EP algorithm described below.
9.3.1 Identification of parameters
With this tractable stability likelihood model we can investigate the behaviour in many-
to-one markets of utility specifications containing complementary pupil and school char-
acteristics. It is no longer possible to compare the stability likelihood to the full likeli-
hood, but we can increase the number of pupils per school to evaluate the performance
of the estimators as the sample size increases.
We investigate two specifications of utility functions on both sides of the market as before.
The first specification has Uas = β(d)das + as and Vsa = δ(d)dsa + ηsa, whilst the second
specification has Uas = β(x)xs + as and Vsa = δ(z)za + ηsa. As before, das is the home-
school distance, xs is a school characteristic, and za is a pupil characteristic. For each
specification we simulate datasets containing a single market with {7, 15} schools, and
{20, 50, 100} pupils per school.
Table 9.2 shows the medians and standard deviations after estimating both the full and
stability likelihoods 50 times for each specification. The median has been calculated
rather than the mean because estimates on smaller markets sometimes exhibit outliers.
Both specifications appear to be identified in many-to-one markets. In small markets the
bias is substantial, but there is clear evidence that both the bias and variance are reducing
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as the market size increases. Estimates of β(x) are the most biased and variable, which
is to be expected since identification of the parameter depends on variation over a very
small number of schools. In the next section we describe the Expectation Propagation
method that has been used to allow the sample size to be increased, and especially the
number of schools for the identification of school-varying parameters.
Table 9.2: Simulation evidence from the stability likelihood on many-to-one markets. 50
replications.
Specification 1 Specification 2
β(d) δ(d) β(x) δ(z)
Median SD Median SD Median SD Median SD
True values -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
7 schools and
20 -1.20 (0.401) -0.75 (0.350) -1.78 (4.790) -0.77 (0.208)
50 -1.06 (0.236) -0.92 (0.233) -1.45 (4.600) -0.86 (0.181)
100 -1.05 (0.097) -0.94 (0.144) -1.24 (0.505) -0.92 (0.136)
pupils per sch.
15 schools and
20 -1.10 (0.314) -0.82 (0.242) -1.72 (1.190) -0.76 (0.213)
50 -1.05 (0.197) -0.90 (0.182) -1.27 (0.494) -0.87 (0.288)
100 -1.01 (0.087) -0.97 (0.105) -1.17 (0.321) -0.92 (0.306)
pupils per sch.
The evidence in these simulations and in those in the previous section appears to support
the analysis of Agarwal and Diamond (2013), by showing that specifications including un-
interacted parameters are identified in many-to-one markets but not one-to-one markets.
We have also presented evidence that specifications involving interactions between pupil-
side and school-side parameters (such as distance) are identified in both many-to-one
and one-to-one markets. Simulation evidence cannot prove that models are identified
or consistent, as we cannot make the sample size arbitrarily large. The next section
discusses informal arguments supporting the hypothesis that stability-based likelihood
models have desirable large-sample properties in many-to-one markets.
9.3.2 Bias arising from multiple equilibria
As the analysis of 2× 2 markets made clear, the issue of identification of complementary
parameters in a two-sided market is not dependent upon the issue of bias arising from
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the incompleteness of the model. We now discuss the latter issue. Both Bayesian and
likelihood-based approaches stress the importance of basing inference upon the full data
generating process. Since we are not using the full data generating process in our model,
many of the standard guarantees associated with likelihood-based inference, regarding
consistency, efficiency and identification, do not automatically apply.
For this reason, those using two-sided models have frequently imposed restrictions de-
signed to ensure that the matching equilibrium is unique and therefore that the model
for equilibrium is complete (Sørensen, 2007; Agarwal and Diamond, 2013; Menzel, 2015).
These models obtain unique equilibria in finite markets, at the expense of strong model
restrictions. The alternative approach that we advocate is to exploit results regarding
the limiting behaviour of the set of stable matchings, M∗, in two-sided markets. The
large sample properties ofM∗ in stable matching markets have been studied by several
authors (Knuth, 1976; Roth and Peranson, 1999; Ashlagi et al., 2013). Using simulations,
Ashlagi et al. (2013) found that in many realistic market specifications M∗ appears to
become small in large markets.
A particularly important case for our purposes is the limiting behaviour of many-to-one
markets. Azevedo and Leshno (2016) studied markets in which the school-side remained
fixed while the student-side increased. They provided a proof that, for a general model of
two-sided many-to-one matching markets,M∗ converges to a singleton as the number of
students per school increases. This relationship is borne out by the simulation evidence
in Table 9.3. If and only if the pupil-optimal and school-optimal matchings are identical
for all agents,M∗ is a singleton. Enumerating the size ofM∗, if it is not a singleton, is
computationally difficult, but a good proxy is provided by the proportion of agents for
whom their pupil-optimal match is not equal to their school-optimal match. Table 9.3
presents this proportion for matching markets of different sizes, showing clearly that the
proportion tends towards zero as the number of pupils per school increases.
Since the stability likelihood Pr(m ∈M∗|θ) constitutes an upper bound on the full likeli-
hood, and the probability that a given matching is a unique equilibrium Pr({m} =M∗|θ)
constitutes a lower bound on the full likelihood (cf. Menzel and Salz (2013) and Figure
9.1), it is reasonable to suppose that some kind of “sandwiching” argument could be used
to justify the smooth convergence of the stability likelihood to the full likelihood.
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Table 9.3: The proportion of pupils for whom the pupil-optimal match is not equal to
the school-optimal match. Evidence from 100 simulations of each market.
Pupils per school 5 schools 10 schools 20 schools
×2 0.0940 0.132 0.132
×10 0.0374 0.0622 0.0924
×50 0.0137 0.0218 0.0333
×100 0.00898 0.0157 0.0303
Although we do not pursue a proof of convergence here, this informal argument along
with the simulation evidence is enough to satisfy us that estimators derived from stability-
based likelihoods will perform reasonably well given enough data. However, a rigorous
proof would probably be more generally useful, since the work of Ashlagi et al. (2013) and
others suggests there may be several conditions under which the set of stable matchings
converges. An approach based on large sample convergence ofM∗ may indeed be useful
in empirical work on discrete games more generally.
9.4 The Expectation Propagation algorithm
Although more tractable than alternative methods, the stability h-likelihood does, like
other methods, have dimensionality which grows with the number of schools. This means
that it becomes prohibitively difficult to optimise the h-likelihood as datasets are com-
bined. In practice we found that estimation became infeasible with more than about two
dozen schools. In the previous section we discussed the importance of amassing enough
data to overcome several sources of finite-sample bias. As there are 12 datasets (three
markets × four cohorts) containing a total of 153 school-years, a method is needed to
combine the estimates without combining the dimensions of the parameter space.
A simple method to combine 12 sets of substantive parameter estimates whilst ignoring
nuisance parameter estimates would be by the sequential application of Bayes theorem.
Such a method would require assuming that each estimated likelihood function can be
summarised by its estimated mode θˆ and negative Hessian matrix −Hˆ, and is therefore
proportional to a multivariate normal posterior distribution N(θˆ, (−Hˆ)−1). The prod-
uct of two normal distributions N1(µ1,Σ1) and N2(µ2,Σ2) is proportional to a normal
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The sequential method proceeds by treating the first estimated posterior as the prior for
the estimation of the second, and the second as the prior for the estimation of the third,
and so on. At each stage the Maximum a Posteriori estimate is used to approximate
the posterior. With such a method the dimensionality of the posterior does not grow
as the sequence progresses, because at each stage the nuisance variables can be analyti-
cally marginalised out by subsetting the estimated mean vector θˆ and covariance matrix
Σˆ = (−Hˆ)−1. The posterior becomes increasingly regular as the prior is increasingly
informative, leading to quicker and more stable estimation. However, this method raises
the problem that the order of estimation matters, especially if the individual distribu-
tions are far from normal. Only the last iteration benefits from the estimation on all of
the other datasets, whereas the estimation of the first dataset does not benefit from any
information to stabilise estimation and ensure normality. If the first likelihood function is
irregular, the optimisation may become stuck in a local mode, which will have knock-on
effects for the estimation on the other datasets, particularly if their likelihood functions
are also irregular.
The Expectation Propagation method (Minka, 2001; Gelman et al., 2014) allows all
partitions to provide prior information for the regularisation of estimation of all other
partitions. The information from all except the k’th dataset is approximated by a cavity
distribution g−k(θ) = g0(θ)
∏
k′ 6=k gk′(θ), which acts as a prior to regularise the esti-
mation of the k’th partition. Here each gk′(θ) is a multivariate normal distribution
that approximates the likelihood contribution of one partition (g0(θ) is the prior). This
cavity distribution is combined with the k’th likelihood to form the tilted distribution
g\k(θ) = Pr(m˜k|θ) g−k(θ). Each of these approximations is summarised by its precision
matrix Qk = Σ−1k and natural parameter rk = Qkµk. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
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Stability Expectation Propagation:
1. Initialise the approximate posterior g(θ) = g0(θ)
∏K
k=1 gk(θ) by setting the initial






2. For each k in {1, 2, . . . ,K}:
(a) Compute the cavity distribution g−k(θ) by setting Q−k = Q−Qk and r−k =
r − rk.
(b) Form the tilted distribution g,\k(θ) = Pr(m˜k|θ) g−k(θ) and optimise this func-
tion to obtain Q\k and r\k. This entails approximating the full posterior with
(θˆ, Vˆ) and −Hˆ, and marginalising over the nuisance variables V.3.
(c) Divide out the cavity distribution to obtain a new approximation of the k’th
likelihood, by setting Qnewk = Q\k −Q−k and rnewk = r\k − r−k.
(d) Update g(θ) with the new k’th approximation.
3. Repeat until convergence.
The main advantages of the EP method are, firstly, that at each iteration the dimension
of the parameter space is reduced by analytically marginalising over the nuisance param-
eters and, secondly, that most of the operations involve simple linear algebra (Gelman
et al., 2014). Additionally, the final posterior is represented by two parameters, which
is easier to work with than, for example, the output of MCMC methods. The main dis-
advantage of the method is that convergence is not guaranteed. We have noticed that,
for some specifications and datasets, parameter values may oscillate slightly rather than
converging completely. This oscillation does not appear to be of a magnitude that would
substantively affect estimates, but it does mean that finding a sensible stopping rule is
more problematic, and more iterations may be necessary than would otherwise be the
case.
3To obtain an estimate of the marginal precision matrix it is necessary to invert the negative Hessian,
subset the covariance matrix, and then invert again. θˆ approximates the marginal mean vector.
Chapter 10
Conclusions
This thesis has presented new evidence on the determinants of parental demand for
schools, and the relationship between choice, competition and sorting in the English sec-
ondary education system. At the same time it has introduced a new structural method for
statistical inference on two-sided matching markets, of which secondary school markets
are an example. This conclusion, firstly, brings together evidence from previous chap-
ters and discusses the relevance of the substantive findings to current debates around
social cohesion, quasi-markets and choice. Secondly, it discusses and evaluates the new
statistical method, and points out avenues for further research in this area.
10.1 Sorting, choice and competition
The thesis set out to answer three research questions around sorting, choice and compe-
tition. The first question concerned the different weightings parents of different ethnic
and socio-economic groups placed on peers, academic performance and other criteria in
choosing a school. The second question asked if heterogeneity in parents’ preferences for
peers and academic performance set up patterns of sorting both in the short run, and
cumulatively as preferences feed back into observable school characteristics. The third
question asked whether sorting has a muting effect on the amount of choice parents enjoy,
and the amount of competition schools face for pupils.
The thesis first set out to confirm that post-residential sorting exists in the markets
studied. To achieve this, a counterfactual was set up in which all pupils attend their
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nearest school, and an index of segregation, D was calculated for each market. These
counterfactual segregation indices were compared to actual levels of school segregation
to disaggregate residential from post-residential segregation. The results were consistent
with substantively important levels of post-residential segregation on ethnicity in all mar-
kets except Preston, where school choice appears to act to reduce segregation. Although
it is clear that residential segregation still explains the majority of sorting in schools,
post-residential sorting processes play an important role. This preliminary result was
important, because it validates an approach that emphasises the importance of choices,
rather than constraints, in observed patterns of sorting. Post-residential sorting may be
a result of choices or constraints but, as we have argued, both choices and constraints
can be thought of as stemming from the decision-making of individual families; therefore
studying parental preferences is vital.
On these grounds the following two chapters set up and estimated a model of parental
preferences for schools based on weighing the relative importance of proximity, peers and
academic performance in choosing a secondary school. We expected to find that parents
value proximity, and they do. We also tentatively expected to find that parents, to
some extent, are conscious of and evaluate the ethnic composition of schools. Finally, we
hypothesised, based on evidence from other studies of school choice, that parents would
value academic performance as measured by raw test scores, but that parents with lower
socio-economic status (SES) would place less weight on academic performance, relative
to other factors, than higher-SES parents. Both of these hypotheses were borne out by
the estimated models, and we deal with each in turn here.
10.1.1 Tipping dynamics and self-segregation
In relation to peer preferences, we found that both white and Asian parents usually pre-
ferred to send their children to schools with a higher proportion of their own ethnicity on
the rolls. We characterised such mutual and symmetric preferences for one’s own group as
horizontal peer preferences, in contrast to vertical peer preferences where the preferences
of one group determine sorting. Further to this, when we allowed peer preferences to be
non-linear, we found that preferences were consistent with an aversion to sending one’s
child to a school overwhelmingly dominated by one’s own ethnic group. This pattern
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of revealed preferences was robust across markets, and preference weightings for white
and Asian families were of a similar magnitude, although those for Asian families were
slightly more non-linear. We also expected to find that the specifics of each place made a
difference, especially for Oldham whose recent history suggests much more consciousness
of ethnic difference than the other two towns. However, what we found was, if anything,
more consistent with an underlying geographic homogeneity to ethnic peer preferences,
as if we had tapped into “deep” parameters of ethnic homophily. However, the similarity
of estimates does not, on its own, provide firm evidence to support this assertion. It is
possible that the three towns studied were not sufficiently dissimilar to reveal geographic
diversity in ethnic peer preferences.
Finding that peer preferences tend to be reversed as one’s own ethnic group approaches
dominance would seem to be a positive result. It suggests that parents do not want
extreme ethnic segregation – that they would rather their children went to an ethnically-
mixed school as long as their ethnic group constitutes the majority. This kind of ethnic
preference sounds moderate, at least more moderate than an absolute aversion to ethnic
mixing. However, models of tipping in sorting dynamics suggest that in the long run,
even moderate preferences for ethnic in-groups can produce complete segregation.
In Chapter 7 we populated the parameters of sorting models for Oldham with our esti-
mated random utility parameters. Oldham is of special interest both because of its recent
history of ethnic unrest, and because of the structural changes in the period 2010–2012
that merged several segregated schools into fewer, larger schools with ethnically-mixed
populations, thereby creating a kind of natural experiment in mixing and ethnic prefer-
ences. Waterhead Academy, in particular, received national media attention (eg. Nye,
2011) as part of a bold strategy to replace an almost-completely white school (Counthill
School) and an almost-completely Asian school (Breeze Hill School) with an integrated
academy. The school was used as a case study for theories of inter-group attitudes by
Ramiah et al. (2015), who found that outside lessons pupils in the new school have
tended to avoid contact with members of the other ethnic group. However, some (un-
published) evidence has been reported, suggesting that through daily contact, pupils’
attitudes towards the other group were gradually improving (Nye, 2011).
This is a positive result of a natural experiment in integration. Yet the results in Chap-
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ter 7 suggest, unfortunately, that the integration of the school population may not be
sustainable given current parental preferences; both the equilibrium model and the com-
putational model predicted increasing (re-)segregation at Waterhead over time. Whereas
the equilibrium model predicted that the school’s population would become almost com-
pletely segregated over time, the computational model implied that the proportions would
become more uneven over many years, but would stop short of complete segregation.
The problem, in Oldham and in the other towns we have studied, is that the preferences of
each ethnic group for ethnic mix are not realistic with regards to the local context. Each
group of parents would like a small proportion of the other ethnic group in their child’s
school; a proportion that does not reflect the actual proportion of the other group that is
likely to wish to attend their local school given local demographics. This may be explained
partly by people’s tendency to over-estimate the proportion of ethnic groups other than
their own in a given setting (Alba et al., 2005). It is this mismatch between feasible
intakes and desired intakes that sets up the sorting dynamics that result in additional
post-residential sorting. In this respect, our emphasis on parental choices actually seems
more pessimistic than a focus on constraints, since at least where institutional constraints,
such as unfair admissions practices, are present they can be removed. Admissions policies,
house prices, school capacity and other constraints undoubtedly do play a role in sorting.
However, where preferences for sorting are mutual, rather than one-sided, constraints are
not necessary for sorting to arise.
This begs the question of whether the only way to achieve ethnically-integrated schools
is to give up on choice and impose mandatory desegregation in a manner similar to the
US in the 1960’s and 1970’s. This need not involve busing children to distant schools;
it would be sufficient to build schools near the boundaries of currently segregated areas,
and to “gerrymander” the catchment areas of each school to achieve ethnic balance.
However, the experience of the US suggests that, apart from being undesirable from a
parental sovereignty point of view, such desegregation may not be sustainable as in the
medium to long run, parents would just subsume school choice (and any ethnic peer
preferences) within residential choice and move to new areas. So-called “white flight” is
a well-documented phenomenon as a result of desegregation in the US (Clotfelter et al.,
2006).
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In the light of the seeming intractability of self-segregation, in the US there has been
a recent interest in policies to promote diversity within a quasi-market system. For ex-
ample the US Department of Justice has published guidance establishing that schools
are permitted to consider ethnicity in admissions criteria to achieve a more diverse stu-
dent body (Erdil and Kumano, 2014). However, as well as moral and legal issues, the
idea of two-sided markets incorporating “ethnic quotas” creates difficult theoretical prob-
lems requiring innovations in the mechanism design literature (Erdil and Kumano, 2014;
Echenique and Yenmez, 2015).
It is unlikely that solutions to ethnic segregation involving the removal of choice, or
even ethnic quotas on admissions, would be socially or politically acceptable in the UK.
Nevertheless, the EU Referendum and other events in 2016 have brought issues around
social cohesion, integration and multiculturalism to the fore again, as they were in 2001.
Perhaps the only policy to tackle (self-)segregation in English schools that would be
effective in the long run, would be to change parents’ perceptions about the benefits of
attending an ethnically-diverse school. Ted Cantle, whose report in 2001 responded to
the race riots in Oldham and elsewhere, proposes what he calls “salesmanship” (Asthana
and Parveen, 2016) on the part of policy-makers, to promote the benefits of integration:
Politicians and policymakers need to encourage white British residents to
remain in diverse areas; to choose, rather than avoid, diverse areas when
they do relocate, encouraging similar choices with respect to placing pupils
in diverse schools. (Cantle and Kaufmann, 2016)
However, changing people’s perceptions is not a job for which politicians, policy-makers
or civil servants have an abundance of tools. Ironically, it may be that education, the
site of the problem, is also the only way in which the problem can be solved.
10.1.2 Socio-economic status and preferences for academic performance
The model of parental preferences constructed in the thesis allowed different socio-
economic groups to have different preferences for academic performance, as measured
by the percentage of pupils achieving five or more A*–C grades at GCSE. The pattern
of preferences for test scores increasing in importance with SES was robust across all
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samples; at each quintile of IDACI (a proxy for SES) parent’s relative weighting of test
scores against other criteria decreased. These results were consistent with previous work
(eg. Hastings et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2014; Burgess et al., 2015). However this feature
of parental preferences, even more than ethnic peer preferences, is difficult to explain in
terms of rational decision-making or well-known psychological theories. Families clearly
have incentives to seek educational “quality”, and measures of test scores contain infor-
mation, albeit imperfect, about both the quality of teaching, and likely peer effects from
other pupils. It might therefore be expected that families of all socio-economic statuses
would take them into account.
There are several possible explanations for the regularity. First, it may be that higher-
SES parents use various sources of information more effectively than lower-SES parents.
Second, as Breen and Goldthorpe (1996) argue, parents’ different commitment to edu-
cational attainment may reflect parents’ different reference points, and hence different
evaluations the value of a given level of educational attainment relative to the perceived
risks in striving for it. Another possible explanation is that lower-SES parents believe
that their children are less likely to gain admission to certain schools, and post-rationalise
perceived constraints. It is also possible that lower-SES parents are less likely to con-
sider test scores a good proxy for the quality of education that their child will receive.
Depending on the (poorly understood) effects of peers and educational production, it
may be rational for lower-SES parents to put less faith in test scores as predictors of
a good quality education. Indeed, it may be the case that higher-SES parents put too
much faith in test scores, given that they tend to be poor predictors of their children’s
satisfaction at school (Gibbons and Silva, 2010).
Finally, it may be what is actually being measured is families preferences for socio-
economic peer groups, which are highly correlated with test scores. The models estimated
in this thesis did not account for the possibility of peer preferences for SES. This exclu-
sion restriction on families’ utility functions was unavoidable as there was not enough
information in the samples to robustly estimate both types of preference. However,
with better data it should be possible to allow for the existence of socio-economic peer
preferences. The more hierarchical, and arguably the more obvious, model would have
higher-SES parents seeking higher-SES peer groups, but lower-SES parents indifferent.
Chapter 10. Conclusions 177
This may interact with a more-or-less homogenous preference for test scores to produce
the observed regularity. However, it is also possible that both higher and lower-SES
parents seek in-group peers for their children. This possibility would produce mutual
self-segregation similar to that discussed in relation to ethnicity.
Even without peer preferences, the endogeneity of test scores suggests the potential for
a sorting dynamic, whereby the interaction of SES with preferences for academic per-
formance would result in cumulative segregation along socio-economic lines over several
years. This is because GCSE test scores depend on the intake (of five years previous)
as an input, and SES is strongly correlated with ability. However, incorporating such a
process would require a model for educational production – i.e. an economic model that
links inputs, such as pupils’ prior attainment, finances, and teaching, to outputs such as
test scores. There is a long tradition of modelling the education production function in
terms of so-called value-added models, an early and influential example of which was The
Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966; Hanushek, 2008). Extending the analysis in this way
would make possible a more complete investigation of sorting processes in education.
10.1.3 Choice and competition
Segregation in schools is intrinsically important, because of the influence of schools on
both later life outcomes and social cohesion; however, as we have made clear, there are
also instrumental reasons for studying sorting in schools, relating to the operation of
education (quasi-)markets. For quasi-markets to work, parents must be able to measure
educational quality, and they must value it. As we have discussed, neither of these
conditions holds uniformly for all parents at all times.
Furthermore, in addition to valuing educational quality, parents must also enjoy a good
choice of attainable and comparable alternatives. This choice is compromised in highly
segregated markets, as school demographics dominate decision making. As articulated
by Rebecca Allen and Simon Burgess, “competitive markets work best where the social
mix at schools is reasonably similar”(Allen and Burgess, 2010, p10).
In Chapter 7 we showed that both sorting by ability and ethnicity attenuates the potential
for demand to flow from one school to another in response to a change in relative quality.
We argued that this potential flow of demand constitutes the competitive pressure that
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is supposed to drive improvements in school conduct and performance; therefore sorting
attenuates competition. We found that schools with large proportions of minority ethnic
students were most affected by reductions in competition due to ethnic segregation.
Likewise, schools with poor test scores experienced the largest effects of re-balancing test
scores on their potential flow of demand. The latter result is consistent with a scenario
in which schools with disadvantaged intakes have muted incentives to put effort into
improving academic performance, because it has a negligible effect on demand.
Schools with large minority ethnic populations also suffer from muted competition and
muted demand. However, in the case of some of these schools, notably the Muslim schools
in Preston and Blackburn, the muted competitive incentives for academic performance
do not seem to have hindered the schools from achieving very good results. In the case
of these schools at least, competitive pressure does not appear to be necessary to drive
academic success.
The model of sorting and competition based upon pairwise cross-derivatives of demand
was inspired by a structural model proposed by Bayer and McMillan (2010). However,
the model of Bayer and McMillan had two parts: a model relating aggregate demand to
competitive pressures faced by schools; and a model for schools’ conduct in the face of
competition. The latter model is a variant of the education production model discussed in
the previous section, with an additional term for a school’s response to local competition.
Bayer and McMillan estimated both parts of the model, and argued that schools do
respond to competitive pressures, but that the competitive pressures themselves were
not sufficiently strong.
This thesis has not modelled the school side of the market (educational production) so
the conclusions we can offer with regards to sorting and competition are incomplete. A
priority for further work is to model the education production function using value-added
models, and to combine these with discrete choice models to obtain a structural model
of both parental decision-making and school conduct. Without the latter we cannot
properly analyse the long-run influence of sorting upon competition, nor of competition
upon sorting.
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10.2 Two-sided structural models
A core motivation for the thesis has been the assertion that, in studying sorting and com-
petition in education systems, it is vital to understand family preferences and decision-
making with regards to school choice. Faced with a lack of data on choices, and an
abundance of data on allocations, we sought a way to reveal information about the pref-
erences underlying allocations. In order to achieve this, we investigated the branch of
game theory dealing with two-sided matchings, known as stable matching theory, and
the current state of the art regarding structural estimation of these models. We found
that current structural models were either too restrictive, requiring strong restrictions
on model form that could not be met in our context, or prohibitively computationally
demanding. This motivated a re-writing of the incomplete likelihood model for stability,
leading to an explicit functional form for the likelihood and more flexible options for
estimation.
Apart from the immediate benefit of being able to implement the model to answer our
research questions, the investigation led to informal insights about the properties of this
class of models, which it is hoped will aid the intuitive understanding of the field for
applied researchers. Using simulation evidence it was conjectured that two-sided models
possess good large-sample properties for bias and identification in one-to-many matching
markets (such as school markets). Such arguments, alongside the large sample sizes we
have been able to achieve by combining datasets, lead to confidence in the validity of
using two-sided models in the context of the thesis.
10.2.1 Assumptions impacting upon the validity of results
However, these arguments assume that the model is complete and perfectly specified.
In developing the model, Chapter 5 described a number of simplifying assumptions that
had to be made in the specification of both pupil and school utility functions. The most
important assumptions are discussed here.
The first assumption, which motivated the entire empirical approach, was that the ob-
served allocations constitute a stable matching. This assumption was justified on the
grounds that each local authority’s admissions system uses stable matching algorithms
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to compute the allocation. However, it is possible that a small number of pupils admit-
ted during the year – i.e. outside the normal admissions process – might create blocking
pairs, as a school might not usually prefer those pupils to other pupils the school has
rejected. There has been little work on the sensitivity of two-sided models to small devi-
ations from stability; this should be a priority for further work on empirical matchings.
It is also assumed that parents express their true preferences on the application form.
Although expressing one’s true preferences is a weakly optimal strategy for stable match-
ing markets, Chapter 8 discusses possible conditions under which this assumption might
fail.
Of the two sides of the market, the school side was most limited in terms of available
explanatory variables. We lacked information about siblings, religious observance, special
educational needs, looked after children, feeder schools, and catchment areas, all of which
have some bearing on probability of admission to a school. The sparsity of the school-side
model risks introducing omitted-variables bias into estimates of preference parameters
on the pupil side. Another direction for future research on empirical matching models
is the extent to which each side of the model is sensitive to omission of variables on the
other side of the model.
It is also not known how sensitive the model is to the capacity of each school. In the
absence of data on capacities we have assumed that each school’s capacity is equal to its
intake, implying that all schools are full. In future work it would be advisable to obtain
data about school capacities, and generalise the model to allow for schools with empty
places.
On the pupil side of the model the dataset was sufficiently detailed to allow us to investi-
gate rich interactions between pupil and school characteristics. However, there were two
restrictions in the pupil utility function that may have limited the ability of the model
to predict aggregate demand. First, there were no fixed effects for schools in the model.
Since these terms ensure that predicted aggregate demand is equal to observed aggregate
demand in the sample, their omission might be expected to affect estimates of aggregate
demand.
The other main restriction of pupil utility functions is the assumption that the unobserved
portion of utility as is uncorrelated across alternatives for each pupil. Whilst it is not
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uncommon for discrete choice studies to make this assumption, it is well-known that
assuming uncorrelated residuals limits the ability of the model to capture substitution
patterns in aggregate demand. However, it is not clear whether a model with correlated
residuals would even be identifiable in the context of a two-sided model. In Chapter 5 it
is argued that the abundance of terms interacting pupil and school characteristics creates
rich substitution patterns in aggregate demand, so that the omission of substitution-on-
unobservables is less serious a concern.
10.2.2 Other applications of two-sided matching models
The two-sided matching paradigm has wide applicability in social science and Economics,
and there are several possible areas in which two-sided empirical models may be useful.
Two-sided empirical models have already been used to study topics such as the matching
of teachers to schools (Boyd et al., 2013), or industrial organisation (Sørensen, 2007).
Although we have argued that the stability likelihood method works best in many-to-one
markets where there are a large number of individuals for each institution, it is possible
that further advances could be made in applications with one-to-one markets. This would
enable the model to be used in diverse applications such as job matching, University
admissions, the matching of directors to boards, or even the market for sportspeople in
team sports.
It is even possible that stable matching models could be applied to one-sided matching
markets. Analogous theories of stability and theoretical results exist for one-sided match-
ing markets, in which individuals match with others of the same type (the so-called Stable
Roommates Problem). If the empirical models we have investigated could be adapted,
this may potentially provide a new avenue for the study of social networks. Although
statistical models for the probability of forming an edge between two people already ex-
ist in social networks research, these models currently do not allow the participants in
the match to have separate utility functions for the match; therefore they are not struc-
tural. However, there would be much work to be done to ascertain the identification and
computational feasibility of such models.
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10.3 Further Work
Although the thesis has answered its own research questions, it has become clear that
there is ample scope to broaden the investigation of the role of parental decision mak-
ing in education markets. We have found evidence of ethnic peer preferences, and the
self-reinforcing sorting dynamics induced by these preferences. Likewise, we have con-
firmed the regularity studied by other authors, that preferences for academic perfor-
mance are strongly moderated by socio-economic status. We have also demonstrated
how preferences and sorting create the conditions, or fail to create the conditions, under
which flows of demand between schools incentivise competition. However, the model
for parental preferences was, of necessity, relatively simple, because of the computational
limitations of two-sided modelling. Although there are many ways in which the two-sided
structural modelling of school markets could be extended and developed, ultimately the
investigation into parental preferences would benefit from new sources of data that more
straightforwardly reveal parental preferences.
Such datasets exist in the US, in Sweden, and now also in England. The English De-
partment for Education (DfE) has begun to collect rankings of primary and secondary
schools submitted by parents as part of the admissions system, although it has not yet
clarified the terms of access. The availability of ranked preferences data, whether from
the US, from Sweden, or from England allows the modelling of parental preferences at a
much larger scale, and also the specification of much richer, more detailed models.
Apart from extending and developing models of parental choice, it is also imperative that
these models be augmented by combining them with models of school conduct in the
production of educational outputs. These value-added models would complete a circuit
by describing how schools react to competitive pressures, and how pupil intakes translate
into observable outputs, which then influence future cohorts’ decisions. This would allow
the investigation of questions such as: to what extent do schools improve performance
in response to competition? Do results improve for some pupils more than others in
response to competition? Do heterogenous preferences for academic performance induce
cumulative processes of sorting in schools? How do these sorting processes interact with
competition and school conduct?
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A final avenue for future research would be to investigate combining models of post-
residential school choice with models of residential choice, incorporating indirect school
choice considerations into the latter. In this thesis we have treated residential location as
fixed, whereas in fact residential location is endogenous with respect to the availability
of good schools. Combining these two choice processes might therefore be expected
to produce new insights into the interaction of residential and post-residential sorting.
Such a model might be implemented as follows: first, estimate a model of school choice
with fixed residential location; then, calculate the expected value of the choice set at
each residential location (discussed in Chapter 7); finally, estimate a model of residential
choice, incorporating the expected value of the choice set at each location as a decision
criterion.
10.4 Concluding Remarks
The focus upon three medium-sized towns in the North of England may seem small in
scope, but there is no doubt that the themes dealt with in this thesis are anything but
parochial. Neither do they appear to be transitory. Fifteen years after the Oldham riots,
and fifty years after the Coleman Report into segregation in America’s schools, social
cohesion continues to preoccupy researchers, policy-makers, and educators. Likewise,
the reform of England’s schooling system around market-like principles mirrors that of
other countries. That, too, continues a trend that has preoccupied researchers, policy-
makers and educators for at least the last thirty years.
The thesis has treated these two topics as natural bedfellows, and has attempted to show
that they are interconnected; sorting and segregation affect markets, and markets affect
sorting. Although few would argue that one of the key roles of schools is to socialise
children as citizens of a diverse yet cohesive society, this aspect of schooling receives
perhaps less sustained focus than it deserves. In contrast to academic achievement,
where national league tables and international comparative assessments such as PISA
and TIMSS put schools and governments under pressure to perform, it is very hard to
hold schools, local authorities and governments to account for failing to foster social
cohesion. So, as always, schools and governments focus on what is measured. It is hoped
that, by showing that sorting is a barrier to effective school choice and competition,
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this thesis has made a convincing argument for redirecting some of that focus towards
tackling sorting and segregation in schools.
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